Abstract
By way of countering Tolstoj’s reputation as an alogical and inept philosophical thinker, this paper explores the tension between maximalism and reasonableness in his defense of the ethics of nonviolence. Tolstoj’s writings of the last decade of his life show that he was perfectly capable of making appropriate conceptual distinctions, recognizing legitimate objections to his position, and responding rationally to them; in so doing, he made valuable points about the unpredictability of human actions, the futility of using violence to combat violence, the equal worth of all humans lives, and the immorality of revenge. Yet his conception of the moral ideal, together with his missionary zeal, led him to exaggerate the absoluteness of his moral message, causing him to predict the unpredictable and demand the impossible of human beings.
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Notes
The references throughout are to L. N. Tolstoj, Polnoe sobranie sočinenie (90 vols. Moscow, 1928–1958). All translations from this work, referred to hereafter as PSS, are mine.
Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii, bk. 1 (1890), 105; bk. 23 (1894), 457, 469. In the election to “Distinguished Member,” five votes (out of thirty) were cast against Tolstoj, but this was fewer than were cast against the other three candidates: the eminent German philosopher Eduard von Hartmann received six negative votes, A. Ia. Koževnikov received seven, and N. N. Strakhov received nine.
For an examination of ethical issues connected with a utilitarian approach to experimental actions, see Scanlan 1965
Tolstoj’s position here on the Christian law of love (“Love thy neighbor as thyself”)—namely, that it is an absolute moral standard but one that can never be observed perfectly by human beings—is remarkably similar to the position of his countryman and fellow novelist Fyodor Dostoevskij; see Scanlan 2002, 82–83.
References
Kamenka, E. (1967). Tolstoj, Count Leo Nikolaevich. In P. Edwards (Ed.), The encyclopedia of philosophy (8 Vols.). New York: Macmillan.
Kant, I. (1909). Kant’s critique of practical reason and other works on the theory of ethics (T. K. Abbott, Trans.), 6th ed. London: Longmans, Green.
Scanlan, J. P. (1965). The morality of deception in experiments (pp. 17–26). March: Bucknell Review.
Scanlan, J. P. (2002). Dostoevsky the thinker. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Tolstoj, L. N. (1928). (PSS) Polnoe sobranie sočinenii (90 vols. Moscow, 1928–1958).
Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii bk. 1 (1890). bk. 23 (1894). Moscow.
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Scanlan, J.P. Tolstoj as analytic thinker: his philosophical defense of nonviolence. Stud East Eur Thought 63, 7–14 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-010-9133-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11212-010-9133-8