Abstract
The significance of absolute income has consistently been highlighted in the literature as an important factor shaping individuals’ propensity to engage in political participation. However, considerably less research has been done on the relationship between relative income and individuals’ propensity to engage in both conventional and unconventional forms of political participation. Using relative income to quantify relative standing, this paper explores the relationship between relative standing and political participation in South Africa. Results show that individuals’ relative standing had a divergent relationship with their propensity to engage in voting and protest. More specifically, the results showed that South Africans with a higher relative standing, i.e., those who experienced relative privilege were more likely to engage in voting, while those with a lower relative standing, i.e., those who experienced relative deprivation, were more likely to engage in protest participation.
Similar content being viewed by others
Avoid common mistakes on your manuscript.
1 Introduction
Political participation forms the foundation of democracy. It includes a wide range of activities performed by citizens with the intention of influencing the selection of and/or the actions taken by public representatives (Chatora, 2012:3). These activities include voting, taking part in demonstrations and boycotts, signing petitions and attending meetings.
In explaining the factors that influence citizens’ decision to participate in such activities, the literature repeatedly highlights the role of absolute income. Wealthier individuals tend to be more inclined to participate in conventional politics such as voting, compared to those who are less wealthy (for example, Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Verba et al., 1995), while the evidence regarding the impact of income on protest participation (as a form of unconventional political participation) yields mixed results (for example, Desai et al., 2023; Melo & Stockemer, 2014). Some studies found that higher income inequality has a positive association with protest participation (Filetti & Janmaat, 2018; Nollert, 1995; Solt, 2015), while others found a negative relationship (Dubrow et al., 2008; Solt, 2015) or even no relationship (Balme & Chabanet, 2008; Vassallo, 2018).
Unfortunately, considerably less research has been done on the association between relative income and on both conventional and unconventional forms of political participation, even though relative income could potentially have a stronger relationship with political engagement than absolute income. This is especially likely in countries with high levels of income inequality.
Although relative income is related to income inequality, they are separate concepts. While income inequality refers to the distribution of income within a specific group of people, such as a country’s citizens, relative income refers to the financial position of individuals in relation to their reference group. It is widely accepted that absolute income and income inequality influence the quality of both democratic outcomes and democratic processes (Anderson & Beramendi, 2005:278). To date, studies that have examined income inequality in relation to political participation have mainly focused on high income countries and conventional political participation, namely elections (for example, Anderson & Beramendi, 2008; Ansolabehere et al., 2003; Brady, 2004; Jaime Castillo, 2009; Solt, 2008; Wong & Wong, 2022).
The theory that an individual’s utility depends on his or her income relative to that of others in his or her reference group (i.e. relative income)—rather than on absolute income—is embodied by the relative income hypothesis (Li, 2018:2). To contextualise this hypothesis, relative deprivation theory can be used as a theoretical framework. Individuals feel dissatisfied or relatively deprived regarding their economic status when they realise that those around them are better off than they are (Shifa & Leibbrand, 2018:612). Furthermore, relative deprivation suggests that these unfulfilled expectations cause frustration, anger and resentment that, in turn, can lead to violence and protests, amongst other forms of political unrest (Obikili, 2018:4).
The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between citizens’ relative standing (as determined by relative income) and the likelihood of political participation. In the context of this research, political participation refers to both electoral and protest participation. The study focuses on South Africa, which has very high levels of income inequality—a reflection of underlying social and racial divides that continue to permeate the political landscape three decades after the end of apartheid. Specifically, the study investigates whether individuals’ relative standing makes it more likely for them to engage in certain types of political participation. The primary dataset used for the analysis is wave 6 of the World Values Survey (WVS).
The results indicate that individuals’ relative standing does affect the likelihood of them engaging in different types of political participation. On the one hand, the results suggest that that those with a higher relative standing (i.e. reported income above the average of their reference group) are more likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation such as voting and less likely to engage in unconventional forms of political participation such as protest action. On the other hand, those individuals with a lower relative standing (i.e. reported income below the average of their reference group) are less likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation and more likely to engage in unconventional forms of political participation. These findings hold, whether the reference group is defined to include all others residing in the same geographic area (i.e. geographic reference group) or only those who are of the same race (i.e. racial reference group) as the respondent.
The contribution of this study to the existing literature is threefold. Firstly, the analysis explores the relationship between relative standing and political engagement at an individual level, rather than national inequality and aggregated political engagement, which is the focus of most of the existing literature. Secondly, the analysis reveals that the way in which relative standing is associated with both the likelihood and type of political participation by individuals in highly unequal countries differ between those above and below a certain income level. Thirdly, this research contributes to the relatively sparse literature on the relationship between relative income and individual-level political participation in countries with high levels of inequality, such as South Africa.
2 Unpacking Relative Standing in More Detail
A large body of literature (for example, Clark & Oswald, 1996; Duesenberry, 1949; Gallice & Grillo, 2020; Guven & Sorenson, 2012; Kaus, 2013; Knight & Gunatilaka, 2012; Maurer & Meier, 2008; Runciman, 1966; Solnick & Hemenway, 1998, 2005) has developed around the notion that people care about their relative standing in society and therefore compare themselves to relevant others (Durst, 2021:745). Equity theory (Adams, 1965), social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) and relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1976) are prominent theories in this literature. These theories emphasise that people measure their accomplishments and income not only according to absolute value but also in relation to others. In turn, these concerns about relative standing could influence individuals’ choices and affect their behaviour (Zeballos, 2015:2).
