Introduction

In this article I shall argue that Hegel’s book The Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as a theory of reception.Footnote 1 What this basically means is that Hegel, as he appears in this work, leaves room for reflection and allows the reader to give the book context and meaning. Thus, the reader is given an educational task. However, is not The Phenomenology of Spirit first and foremost a philosophical project rather than an educational project?

The answer is yes, but the book also has educational relevance. By extension, I shall argue that the book can be read as a Bildungsroman (see Laverty 2019, p. 574, and Arcilla 2020, pp. 95–101 for more modern definitions of the concept of Bildungsroman). This is supported by the late philosopher Richard Rorty: “[T]he Phenomenology of Spirit taught us to see not only the history of philosophy, but that of Europe, as portions of a Bildungsroman” (Rorty 1996, p. 91). Lars Løvlie, too, states that The Phenomenology of Spirit “[…] runs in several respects like the German Bildungsroman” (Løvlie 1995, p. 279). More specifically, The Phenomenology of Spirit is a story similar to Goethe’s Bildungsroman Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship (1795–96) in that the spirit (der Geist) from Hegel’s book has certain pronounced similarities with the protagonist Wilhelm Meister. Both the spirit and Wilhelm are quite immature in their early stages, but as they regularly encounter new challenges and conflicts that must be resolved, this gradually leads each to a greater self-awareness and knowledge. In this way, they each undergo their own process of Bildung. Admittedly, the spirit offers a case of the Bildung of European citizens, while Wilhelm portrays the Bildung of an individual. Nevertheless, The Phenomenology of Spirit has much in common with Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship, which has essentially two educational purposes.

First, we follow Wilhelm’s educative or renewal process as a human being. At first Wilhelm knows what he wants in life. His dream is to become an actor, and he blindly follows this path (Goethe 2003, p. 27–28). However, on his journey he meets different people who give him new ideas. He thus begins to realise that he has taken the wrong path in life: “Wilhelm was beginning to feel that things work out differently in the world from what he had imagined” (ibid., p. 105). Eventually Wilhelm abandons his original dreams and longings and sets off on a new path due to increased self-awareness and knowledge. Secondly, Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship works to educate the reader. The book addresses itself to the reader, both directly and indirectly. Wilhelm’s utterances, inner monologues, actions, and the like speak indirectly to the reader. Take for example the conversation about a work of painting depicting a prince, where Wilhelm is criticized by a member of the Tower Society because he sees himself and his own sympathies in the painting: “But if the painting had remained in your home, you would probably have developed more understanding for the works themselves, instead of always putting yourself and your feelings into them” (ibid., p. 38). Implicitly, Goethes Bildungsroman urges the reader to take a position on the different opinions of the painting during the conversation. Goethe thus creates an educative room where the reader may gain knowledge of different sorts. The reader is also explicitly accompanied by a narrator who addresses the reader directly. One example is where Wilhelm tells his girlfriend, Mariane, about his favourite stories. She has already fallen asleep and has not heard the last part of Wilhelm’s stories. The narrator then says that “it is to be hoped that in the future our hero will find more attentive listeners for his favorite stories” (Goethe 2003, p. 15). The narrator obviously criticises Mariane for being an inattentive listener, but his words also give a critical indication that Wilhelm may be too preoccupied with himself. As this is not explicitly stated, the readers must therefore make up their own mind about this. Yet again the reader has been challenged educationally.

The claim that the Bildungsroman has two purposes is supported by Fritz Martini (1991). According to Martini (1991) the term Bildungsroman was first used by Karl von Morgenstern in his lectures from 1819 and 1820. The key message from one of Morgenstern’s lectures was as follows: “It could well be called the Bildungsroman, first and foremost because of its content, because it presents the hero’s Bildung from its inception and continuation until a certain stage of completion; secondly, however, because precisely through this presentation it encourages the cultivation of the reader more fully than any other type of novel” (Martini 1991, p. 18). The quote underlines that the Bildungsroman has two purposes. First, it describes the protagonist’s process of Bildung. This is the main purpose of the Bildungsroman. Secondly, however, this genre, more than any other, encourages the reader to undergo a process of Bildung. One could argue that other works also encourage the education of the receivers even though they are not categorised as a Bildungsroman. However, the Bildungsroman do this more profoundly than other works because Bildung is the key topic. For example, when the reader is constantly confronted with examples of Wilhelm Meister’s Bildung, not least that he learns from his mistakes, the path to the reader’s own Bildung is short. In other words, the Bildungsroman is written in such a way that it might inspire the reader to consider the narrative arc of their own life.

