Abstract
This paper argues that an educated being logically does not have to be a human. Philosophers analyzing the concept of education have reached a consensual notion of the matter; but in applying that idea, they have barely discussed whether or not human beings are the only entities that may be educated. Using their notion as the core of a heuristic conception of education, this paper attempts to show that in some contexts it might make sense to predicate education of certain non-human entities. In addition, the paper examines the place of beliefs, reflective intelligence, practical thinking, and feelings in education. It concludes by discussing its implications for educational theory and practice and for the connections between the educated being and personhood and the right to education.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Another presentation of the first position may be found in Peters (1973a, pp. 11–29).
Vid. J. R. Martin (1981). In this paper, Martin allowed that Peters’s notion of the ideal of the educated human being probably was integral in everyday-English discourse (p. 97). But she ultimately was concerned with constructing a morally preferable educational ideal—the educated person, which incorporates the masculine (productive) and feminine (reproductive) characteristics of human nature. The link between education and personhood will be discussed below.
Spencer (1963) first published his collection, Essays on Education and Kindred Subjects, in 1861. In that volume he argued that the traditional education of upper-class males in the classics and upper-class females in aesthetic matters was explainable only by the social distinction brought by knowledge of such largely “useless” subjects.
According to some sociobiologists, certain varieties of hyenas have complex social organization and social intelligence (The New York Times March 4, 2008: D1, D4). Their technology is rather rudimentary, however, most notably being the use of their claws to dig burrows for securing the safety of their offspring.
It has been reported (Financial Times March 4, 2008: 9) that a generation of semantics-capable computers is on the horizon of Artificial Intelligence engineers. Those machines will have interactive capabilities that might enable them to be travel agents or employment advisors.
Vid. R. M. Henig, “The Real Transformers,” The New York Times Magazine July 29, 2007: 28–35, 50, 55.
Some members of the television audience that watched Big Blue II play chess with Gari Kasparov rooted for the computer, thereby approaching it as something more than a piece of property owned by IBM. And although they recognized that the Corporation had the legal right to do with the machine as it saw fit, they questioned that IBM should have disposed of the appliance as it did. Nevertheless, if one holds that Big Blue II was a person in at least the metaphysical sense, one might suggest that the computer was a special piece of property—more like a champion thoroughbred than a sheet of copier paper—and deserved better respect than it got. After all, there are decent ways to put winning computers out to pasture. If one holds in addition that Big Blue II was a person in the moral sense, one might consider that it was a disturbingly special kind of property, namely, a slave gladiator. Aristotle famously held that slavery was justifiable only for people capable of acting according to, but not from, reason. Because super computers can act from reason, they cannot, according to Aristotle, be justifiably enslaved. So, who will abolish the enslavement of electronic persons? Will an electronic Spartacus rise to the occasion? In California, there is a group known as the Animal Liberation Front; but where is the Computer Liberation Front? Do the owners of super computers refuse to regard them as moral persons because the owners regard slavery as immoral?
This equality does not necessarily hold in specific situations. Because some voluntary agents may be superior to others in performing certain actions, the superior agents, all other things beings equal, have a greater right than the others have to perform those actions. Hence, physicians have a greater right to treat the ill than do agents who are not physicians (Gewirth 1978, pp. 121–134).
References
Audi, R. (Ed.). (1995). The Cambridge dictionary of philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Coleman, J. S. (1982). The asymmetric society. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
Darwin, C. (1896). The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. New York: D. Appleton and Company.
Dennett, D. C. (1978). Brainstorms: Philosophical essays on mind and psychology. Montgomery, Vt: Bradford Books, Publishers.
Dewey, J. (1916). Democracy and education. New York: The Macmillan Company.
Dewey, J. (1934). Art as experience. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.
Dewey, J. (1938a). Experience and education. New York: The Macmillan Company.
Dewey, J. (1938b). Inquiry, the theory of logic. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
Dray, W. H. (1973). Commentary. In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The philosophy of education (pp. 34–39). New York: Oxford University Press.
Edel, A. (1973). Analytic philosophy at the crossroads. In J. F. Doyle (Ed.), Educational judgments: Papers in the philosophy of education (pp. 232–258). Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.
Feinberg, J. (1982). Rights, justice, and the bounds of liberty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Frankena, W. K. (1973). The concept of education today. In J. F. Doyle (Ed.), Educational judgments: Papers in the philosophy of education (pp. 19–32). Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.
Gewirth, A. (1978). Reason and morality. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Green, T. F. (1971). The activities of teaching. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Griffin, D. R. (2001). Animal minds: Beyond cognition to consciousness. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Hare, R. M. (1964). The language of morals. New York: Oxford University Press.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1900). The philosophy of history (trans: Sibree, J.). New York: P. F. Collier & Son.
Heslep, R. D. (1989). Education in democracy: The moral role of education in the democratic state. Ames, IA: Iowa State University Press.
Heslep, R. D. (2006). Ten basic questions about education: How the concept of education shapes the practice of education. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.
Hirst, P. H., & Peters, R. S. (1970). The logic of education. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Hutchins, R. M. (1953). The conflict in education. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.
Kenny, A. (1966). Action, emotion and will. New York: Humanities Press.
Lumsden, C. J., & Wilson, E. O. (1981). Genes, mind, and culture: The coevolutionary process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Martin, J. R. (1981). The ideal of the educated person. Educational Theory, 31(2), 97–109.
McClellan, J. E. (1976). Philosophy of education. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Olafson, F. A. (1973). Rights and duties in education. In J. F. Doyle (Ed.), Educational judgments: Papers in the philosophy of education (pp. 173–195). Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1999). Cognitive and communicative abilities of grey parrots. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Peters, R. S. (1967). Ethics and education. Atlanta, GA: Scott, Foresman Company.
Peters, R. S. (1973a). Aims of education – A conceptual inquiry. In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The philosophy of education (pp. 11–34). New York: Oxford University Press.
Peters, R. S. (1973b). Reply. In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The philosophy of education. New York: Oxford University Press.
Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc.
Scheffler, I. (1965). Conditions of knowledge: An introduction to epistemology and education. Atlanta, GA: Scott Foresman Inc.
Siegel, H. (1990). Educating reason: Rationality, critical thinking and education. New York: Routledge, Inc..
Singer, P. (Ed.). (2006). In defense of animals: The second wave. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
Snook, I. A. (1972). Indoctrination and education. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd.
Spencer, H. (1963). Essays on education and kindred subjects. New York: Dutton.
Strawson, P. F. (1963). Individuals: An essay in descriptive metaphysics. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, Inc.
Strawson, P. F. (1967). Introduction to logical theory. London: Methuen & Company, Ltd.
Strawson, P. F. (1997). Entity and identity and other essays. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc.
Thorndike, E. L. (1913). Educational psychology (Vols. 2). New York: Teachers College, Columbia University.
Watson, J. D. (2003). DNA: The secret of life. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
Woods, J. (1973). Commentary. In R. S. Peters (Ed.), The philosophy of education (pp. 29–34). New York: Oxford University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Heslep, R.D. Must an Educated Being Be a Human Being?. Stud Philos Educ 28, 329–349 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-009-9131-9
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-009-9131-9