While several studies have been conducted on relative standing, most of these focus on its association with subjective wellbeing (Bookwalter & Dalenberg, 2010; Clark & Oswald, 1996; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Gori-Maia, 2013; Guillen-Royo, 2011; Luttmer, 2005; Posel & Casale, 2011). Although some studies have analysed the impact of relative standing on alternative themes such as poverty, social capital, employment, health and migration decisions (for example, Fischer & Torgler, 2013; Miller & Paxson, 2006; Moav & Neeman, 2010; Schneck, 2011; Stark et al., 2009; Vernazza, 2013), evidence of an empirical association between relative standing—measured as relative income—and different forms of political participation at an individual level is sparse. This is particularly true within the South African context.
Relative standing is represented by individuals’ ranking in the reference group’s income distribution. It can be measured objectively, by income or wealth, or subjectively, according to individuals’ perceptions of their relative financial welfare (Meiring et al., 2018:12). A reference group provides the boundaries within which individuals or groups can make relevant comparisons with other individuals or groups (Stewart, 2006:781).
The choice of reference group can be based on several characteristics, including age, ethnicity, geographic proximity, gender, religion and type of employment (Sakketa & Gerber, 2016:3). It is common practice among economists and other social scientists to select reference groups a priori based on various demographic characteristics. However, some researchers have asked participants directly about their reference group or have used vignettes (Carlsson & Qin, 2010; Knight et al., 2009; Sakketa & Gerber, 2016; Van Soest et al., 2012).
In terms of assessing an individual’s relative standing, comparing his or her income with the average income of that person’s reference group is considered a natural reference point, with a positive and negative relative income representing a good and bad relative standing respectively (Vendrik & Woltjer, 2007:1424). It is, however, important to note that these measures are based on the assumptions that individuals know how they rank in the overall distribution or what the mean income of the reference group is (Posel & Casale, 2011:198). Overall, empirical studies (for example, Budria, 2013; Ifcher et al., 2018; Stevenson & Wolfers, 2008) have found that, irrespective of how the comparison is made, the individual’s ordinal rank or position and the mean or median reference income are commonly used as objective measures of relative income (Lakshmanasamy & Maya, 2020:2).
Generally, relative comparison can either be upwards or downwards. With upward comparisons, an individual is considered relatively deprived if he or she is poorer than the average of the comparison group. Conversely, with downward comparisons, an individual is deemed better off if he or she is richer than the average of the comparison group (Ravallion & Chen, 2017:3).
In the broad sense, individuals’ concerns about their relative standing affect their utility, which, in turn, is likely to influence the activities these individuals choose to engage in in an attempt to increase their relative position (Akay & Martinsson, 2008:2). In most instances, perceptions of relative deprivation are associated with frustration and unhappiness, which can lead to a decline in trust between the individuals and government or other institutions that regulate the society in which they reside (Fischer & Torgler, 2007:12). Over time, it can influence a wide range of socio-political outcomes (Burgoon, 2018:7). Both social scientists and nonexperts consequently believe that frustration linked to personal experiences is a major driving force in the decision to participate in social or political movements (Orum, 1974:181).
The current study defines reference groups as all individuals residing within the same geographic area as the respondent and makes use of the reported per capita household income in order to derive the relative standing of each individual in the sample.
Geography has often been used as a natural reference group within the literature on relative standing and there is much evidence (see, for example, Shi et. al., 2023; Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2008, and Senik, 2009) suggesting that people are more likely to compare their income with those who are geographically closer to them. Moreover, existing evidence (Kingdon & Knight, 2007) indicates that the relative concerns of individuals who live in close proximity are different to those of individuals who live farther away, highlighting the role of geography in defining reference groups (those living closer may be seen as “friends” and therefore evoke fewer feelings of envy and frustration). In addition, political participation has been shown to be geographically clustered (Cho & Rudolph, 2008). However, given the history of racial division and the high correlation between race and socio-economic status in South Africa, there is also evidence that suggests that race should be the defining feature along which reference groups are defined (Kaus, 2013; Kingdon & Knight, 2007; Posel & Rogan, 2019). For this reason, the current study also later expands the definition of reference group to incorporate all individuals of the same race group as the respondent.
The choice of using an objective measure of relative standing rather than a subjective measure (i.e. reported per capita household income compared to another self-reported income rank vis-à-vis a defined reference group) is primarily motivated by the availability within the data. As discussed later, we conduct a variety of robustness checks to ensure that the results are not driven by the choice of income variable and reference group.
3 Inequality, Relative Standing, and Political Participation
Several studies (Filetti & Janmaat, 2018; Karakoc, 2013; Ritter & Solt, 2019; Solt, 2008) have investigated the relationship between inequality and political participation. This literature highlights three prominent theories that were largely developed for democratic contexts that attempt to explain the effect of inequality on political participation.