Like Goethe’s Bildungsroman, The Phenomenology of Spirit has a twofold educational task. On the one hand, the latter is a philosophical book that also deals with Bildung, as it illustrates the spirit’s education process, or the maturation process of the European people. Admittedly, there are different readings related to this (which I will return to), but in general, The Phenomenology of Spirit speaks of “the universal individual” or the collective, and how “it acquires its concrete form and its own configuration” (Hegel 2018, p. 14). The Bildung of the spirit consists in it becoming more mature and concrete in its form, leading up to more awareness and insight. Hegel’s book therefore fulfils one of the aspects of Bildung with respect to Goethe’s Bildungsroman, as it provides concrete descriptions of Bildung processes of its ‘protagonist’; namely, the spirit. On the other hand, The Phenomenology of Spirit also seeks to educate the reader to a historical understanding: “In this respect education, considered from the side of the individual, consists in his acquiring what is thus present before him, absorbing into himself his inorganic nature, and taking possession of it for himself” (Hegel 2018, p. 15). This can be interpreted from the perspective of the readers who should be made aware of their inorganic nature, meaning their unknown historical past. Thus, Hegel’s book also fulfils the second aspect of Goethe’s Bildungsroman, because it seeks to educate the reader.

The main argument of the article is precisely the latter objective, set by both Wilhelm Meister’s Apprenticeship and The Phenomenology of Spirit. In other words, I shall argue that The Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as a Bildungsroman or a theory of reception. There are three sections to this argument. The first section—Technique—discusses the question of whether The Phenomenology of Spirit invites a passive or active reception of its content. The second section—Haptics—discusses the reception as a form of “touch”. This implies that there are two parties “touching” one another. The phenomena in Hegel’s book are currently unknown, and they challenge or “touch” the reader, who is forced to return “the touch” or accept this challenge. The reader can thus learn something immediate; however, Hegel’s book requires more work in light of Bildung. That leads us to the third and final section—Recollection, which involves reception as a process of recollection and transformation. Through the reception of touch and recollection the reader can ultimately gain self-awareness and knowledge of the phenomena in Hegel’s book, i.e., Bildung.

But how is this kind of Bildung process possible in the first place? Here we must have an understanding of the concept of the absolute (das Absolute). What is the absolute? The term itself easily leads to misunderstandings, and it does not get any easier by the fact that Hegel himself is rather unclear when it comes to what the absolute means. I will therefore rely on Frederick Beiser (2005), where he points out that Hegel was close to Schelling's definition of the absolute: “According to Schelling, the absolute is ‘that which is in itself and through itself’, or ‘that whose existence is not determined through some other thing’” (Beiser 2005, p. 59).

It is about knowing something in itself, without having to draw in relationships with other things. Reason must grasp each thing as if nothing else existed outside this thing. Beiser elaborates:

This means that reason should strip away from the thing its properties or distinctive form, the determinations by which it differs from all other things, since these properties or determinations constitute its relations to other things. Once we remove all the distinguishing properties of the thing we see the entire universe within it, for all things are the same without distinguishing properties (Beiser 2005, p. 61).

An important educational task is thus to grasp the thing itself by abstracting from its distinguishing properties. Bildung in The Phenomenology of Spirit begins with the following question: What is the absolute; or, the thing itself, apart from its relations to other things?