The first is relative power theory (Solt, 2008), which posits that economic inequality generally depresses political participation, especially among poorer individuals. This theory assumes that those in higher income groups hold more political power, especially when economic inequality is high, while those in lower income groups believe that the political system is incapable of protecting their interests, making it less likely that they will engage in politics (Huijsmans et al., 2020:2). According to Solt (2015), the theory predicts that participation in elections and nonviolent protests should exhibit similar patterns.
Secondly, conflict theory (Solt, 2008) provides a counterargument to relative power theory, positing that inequality increases individual political participation. Since greater inequality would mean that those in low-income groups are poor compared to their richer counterparts, redistributive policies would therefore be more appealing to low-income groups, as they may view these policies as a means to improve their status quo. This theory is based on the Meltzer-Richard theorem assumption (Meltzer & Richard, 1981) that individuals’ political interest emanates from their position in the income distribution rankings. Therefore, those in low-income groups will engage in political participation to push for more redistribution, while the rich will also become more politically engaged to oppose the redistribution policies, since these will be costly for them (Polacko et al., 2021:457). The third theory, resource theory, highlights income—not inequality—as the core driver behind the decision whether to engage in political participation. This theory therefore assumes that, in a context of greater inequality, those who are relatively more affluent will be more inclined to participate in conventional politics, while whose who are relatively poor will be less inclined to participate (Solt, 2008:50). When considering protest participation, the resource theory predicts that rising inequality will decrease protest participation among poorer people but increase protest participation among richer people (Solt, 2015:1315).
In addition to these three core theories, there is a fourth theory that is often applied in the context of inequality and specifically protest participation. Grievance theory postulates that grievances and personal discontent spur political participation, especially protest behaviour (Kern et al., 2015:466). This theory considers both absolute levels of deprivation and relative levels of perceived deprivation (Kern et al., 2015:467). For the rich, increasing inequality is assumed to reduce grievances, thereby suppressing protest participation. For the poor, on the other hand, protest is expected to increase, because higher income inequality is likely to bring about a decrease in their standard of living in both absolute and relative terms (Kołczyńska, 2019:258). Since protest is perceived as a response to social problems and citizen discontent, dissatisfaction as a result of relative deprivation may therefore stimulate protest action (Dalton et al., 2009:56).
To date, these core theories have largely been examined in the context of geographic inequality and individual-level participation, with scholars paying little attention to relative standing (relative income) and its impact on individual-level political participation. An individual’s relative income position can either encourage or discourage the individual to engage in political participation, since relative income relates to participation indirectly by shaping normative attitudes towards political participation (Northmore-Ball, 2010:19). Similarly, the experience of residing in a highly unequal area can have a differential impact on the attitudes and beliefs of wealthy versus economically vulnerable individuals. Szewcsyk and Crowder-Meyer (2022) find a larger “gap in participation” between the wealthy and economically vulnerable individuals in the United States in highly unequal areas, compared to areas where there are lower levels of inequality.
The aim of the current analysis is to test whether relative income is associated with political participation differentially depending on where an individual is situated on the income distribution. More specifically, the study aims to answer the following two questions:
-
First, what is the relationship between relative standing and various forms of political participation? Given existing evidence, we would hypothesise that individuals who are relatively privileged (i.e. above the mean income of their reference group) are more inclined to vote as a form of conventional political participation, and those who are relatively deprived (i.e. below the mean income of their reference group) are more likely to protest to express their frustration.
-
Second, how does the proximity of the reference group influence the relationship between relative standing and political participation? Based on previous findings in the literature, we would hypothesise that the distance of the reference group (i.e. being made up of “close others” versus “distant others”) would influence the likelihood of participating politically.
4 Data
This study uses individual-level data from wave 6 of the WVS, which was conducted in South Africa in 2013Footnote 1. The WVS is a global research programme devoted to both the academic and scientific study of economic, social, political, religious and cultural values of individuals across the globe. The survey is conducted in waves, at five-year intervals, by social scientists from top universities across the world.
The WVS provides valuable demographic information on the various forms of political participation, which is particularly important to this study. In South Africa, wave 6 featured a stratified, multi-stage probability sample design, and a nationally representative sample of 3531 respondents were interviewed. All respondents were aged 16 years or older, and the interviews were conducted in-person in the respondent’s languageFootnote 2 of choice. The sample is weighted to the full populationFootnote 3 and is therefore representative of the adult population of South Africa.
As mentioned, political participation in the context of this study refers to both voting and protest participation. To measure voting participation, two dependent variables are constructed to determine whether individuals vote in local and/or national elections. The questionnaire asked: “When elections take place, do you vote always, usually, or never? Please tell me separately for each of the following levels: (1) local elections, (2) national elections”. The responses were coded as follows: 1 = Always; 2 = Usually; 3 = Never; 99 = Don’t know. Based on the responses, a binary variable was constructed, with ‘Non-voter’ taking the value 0 and ‘Voter’ taking the value 1Footnote 4.