To relate this even more specifically to The Phenomenology of Spirit, we should listen to Hegel himself. Towards the end of the book, he says the following: “The goal, absolute knowledge (das absolute Wissen), or spirit that knows itself as spirit, has for its path the recollection of the spirits as they are within themselves” (Hegel 2018, p. 321; Hegel 1995, p. 591). Let me break down the sentence to clarify what it means and what it does not mean. (1) The aim of the process of Bildung is absolute knowledge. (2) Absolute knowledge equals spirit that knows itself as spirit. (3) Bildung’s path is the recollection of spirits as they are within themselves. First, how may we understand this negatively, or what does it not mean? It is not a matter of modern history, where the historian accurately and critically assesses and verifies historical sources. Absolute knowledge does therefore not correspond to causal explanations or empirical historical knowledge. Secondly, what does Hegel’s sentence mean positively? Absolute knowledge comes into being through consciousness’ recollection of its own past. This is how the history of the West is reconstructed by placing it in the context of what is essential, typical and distinctive for an era. The past is thus actualized as meaningful history. This is already done by Hegel of The Phenomenology of Spirit. Therein he portrays absolute spirits or the zeitgeist of different eras, as essential, characteristic and exemplary expressions. It is now the reader’s educational task to reach absolute knowledge by giving coherence and meaning to Hegel’s spirits or images.

I attempt to strengthen my argument by way of close reading The Phenomenology of Spirit. I therefore use a lot of quotes from this book to substantiate my claims. Some claims are also backed up with second-hand literature. To accommodate English-speaking readers, I quote from Michael Inwood’s 2018 translation of The Phenomenology of Spirit. However, where the translation is not satisfactory, I also insert what Hegel wrote in German. This is necessary as several German concepts used by Hegel are untranslatable into English. This applies to the concept of Bildung as well. There is no word in English that covers the full depth of the German concept of Bildung. However, for the sake of simplicity, I sometimes make use of the Anglo-American concept of education when I refer to Bildung and its definition given above.

Technique

The preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit states that “[…] mathematics […] has the unconceptual relationship of magnitude as its principle, and dead space and the equally dead unit as its material. This method may also, in a freer style […] remain in ordinary life, in a conversation or historical instruction for the sake of curiosity more than cognition, more or less like a preface too” (Hegel 2018, pp. 22–23). With the aid of this quote, I would argue that a text such as “the dead space” is static and immutable, and will lead to a technical form of reception such that the text requires a pre-postulation by the reader. The reader must indiscriminately obey the commands of the text. We are given a passive reception as the reader is urged to blindly imitate the text as an ideal. In other words, I would claim that such a static text aims to guide the reader towards a specific interpretation. We are given a reception as an initiation, where the reader is meant to take in the specific meaning of the text. It is as though the teacher has thought it all through for the student, who merely does what the teacher says. The student becomes a marionette who is controlled by the teacher.

It is clear that The Phenomenology of Spirit does not want the recipient to be passive. Rather, the book makes space for an interaction between Hegel and his readers. This is made clear when Hegel speaks of “the effort to grasp it and to make it his own” (Hegel 2018, p. 17). This means that The Phenomenology of Spirit contains an hitherto unknown past, and in order to grasp it, the reader must make an effort and become actively involved in the book. Hegel’s book thus offers resistance by archiving this hitherto unfamiliar story, which the reader must incorporate and recreate.

That being said, The Phenomenology of Spirit does contain certain guidelines of an educational nature, which means that it attempts to lead the reader to an unequivocal interpretation. The education is therefore technically grounded. This claim casts significant doubt on whether Hegel really does invite an interaction with his readers. Charles Taylor, for instance, states the following in his book Hegel:

The PhG, written at the end of the Jena period (1806–7), can be thought of as a kind of introduction to Hegel’s system, whose function would be to take the reader from where he is, buried in the prejudices of ordinary consciousness, to the threshold of true science (Taylor 1998, p. 127).

Taylor’s point in this context is that the the reader of The Phenomenology of Spirit should be educated on Hegel’s terms. In other words, Hegel has envisaged an educational reading of a general and universal nature. The intent is to educate the readers and encourage them to acquire the system of The Phenomenology of Spirit, meaning that which is considered to be the true science.

Michael N. Forster of Idea of a Phenomenology of Spirit elaborates on this technical perspective. He argues that the absolute spirit is aware of what it is: “Absolute Spirit is essentially both what it is and aware of what it is” (Forster 1998, p. 193). In other words, the spirit is a phenomenon that knows from the very beginning what it is. Thereafter, Forster says that The Phenomenology of Spirit facilitates an educational reading that will lead the yet ignorant reader to Hegelian science. Furthermore, this process is identical to the spirit’s culmination of self-realisation: “[…] ‘leading the individual from his uneducated standpoint to knowledge [i.e., to Hegelian Science]’ is in Hegel’s eyes identical with the culmination of the Absolute’s essential accomplishment of self-knowledge” (ibid.). Briefly put, the educational project entails guiding the modern European citizen towards the Hegelian system or his ideal philosophy.

If it is true that The Phenomenology of Spirit charts the route or tries to guide the reader in the correct direction, the text then rejects the active involvement of the opposing party, i.e., the reader. This would have fateful consequences. First, the text can be closed once and for all, after the reader has grasped the Hegelian system. In this sense, the text is a thing of the past. It is not a text for the future, meaning an educational text that has yet to provide new ideas. Secondly, the readers become passive, as they are to accept Hegel’s ways. The readers thus have no say in the process of Bildung. Rather, it is Hegel who stands forth as an instructor who points out the right direction for his readers. This is, however, a highly simplistic and one-dimensional way to view Bildung. The reason being that the reader must simply submit to the commands and dominations of the text, which presupposes a pre-programmed reader.

However, Bildung requires contradictions. The reader must have a text that offers active resistance. Only through interaction, can the reader and text achieve change. The question is whether The Phenomenology of Spirit really is such a text. I have partly cast doubt on this; however, it can be be argued that the text offers resistance if we take a closer look at the German concept of “Gegenstand”, which is used in Hegel’s book (Hegel 1995, p. 154). Gegenstand is translated as “the object” by Inwood (Hegel 2018, p. 81), but that English concept does not capture the meaning of the German concept; in fact, far from it. Gegenstand opposes the technical aspect, as it offers resistance (cf. Løvlie 1999, p. 52). Gegenstand is absolute, and it offers resistance to the reader’s concepts because it contains an unknown past, while also possessing a form of intellectualism and reason that is highly unpredictable. This means that the book produces sudden and surprising changes in perspective. As the reader’s concepts and Gegenstand are set in a constant movement and chance, concept and Gegenstand can eventually correspond each other in the consciousness. This can be seen as a process of Bildung in which concept (i.e. the reader) and Gegenstand (i.e. the absolute) are reconciled in the sense that concept describes the Gegenstand as it is and the Gegenstand expresses itself in the concept.

The static text’s demand for calm, immutability and the need to remain untouched is foreign to a text such as The Phenomenology of Spirit, which unfolds in a spontaneous and erratic motion. It is anything but indifferent to the reader’s activity. We can extract this from the famous master–slave example, which specifies that the latter achieves self-knowledge through the work. But let me first recontextualise the relationship between master and slave to a relationship between reader and text. As such, it can be said that the reader is “the working consciousness” (“das arbeitende Bewußtsein”) who “arrives at the intuition of independent Being as of its own self” (Hegel 2018, p. 81; Hegel 1995, p. 154). The reader as the working consciousness arrives at an understanding through the work or the cultivating (“in dem Bilden”) (Hegel 1995, p. 154). The Phenomenology of the Spirit supports this when it says that “work cultivates (“sie bildet”). The negative relation to the object (“den Gegenstand”) becomes its form and something permanent, because it is precisely for the worker that the object (“der Gegenstand”) has independence” (Hegel 2018, p. 81; Hegel 1995, p. 153–154). In my interpretation, the reader as the working consciousness gains awareness, insight and independence by working with and cultivating (“in dem Bilden”) Gegenstand as Absolute. The reader should not be totally dependent on Hegel’s book; rather, reader and text are both dependent on each other.