To measure protest participation, the questionnaire asked: “I'm going to read out some forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have ever done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it”. The responses were coded as follows: 1 = Have done; 2 = Might do; 3 = Would never do; 99 = Don’t know. Only two protest activitiesFootnote 5 were included in the analysis, namely attending a peaceful or lawful demonstration and joining strikes. Once again, based on the responses, a binary variable was constructed, with ‘Non-protester’ taking the value 0 and ‘Protester’ taking the value 1Footnote 6 . The full sample consists of 3367 respondents. However, after adjusting the missing values, the sample size for the regression analysis varies from 3082 to 3288.
Monthly household income, sociodemographic variables, as well as variables with a political nuance from the WVS are included in the analysis. More specifically, age, race, gender, employment status, educational attainment, location, partisanship and political interest are controlled for. We also generate an index capturing the political attitudes of the individual. These variables have all been shown to correlate with citizens’ decision around political participation (Gordon et al., 2019).
Household income data from the WVS are reported in income brackets. To compare individual respondents’ income to that of their geographic reference group, these income brackets are recoded and made continuous using the midpoint method, then adjusted for household size (i.e. the per capita household income is calculated, based on the household size of the household). The relative income variables are then created by the interaction between (i) an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the individual respondent’s income is above (below) that of the mean income for the geographic reference group, and 0 otherwise, and (ii) the absolute difference between the income of the individual respondent and the mean income of the geographic reference group.
Table 1 presents the descriptions of the variables used in this study.
5 Empirical Strategy
The main empirical aim of this study is to examine the relationship between relative standing and political participation. Political participation in this context includes both conventional participation (voting in local and national elections) and more direct forms of unconventional participation (participation in lawful demonstrations and strikes)). Testing the first hypothesis, the analysis is done by examining whether the likelihood of participation differs between individuals considered to have a relative advantage compared to those around them and those who have a relative disadvantage. A further intention is to test whether being in a positive versus a negative relative position relates to the form of political participation an individual chooses to partake in. Testing the second hypothesis, the geographic location of the reference group is varied.
To examine the relationship between relative standing and political participation, logistic regression analysis is employed. As previously mentioned, the outcome variables are comprised of various types of voting and protest participation that are, in essence, binaryFootnote 7 in nature. Binary logit regressions are therefore used. Logistic regressions also allow for independent variables to be ordinal, interval, nominal or continuous.
This paper makes use of the empirical strategy by Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), who examined the relationship between relative consumption and well-being, using the consumption of a geographic reference group. In their analysis, the authors generated separate variables for individuals who are in households with consumption levels above and below the mean consumption of their geographic reference group. The variables are generated to simultaneously capture both whether an individual’s household consumption is above or below that of the geographic reference group, and by how much the household consumption either exceeds or falls short of the reference group.
We replicate this strategy using income and not consumption data in order to estimate the following:
where \(y_{ik}\) represents the binary outcome of the decision whether to engage in political participation. The subscript i indexes the specific respondent and \(k\) represents geographical proximity (i.e. the chosen reference group parameter for this study). \(\kappa\) is interpreted as the relationship between absolute income and the outcome variable, where \(x_{ik}\) represents individual income (defined as the monthly per capita household income) reported by the respondent and \(x_{k}\) represents the mean income of individuals in the reference group (defined as the monthly per capita household income of others in the geographic area \(k\)). \(\theta\) is interpreted as the relationship between relative income and the outcome variable and \(I\left( . \right)\) is an indicator function that specifies whether the individual is above or below the mean income in the relevant geographic area/reference group. \(z_{ik}\) denotes sociodemographic and political controls.
Per capita household income is included to control for absolute income in order to allow absolute and relative income to be modelled as having distinct relationships with the outcome. Absolute income is expressed in the log form. To check for non-linearity, the squared term for absolute income is also included in the regression analysis.
Relative income is used to quantify relative standing. An individual’s relative standing or relative income is thus a point either above or below some critical income level (i.e. mean income) where individuals rank in relation to a particular reference group (Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002:367). Relative standing is measured as the absolute value of the difference between an individual’s income and the mean income of the reference group (i.e. comparing the per capita household income to that of the mean per capita household income of others in the same geographic area). In the context of this study, an individual whose income is above the mean income of the reference group is considered to have a relative advantage or experience relative privilege. Conversely, an individual whose income is below the mean income of the reference group is considered to have a relative disadvantage or experience relative deprivation. For the main analysis, the mean income for each reference group is generated using income data from wave 6 of the WVS. Relative income is then calculated as the absolute difference between the individual’s income and the mean income for each reference group and labelled accordingly—either ‘Above’ or ‘Below’. These two variables represent the actual value of how far an individual’s income is above (i.e. relative privilege) or below (i.e. relative deprivation) the mean respectively and signify the strength of the relationship between relative income and political participation.
As discussed earlier, reference groups are defined according to the geographic area in which the respondent resides. The reference group is defined according to three geographical areas, namely municipality, district and province. Municipality represents those who live the nearest, district represents those who live farther away, and province represents those who stay the farthestFootnote 8. Bearing this in mind, the critical level of income mentioned above therefore refers to the mean income in the municipality, district and province respectively. To ensure representativeness of the results, weights are used in all regressions.
It is important to point out certain issues relating to the data and empirical strategy used in this study. Firstly, the income data in the WVS are presented according to income brackets. To make the data continuous, the midpoint method is employed. Although this method is widely used by economists, the midpoint is essentially an imputed variable, which may lead to concerns regarding the reliability of the results. Secondly, the household income variable from the WVS dataset has 1333 (37.75%) missing values, which are dealt with using sequential regression multiple imputation (SRMI)Footnote 9. To test the robustness of the results and to confirm that the results are not driven by the way in which these imputations had been conducted, various robustness checks are conducted, which are discussed in more detail below.
5.1 Empirical Analysis
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics
The summary statistics of all the variables for the sample used in the regression analysis are presented in Table 2. It is clear that electoral participation for both local and national elections are relatively high among South Africans, while participation in protest activities is, on average, relatively low. Individuals are generally more likely to engage in lawful demonstrations compared to strikes.
Relative standing by race for the entire sample is presented in Fig. 1. The majority of the black African and coloured populations are deemed relatively deprived, while the majority of the white and Indian populations appear to be relatively privileged.
Objective relative standing by race
5.1.2 Results
The results of the logistic regressions estimating the association between relative standing on the likelihood of political participation are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. The inclusion of absolute and relative income in the model allows for differentiation between their respective associations with political participation. In Table 3, the geographical reference group considered is municipality, which serves as a proxy for those residing in close proximity. In Table 4, it is the district, which represents a reference group of individuals who reside farther away. In Table 5, the reference group is defined as all those who reside in the same province, the largest geographic area of the three specifications. In all three tables, irrespective of the proximity of the reference group, the results indicate that individuals who are relatively deprived are more likely to participate in protest and less likely to vote. On the other hand, individuals who are relatively privileged are more likely to vote and less likely to engage in protest participation. In line with the main result for electoral participation, Anderson and Beramendi (2008) also found that individuals whose income is above the median are more likely to participate in elections while those whose income is below the median are less likely to do so.
Following Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008), the regression also includes the result of a Wald test, which indicates whether the parameters of interest (\(\theta_{l}\) and \(\theta_{u}\)) are equal. In all of the regressions, the null hypothesis—i.e. that \(\theta_{l}\) = \(\theta_{u}\)—can be rejected. This implies that there is a differential relationship between relative income and political participation for individuals above the mean and those below the mean. In other words, the extent to which individuals care about their relative standing is largely determined by whether they experience a relative advantage or a relative disadvantage.
In Table 3, the absolute income coefficient shows a positive and statistically significant impact on protest participation, while the income coefficient is positive it becomes insignificant for electoral participation. The squared term is negative for all models but only statistically significant for voting participation. Both the absolute and squared terms are jointly significant at the 1% level. The turning point for Model 1 is 1.69 and 1.5 for Model 2. Given that these turning points fall within the data range, it provides evidence for an inverse U-shaped effect. The turning points for the remaining models are located outside the data range. Although not an inverted U-shape, by also taking the signs of the absolute and squares terms into consideration, this suggests the presence of a non-linear relationship between income and political participation.
When considering district and province respectively, the absolute income and squared term are jointly significant in all models at a 1% level. The turning points for Model 1 and Model 2, again both fall within the data range and the turning points for the remaining models fall outside the data range. While the turning points for all Model 3 and Model 4 regressions do not fall within the data range, this does not imply the absence of a non-linear relationship but can rather be attributed to the data being too noisy or sparse to detect the turning point.
Regarding the sizes of the coefficients on the other controls, it appears that older individuals are significantly more likely to participate in elections, while younger people are significantly more likely to protest. This finding is in line with literature that suggests that older people are more likely to engage in conventional forms of political participation (Gordon et al., 2019; Grasso et al., 2019; Putnam, 2000), while younger individuals are more likely to engage in unconventional forms (Grasso et al., 2019; Marien et al.,; 2010). The results also indicate that women are significantly more likely to engage in electoral participation, which is in line with the findings of Verba et al. (1995).
Individuals with an educational level of Grade 12 or higher are more likely to vote and protest. Similarly, individuals who are employed are also more likely to engage in voting and protest. Partisanship is positively correlated with voting participation and as posited by Verba et al. (1995), political interest generally has a positive and significant association with both voting and protest behaviour.
6 Robustness Checks
Given the data limitations previously mentioned, there may be concerns around the reliability of these results. The first concern relates to the use of imputations and whether the imputations are, in fact, driving the main results. Secondly, some may argue that the WVS is not representative of the various geographic reference groups, namely at provincial, district and municipal level. The robustness of the main results is therefore tested using four robustness checks. For each set of the robustness checks, Models 1 to 4 in Tables 8,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18 in the Appendix include the full set of covariates as used in the main analysis. Only the coefficients on the main variables of interest are reported here, i.e. relative income if above the mean and relative income if below the mean.
To address the first concern, the initial analysis is repeated, but this time without imputations. The main results were largely unchanged, which is why the results are not reported here.