This argument is supported by the description of spirit as an “I that is We, and We that is I” (Hegel 2018, p. 76). The spirit is the relationship between the individual (I) and the collective (We). The spirit is not an autonomous actor. It is neither solely the individual nor the collective. Instead, the spirit is both equality and inequality with itself. This means that the one party cannot achieve self-awareness without the other. It is a relationship based on dependency, or rather a dialectic relationship between the identical and the different. The readers, in turn, must identify with and reinterpret the text, and in this way arrive at awareness and knowledge. This implies that the reception should be active rather than passive.

I do admit that there are one-dimensional tendencies in The Phenomenology of Spirit. As I have stated, The Phenomenology of Spirit contains specific guidelines, but not those claimed by Michael Inwood in his book Hegel. Here he states: “There are not two Hegels as there are two Wittgensteins and, perhaps, several Schellings” (Inwood 1983, p. 4). According to Inwood of the referred book, Hegel is only the master of the system: “Above all he [Hegel] provides system: an attempt to assign everything its place in a single coherent whole” (ibid., p. 522). While it is true that The Phenomenology of Spirit at times gives the impression of a systematic, educational-philosophical project, it is more likely that this immobility and system is at odds with the dynamics and vibrancy of the text. This means that the one-dimensional and linear account of Bildung is never fulfilled. Let me examine this further through a new perspective.

Haptics

The following argument will revolve around the subject of touch, and I will develop what I refer to as haptic reception. Prior to this, we must be clear about what is and is not possible with respect to The Phenomenology of Spirit itself. It is not possible to speak of a physical or bodily form of touch. Nor can we speak of emotional aspects. Emotions are certainly involved when a reader is touched by a text. However, in light of Hegel’s text, emotions are only involved in the sense that the reader is emotionally engaged. What is then possible to say about touch in light of The Phenomenology of Spirit? Is it possible to say anything at all? It is, in any case, quite obvious that touch is not a central issue in the book. However, by studying the verbiage in Hegel’s text in its original German, we see that the notion touch (Berührung) occurs in several places. In addition, we find a number of notions that are related to the haptic. Again, we cannot rely on the English translation but have to use Hegel’s own German notions. For example, the following notions recur in various inflectional forms in the German text: At hand (vorhanden), concept (Begriff) and grasp (greifen). Still, we must concede that touch is not especially prominent in the book, but the use of such haptic concepts enables us to discuss this theme, primarily in relation to experience. Touch in light of The Phenomenology of Spirit is an experiential concept (which I will elaborate below).

Introducing haptics in this manner is an unconventional perspective. The Phenomenology of Spirit is traditionally considered to be innovative in relation to Kant’s epistemological distinction between subject and object. Hegel’s text introduced a dialectical relationship between subject and object. I acknowledge this, while at the same time I would add that this process is haptic, as part of a Bildung and experience-based process. If the readers are to understand the text, this would require a form of haptic experience, which entails that the text “touches”. This “touch” implies that the unknown phenomena of the text come at the readers. In this way, the readers are challenged and confronted and have their views and beliefs shaken. The readers may even become doubtful of their conceptual world. This forces the readers to “re-touch” the text, meaning that they must accept the challenge, so that we have what I refer to as a haptic boundary zone between the readers and the text. Knowledge, which is never known in advance, appears in the boundary zone where the parties “touch” one another. This is a part of the haptic reception, which begins by anticipating the knowledge.

Anticipating knowledge may be a haptic matter, as knowledge is virtually “grasped” beforehand, just as we form an idea of how an orange will taste before we peel and eat it. This involves sensing something in advance. Thoughts on this subject appear implicitly in The Phenomenology of Spirit. Take this quote for example: “However, the very fact that consciousness knows of an object at all already involves this distinction: to consciousness something is the in-itself” (Hegel 2018, p. 40). As this translation has left out the keyword “vorhanden” we should therefore also view Hegel’s own words here, which will help to grasp my point: “Allein gerade darin, daß es überhaupt von einem Gegenstande weiß, ist schon der Unterschied vorhanden, daß ihm etwas das Ansich” (Hegel 1995, p. 78). There are two things we should take note of here, both relating to consciousness. On the one hand, we have the existing knowledge (das vorhandene Wissen) (Hegel 1995, p. 78), meaning knowledge that is grasped. On the other hand, we have the actual knowledge, which is not yet grasped or understood. In this sense, we are given the difference between what is grasped and what is not yet grasped. Thus, knowledge is incomplete. There is something deficient about it—parts of the knowledge are not yet grasped. We therefore try to anticipate the unknown knowledge, or grasp it beforehand.