To address the second concern, the first robustness check involves repeating the initial analysis but with the raw income categories included in the regression analysis, representing the strength of the relationship between absolute income and political participation. To derive relative income, the mean income bracket for each reference group is determined and relative standing defined as how far above or below the individual’s reported household income is in comparison to the mean income bracket.Footnote 10 The results for the first set of robustness checks are reported in Tables 8, 9 and 10 in the Appendix. Since the data has not been imputed, there is a drastic reduction in the number of observations. While there is loss of significance on some of the coefficients, irrespective of the reference group considered, the results broadly confirm the initial result: that those who are above the mean are more likely to vote and less likely to protest, while those who are below the mean are less likely to vote and more likely to protest.
For the second robustness check, national income data from the 2011 South African Census is introduced and used to generate relative income by municipality, district and province. It should, however, be noted that the same missing data concerns of the WVS plague the 2011 Census. Given the high proportion of households who reported zero or unspecified income in the Census, sequential regression multiple imputation is once again applied to account for this. Since the sampling and weighting procedures of the WVS and the 2011 Census are not entirely the same, each dataset, specifically the income variable, is imputed separately. Per capita household income is then calculated from the imputed data and based on the reported household size of each household. The results are presented in Tables 11, 12 and 13 in the Appendix. Overall, while there is loss of significance, where significance is retained, the tables show that the main results are robust for electoral and protest participation for all reference groups, even after the introduction of national income data.
Next, the robustness of the results is evaluated against a difference reference group, namely race, in relation to geographical proximity. The motivation for selecting this reference group is based on evidence indicating that individuals tend to form reference groups based on race in South Africa (Kaus, 2013; Kingdon & Knight, 2007; Posel & Rogan, 2019). For the third robustness check, the main analysis is repeated, but this time by using both race and geographical proximity. Relative standing is therefore assessed based on the comparison of an individual’s income and the mean income of their own race within the same geographical area, namely province, district or municipality. To conduct the robustness check, the main analysis is repeated, the results of which are reported in Tables 14, 15 and 16 in the Appendix. While there are instances where there is a loss of significance, overall, the stability of the coefficients’ signs remains robust. Results that are significant align with the main findings.
As a final robustness check, the main analysis is repeated but this time national income data from the 2011 South African Census is introduced again and used to examine relative income by race in relation to geographical proximity. The results are presented in Tables 17, 18 and 19 in the Appendix. Although this final robustness check broadly confirms the conclusions from the main analysis, some of the specifications lack statistical significance and it is therefore not as convincing as the first three robustness checks.
In summary, when considering both the main results and robustness checks collectively, the results affirm that individuals who are relatively privileged are more likely to vote and less likely to protest, while those who are relatively deprived are less likely to vote and more likely to protest, even after considering race in relation to geographical proximity as a reference group.
7 Relative Standing and Political Attitudes
A longstanding and crucial question within the political science domain relates to why certain individuals choose to engage in politics while others only do so infrequently or never. A large body of research (for example, Blais & Labbé-St-Vincent et al., 2011; Quintelier & Hooghe, 2012) has highlighted political attitudes as an important determinant of the likelihood of political participation (Weinschenk et al., 2021:1).
We make use of the answers to various questions in the WVS which aim to capture the sentiment of individuals around political confidence, trust, election legitimacy and views on the direction in which the country is headed. As set out in the discussion of the results from the main regression, we generate an index capturing individuals’ agreement with the following 4 sentiments:
-
Confidence in the president;
-
Votes are counted fairly;
-
Trust in government decision making; and
-
Country heading in the right direction
Higher positive values here represent a more positive political attitude while lower values represent a more negative political attitude. In the main regressions, the coefficient on the political attitude index is consistently positive and statistically significant. This seems to indicate that individuals who have a more positive political attitude are both more likely to vote and participate in protest action. This may speak to the level of apathy present in those who score low on the index of political attitude (i.e. are more negatively inclined) and therefore do not participate politically.
Table 6 provides insights into the political attitudes among the relatively privileged versus the relatively deprived in South AfricaFootnote 11. As shown in Table 6, overall, the political attitudes of both relatively privileged and relatively deprived individuals appear to be very similar. However, there are instances where statistically significant differences in attitudes between the two groups are observed. Although there is no statistically significant difference between the self-reported confidence in the president, whether votes are counted fairly or not, and the political attitude index as a whole, those who are relatively deprived show higher levels of trust in government decision-making (52.07%) and are less negative about where the country is headed (33.78% say that the country is headed in the right direction) than those who are relatively privileged (44.85% and 30.25.03% respectively), and the difference is significant (for trust in government decision-making, at the 5% level, but for where the country is headed, only at the 10% level of significance). Although this evidence is not overwhelming, it does provide some tentative reasons for why these two groups’ political participation are divergent.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
With South Africa being a highly unequal country, the results of this study provide valuable insights into the association between relative standing and the likelihood of political participation. In order to estimate the relationship between relative standing and political participation, individual-level data from wave 6 of the WVS were employed. Two types of political participation were considered, namely electoral (conventional) and protest (unconventional) participation.
Two hypotheses were tested. The first hypothesis asked whether relative standing had a divergent relationship with the likelihood of participation in conventional and unconventional political action. More specifically, it questioned whether individuals rank in the income distribution was correlated with how they engage politically. We found evidence to show that this was indeed the case.