This idea is emphasised by Gadamer in his book Wahrheit und Methode (Truth and Method). Here, too, we need the original German version of Gadamer’s work to see the relation to the haptic. At one point Gadamer discusses “den ‘Vorgriff der Vollkommenheit’ (“the anticipation of perfection”; my interpretation) (Gadamer 1965, p. 277–278). The expression strongly implies that the reading can reach perfection. In my opinion, it is objectionable that Gadamer connects  reading to perfection. However, if we disregard this, the notion “Vorgriff” suggests that it is a matter of “grasping” or “touching” in advance that which is not yet known. It also involves the premonition of “grasping” the unknown, i.e., expecting to arrive at new understanding and insight. However, the reader who anticipates must not be equated with the one who is grasping for something else, or as Hegel puts it: “greift solches Wissen immer nach einem Anderen” (Hegel 1995, p. 13). Here is the full sentence in Inwood’s English translation, which will help clarifying my argument:

For instead of dealing with the Thing, this sort of of procedure is always away beyond it; instead of lingering in the Thing and forgetting itself in it, this sort of knowledge is always hankering for something else; it remains preoccupied with itself rather than absorbed in the Thing and surrendering to it (Hegel 2018, p. 6).

As for reading, we are warned here against “hankering” or “grabbing” something that is not in the text. Let us return to what I said earlier about the absolute: It is about knowing something in itself, without having to draw in relationships with other things. If the reader fails at this, the reading goes beyond the text. The reader will only bring something foreign into the text, instead of letting the foreign come forth through an interaction with the text. This “grabbing” for something else will lead to nothing but an objectifying colonisation of the text. Thus, the text will remain incomprehensible, while the reader becomes stagnant, unchanging, and unable to move towards new directions of awareness and knowledge. The educational task to grasp the thing itself by abstracting from its distinguishing properties will fail.

In contrast, the reader must gain experience in order to examine and assess that which is “touched” beforehand. This is described in The Phenomenology of Spirit as “the method of carrying out” (“die Methode der Ausführung”) (Hegel 2018, p. 39; Hegel 1995, p. 75). All of this brings us to the understanding that anticipation is not about defining knowledge in advance. If we believe that we can grasp or touch everything in advance, we will have to deal with an abstract form of knowledge, or knowledge that has not been processed and worked through. Nevertheless, there is nothing wrong with “anticipating” the future through goals or visions. It is just that knowledge grasped before experience must be assessed up against knowledge grasped after experience to ensure that we are flexible and open to change. This is apparent in the following quote:

Since consciousness thus finds in its object that its knowledge is at odds with the object, the object itself does not hold out either; or the standard of the assessment alters when that of which it was supposed to be the standard fails the test; and the assessment is not only an assessment of the knowledge, but also of the standard of the assessment (Hegel 2018, p. 40).

The quote supports that the anticipated understanding must be assessed against lived experiences, so that it can be adjusted. Thus, knowledge emerges through the dialectics between anticipation and experience. Anticipatory understanding, which is grasped beforehand, is in itself only a concept, which means that it lacks concrete content. Furthermore, this means that the anticipated knowledge must be realised.

In order to realise the anticipated knowledge, the reader must surrender to the text. If not, the text will remain incomprehensible. This is apparent in a quote from the preface: “Accordingly, the movement of knowing proceeds on the surface, does not touch the Thing itself, not the essence or the concept, and is therefore no conceptual comprehension” (Hegel 2018, p. 21). Here the notion of touch is used at one point, but Hegel himself includes three haptic related concepts in his original writing (italicized by me): “Die Bewegung des Wissens geht darum auf der Oberfläche vor, berührt nicht die Sache selbst, nicht das Wesen oder den Begriff und ist deswegen kein Begreifen (Hegel 1995, p. 44). As there is no touching (Berührung) between the two experiences, the reader and the text, the concept (den Begriff) is therefore not grasped (kein Begreifen). The two experiences become “like oil and water, which cannot be mixed and are only externally combined” (Hegel 2018, p. 19). In my context this would mean that the recipient and the text are not in contact with one another. What then is necessary to become inwardly connected to the text? The readers must first and foremost restrain themselves: “Renunciation of personal intrusion into the immanent rhythm of concepts (der Begriffe), avoidance of intervention in the rhythm with wilfulness and wisdom garnered elsewhere, this abstention is itself an essential moment of attention to the concept” (den Begriff) (Hegel 2018, p. 27). Again, Hegel’s own words are more haptic related than Inwood’s English translation. Instead of talking of “intervention”, Hegel talks of “eingreifen”, thus warning against grasping something into the text (Hegel 1995, p. 56). Without this restraint, the reader will touch the text too soon, and remain on the outside, being untouched, while relating to something other than that which Hegel has written about. The absolute or the thing itself will be out of hand. It is rather a matter of being “present”, so that one surrenders to the other, and vice versa. This means that the text “touches” and “calls on” the reader who “re-touches” the text. In other words, the text speaks to an interpreter, who must answer and accept the calling, whereupon we may reach an “I that is We, and We that is I.”

The relationship itself is complicated as the reader must contend with the text’s dialectics between the known and the unknown. On the one hand, The Phenomenology of Spirit provides a known picture of the story. On the other hand, the book gives a semblance of the unknown story. Thus, we are given a veneer that is determined by a dialectic interaction between the known and the unknown. Furthermore, a contradiction and division arise between the two—the reader and the text. We are given a contradictory relationship between equality and inequality, identity and difference. This is precisely why the reader must strive for a reconciliation, which entails an understanding of that which is different and unknown, which is comprehensibly close, but at the same time incomprehensibly distant. When this turmoil and uncertainty settles, the aspects that once were characterised by cognitive dissonance become cognitive consonance. However, this sense of cognitive consonance is not permanent. This is because Hegel of The Phenomenology of Spirit continues to “call on” the readers. The book can be read again and again, while the readers continue to feel uncertain about their views and opinions.

To summarise: Haptic reception in this context is about the text “calling” and “touching” the reader, who must answer and “re-touch”. This process is encompassed by the absolute which reveals contradictions between the reader and the text. In that sense, the absolute is the energy source and opening for the process of Bildung, which brings forth “a new world and a new shape of spirit” (Hegel 2018, p. 320). With this new world, both sides of the experience—reader and text—are transformed. It is not about the individual’s total capitulation, where one individual fully surrenders to another. Rather, the reader of The Phenomenology of Spirit must indulge another, but only to place the wealth of sensory impressions and sensations into context. The haptic reception ends in a form of conceptualisation, where the reader makes the concept meaningful. This leads us to the third and final argument of reading The Phenomenology of Spirit as a Bildungsroman or a theory of reception.

Recollection

The haptic reception is a poetic, creative activity, as the readers renews themselves by transforming the text. Through the reader’s action, the text is given a new form, while the reader, in turn, gains self-awareness and knowledge through this transformation. To rephrase, the readers achieve self-realisation through their interaction with the text, and, specifically, by giving the text context and meaning. Overall, the haptic reception is characterised by immediate learning. Reception as recollection, on the other hand, happens afterwards, in which the experiences are thoroughly thought through in order to gain a better understanding of the images presented by Hegel (cf. Brandom 2019).

This is a part of the process of Bildung, the purpose of which asserts that the unknown spirit or history must be “conceptually comprehended” (Hegel 2018, p. 321). However, the reader cannot simply achieve this purpose, as it is emphatically stated that the individual must “undertake the prodigious labour of world-history” (Hegel 2018, p. 15). The reader is faced with extremely demanding work—work that another has initiated. This other is Hegel. In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel presents “a gallery of images” (Hegel 2018, p. 320). This means that the book archives “a slow movement and succession of spirits” (Hegel 2018, p. 320), and it is the reader’s task to process and reconstruct these recollections. To rephrase, the reader must work with what is already recalled by Hegel. In order to “grasp” the recalled past in the book, the reader must undergo the pain and effort of this Bildung process (den Schmerz seiner Bildung und […] die Anstrengung seiner Arbeit) (Hegel 2018, p. 280; Hegel 1995, p. 518). Only then will the history be conceptually comprehended, and at the same time, reconstructed. Through reflection and contemplation, a new figure of the spirit is formed. At that moment, the spirit’s figure is absolute, appropriated and “inwardised” (cf. Brandom 2019).