Regarding electoral participation, the results showed that individuals who were relatively privileged were more likely to vote, while those who were relatively deprived were less likely to do so. For protest participation, those with a relative advantage were overall less likely to protest, while those who were relatively deprived were more likely to engage in various forms of protest. This finding aligned with the observation made by Bohler-Muller et al., (2016:4) in response to the increase in protest action in municipalities with a higher proportion of economically vulnerable individuals. In the South African context, it seemed that those who were considered well-off were generally more prone to using formal channels to voice their dissatisfaction, while those who were less well-off were more prone to protesting. In other words, those who were relatively privileged were more likely to participate in more conventional forms of political participation, while those who were relatively deprived were more inclined towards unconventional forms of political participation.
The second hypothesis we tested asked whether the location of the geographic reference group mattered. In other words, it questioned whether the relationship between relative standing and political participation would differ if the reference group was defined as others living in close proximity to the respondent compared to those living further away. We found no evidence to suggest that the location of the geographic reference group influenced the results, as all definitions of the reference group provided similar evidence of the interaction between relative standing and political participation.
Overall, the main results were robust to a wide variety of robustness checks on how the reference group was defined. The analysis further explored whether some of this divergent behaviour could be explained by differences in attitudes toward the government, which were self-reported in the data, and found tentative evidence supporting this.
The regression results for protest participation corroborated grievance theory, which posits that relatively deprived individuals were generally more likely to engage in protests. This was confirmed by the large proportion of individuals who were relatively deprived and reported feeling worse off than other South Africans.
Notes
It should be noted that South Africa was not included in the latest wave of the WVS (wave 7, from 2017 to 2022) at the time of writing.
The questionnaire was made available in English, Afrikaans, Tswana, Sotho, Xhosa and Zulu.
The sample is weighted within a statistical margin of error of less than 2% at a 95% confidence level.
Responses Always and Usually were coded 1. Responses Never were coded 0 and Don’t know coded as missing.
The other forms of political action included in the questionnaire were attending a community meeting; refusing to pay for services such as water, electricity or property rates; occupying buildings or factories; refusing to pay a tax or fee to the government; signing a petition; participating in boycotts; using force or violence for a political cause and participating in any other act of protest.
Responses Have done and Might do were coded 1. Responses Would never do were coded 0 and Don’t know coded as missing
There are two possible outcomes per dependent variable: to vote or not and to protest or not, with 1 indicating a voter/protester and 0 indicating a non-voter/non-protester.
South Africa is divided into nine provinces, which are subdivided into 44 district municipalities, which are further subdivided into 213 local municipalities at the time of writing.
See Table 7 in the Appendix for a more detailed description of the imputation method employed.
For this robustness check, it was not possible to obtain the per capita income, as income is taken as it is reported in the bracket or a bound.
Variable names and descriptions are presented in Table 20 in the Appendix.
References
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267–299). Academic Press.
Akay, A. & Martinsson, P. (2008). Does relative income matter for the very poor? Evidence from rural Ethiopia. In IZA Discussion papers 3 812. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Anderson, C.J. & Beramendi, P. (2005). Economic inequality, redistribution, and political inequality. Presented at the “Income Inequality, Representation, and Democracy: Europe in Comparative Perspective” conference, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, May 2005.
Anderson, C. J., & Beramendi, P. (2008). Income, inequality, and electoral participation. In P. Beramendi & C. J. Anderson (Eds.), Democracy, inequality and representation in comparative perspective. Russell Sage Foundation.
Ansolabehere, S., De Figueiredo, J. M., & Snyder, J. M., Jr. (2003). Why is there so little money in U.S. politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(1), 105–130.
Balme, R., & Chabanet, D. (2008). European governance and democracy: Power and protest in the EU. Rowman & Littlefield.
Blais, A., & Labbé St-Vincent, S. (2011). Personality traits, political attitudes and the propensity to vote. European Journal of Political Research, 50, 395–417.
Bohler-Muller, N., Davids, Y.D., Roberts, B., Kanyane, B., Struwig, J., Masiya, T. & Nomdo, A. 2016. Service delivery Challenges in South Africa: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS): Compendium of Results. In Democracy, Governance and Service Delivery (DGSD) Programme, Human Sciences Research Council [Online]. Available: http://repository.hsrc.ac.za/bitstream/handle/20.500.11910/10377/9475.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [2020, November 16].
Bookwalter, J., & Dalenberg, D. (2010). Relative to what or whom? The importance of norms and relative standing to well-being in South Africa. World Development, 38(3), 345–355.
Brady, H. E. (2004). An analytical perspective on participatory inequality and income. In K. M. Neckerman (Ed.), Social inequality (pp. 667–702). Russell Sage Foundation.
Budria, S. (2013). Are relative-income effects constant across the well-being distribution? Journal of Happiness Studies, 14(4), 1379–1408.
Burgoon, B. (2018). Positional deprivation and the economic roots of radical right and radical left voting. Paper presented at Duke University Workshop on Radicalism and Realignment, Durham, North Carolina. March 2018.