By separating experience and recollection, we can more clearly see the educational objectives of The Phenomenology of Spirit. For example, Lars Løvlie states that experience in the The Phenomenology of Spirit is an immediate learning process, where the individual is under the control of experience or coerced by action (Løvlie 1999, p. 51). The haptic reception, discussed in the previous section, is one example of an experience. When two experiential sides “touch” each other, this often leads to immediate learning there and then.

Recollection, on the other hand, is reflective relationships to experiences already made by oneself or others (cf. Løvlie 1999, p. 51). This recollection relates to historical knowledge as objectives for interpretations and re-descriptions. Recollection involves going back in time to undertake a challenging and hard work. Recollection is not the same as appropriating the past as a memory. No, recollection preserves and “inwardises” the experience. This important viewpoint emerges more clearly when we look closely at Hegel’s German writing. Let us start with the English translation: “But re-collection has preserved them and is the interior” (Hegel 2018, p. 321). And here is Hegel’s own words: “Aber die Er-Innerung hat sie aufbewahrt und ist das Innere” (Hegel 1995, p. 591). The English notion “recollection” does not capture the meaning of the German notion “Erinnerung”. The part “inner” of Erinnerung tells us that it has to do with something inner, whereas the part “ung” tells us that it is a process. Hegel has even inserted a hyphen in the notion of Er-Innerung, which is also italicized, probably to emphasize that the figure of spirit is to be inwardised. “Inwardising” indicates that the experience has been processed, revised and expanded. The Phenomenology of Spirit underlines this by stating that the previous spirit or history is “now reborn of knowledge” (Hegel 2018, p. 320). This means that the new spirit retains and perpetuates the old. Through afterthought and reflection, new perspectives have emerged that provide new meaning and understanding. Based on this, the threads can now be linked back to the beginning of the article, where I stated that The Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as a Bildungsroman.

The reader of The Phenomenology of Spirit must reflect on the experiences that have been preserved or “inwardised” in this Bildungsroman. The educational task is to lend meaning to what is recalled by Hegel. The reader must try to “comprehend” the historical figures or this “gallery of images” which is preserved in The Phenomenology of Spirit. In this sense, both the teacher—Hegel—and the student—the reader—are interdependent. If this book is to be realised, the reader must conceptualise the previously recalled spirits. Thus, the reader must give the story presented in The Phenomenology of Spirit a new future by way of a conscious reflection which transcends this storytelling. It is about reaching absolute knowledge by way of penetrating and digesting “all the riches of spirit” (Hegel 2018, p. 320). But even if the knowledge is absolute, the journey of Bildung has not reached a terminus. One can read Hegel’s Bildungsroman again and again, and each time one reads it, something new will emerge. The Phenomenology of Spirit is a book of the past but not a book for the past; rather, it lies before us, waiting to be read again, waiting for readers to take on new educational adventures.

Last but not least, The Phenomenology of Spirit has many educational implications that the modern school system can benefit from. One of the most important lessons from Hegel’s book is to let children, pupils and students have a say in what they learn. As humans, we are born into a world shaped by others. We all have to relate to what others have said and thought. Hegel’s Bildunsroman or his theory of reception implicitly urges us to respond to what others have said and thought, rather than taking these for granted. However, it does require hard work. It is not about throwing out immediate opinions about things without thoroughly reflecting upon them. If the school system makes room for this kind of Bildung, we will have more reflective citizens who respect what has been said and thought, but not without critical assessment, so that they are not simply governed and controlled by others. In this way, the school will foster a spirit which is composed of, on the one hand, children, pupils and students and, on the other hand, what others have said and thought.