Carlsson, F., & Qin, P. (2010). It is better to be the head of a chicken than the tail of a phoenix: Concern for relative standing in rural China. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 39(2), 180–186.
Chatora, A. (2012). Encouraging political participation in Africa: The potential of social media platforms, Situation Report. [Pretoria]: Institute for Security Studies (ISS).
Cho, W. K. T., & Rudolph, T. J. (2008). Emanating political participation: Untangling the spatial structure behind participation. British Journal of Political Science, 38, 273–289.
Clark, A. E., & Oswald, A. (1996). Satisfaction and comparison income. Journal of Public Economics, 61, 359–381.
Crosby, F. (1976). A model of egoistic relative deprivation. Psychological Review, 83, 95–113.
Dalton, R., Van Sickle, A., & Weldon, S. (2009). The individual-institutional nexus of protest behaviour. British Journal of Political Science, 40, 51–73.
Desai, R. M., Olofsgård, A., & Yousef, T. M. (2023). The middle class and the modalities of political protest: Evidence from the Arab world. Social Science Quarterly, 104, 684–701.
Dubrow, J. K., Slomczynski, K. M., & Tomescu-Dubrow, I. (2008). Effects of democracy and inequality on soft political protest in Europe: Exploring the European Social Survey data. International Journal of Sociology, 38(3), 36–51.
Duesenberry, J. (1949). Income, savings and the theory of consumer behaviour. Harvard University Press.
Durst, A. K. (2021). Education as a positional good? Evidence from the German socio-economic panel. Social Indicators Research, 155, 745–767.
Fafchamps, M., & Shilpi, F. (2008). Subjective welfare, isolation, and relative consumption. Journal of Development Economics, 86, 43–60.
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, A. (2005). Income and well-being: An empirical analysis of the comparison income effect. Journal of Public Economics, 89(5), 997–1019.
Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 7, 117–140.
Filetti, A., & Janmaat, G. J. (2018). Income inequality and economic downturn in Europe: A multi level analysis of their consequences for political participation. Acta Politica, 53(3), 327–347.
Fischer, J. A. V. & Torgler, B. (2007). Social capital and relative income concerns: evidence from 26 countries. CREMA Working Paper No. 2007-05. Basel: Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
Fischer, J. A. V., & Torgler, B. (2013). Do positional concerns destroy social capital: Evidence from 26 countries. Economic Inquiry, 51(2), 1542–1565.
Gallice, A., & Grillo, E. (2020). Economic and social-class voting in a model of redistribution with social concerns. Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(6), 3140–3172.
Gordon, S., Struwig, J., Roberts, B., Mchunu, N., Mtyingizane, S., & Radebe, T. (2019). What drives citizen participation in political gatherings in modern South Africa? A quantitative analysis of self-reported behaviour. Social Indicators Research, 141, 791–808.
Gori-Maia, A. (2013). Relative income, inequality and subjective wellbeing: evidence for Brazil. Social Indicators Research, 113(3), 1193–1204.
Grasso, M. T., Yoxon, B., Karampampas, S., & Temple, L. (2019). Relative deprivation and inequalities in social and political activism. Acta Politica, 54(1), 398–429.
Guillen-Royo, M. (2011). Reference group consumption and the subjective well-being of the poor in Peru. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(2), 259–272.
Guven, C., & Sorensen, B. E. (2012). Subjective well-being: keeping up with the Joneses. Real or perceived? Social Indicators Research, 109(3), 439–469.
Huijsmans, T., Rijken, A. J., & Gaidyte, T. (2020). The income gap in voting: moderating effects of income inequality and clientelism. Political Behavior, 44, 1203–1223.
Ifcher, J., Zarghamee, H., & Graham, C. (2018). Local neighbours as positives, regional neighbours as negatives: Competing channels in the relationship between others’ income, health, and happiness. Journal of Health Economics, 57(2), 263–276.
Jaime Castillo, A. M. (2009). Economic inequality and electoral participation. A cross-country evaluation. Paper prepared for the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) conference, Toronto, Canada. September 6, 2009.
Johansson-Stenman, O., Carlsson, F., & Daruvala, D. (2002). Measuring future grandparents’ preferences for equality and relative standing. Economic Journal, 112, 362–383.
Karakoc, E. (2013). Economic inequality and its asymmetric effect on civic engagement: Evidence from post-communist countries. European Political Science Review, 5, 197–223.
Kaus, W. (2013). Conspicuous consumption and race: Evidence from South Africa. Journal of Development Economics, 100, 63–73.
Kern, A., Marien, S., & Hooghe, M. (2015). Economic crisis and levels of political participation in Europe (2002–2010): The role of resources and grievances. West European Politics, 38(3), 465–490.
Kingdon, G., & Knight, J. (2007). Community, comparisons and subjective well-being in a divided society. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 64, 69–90.
Knight, J., & Gunatilaka, R. (2012). Income, aspirations and the hedonic treadmill in a poor society. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 82(1), 67–81.
Knight, J., Lina, S., & Gunatilaka, R. (2009). Subjective well-being and its determinants in rural China. China Economic Review, 20(4), 635–649.
Kołczyńska, M. (2019). Changes or cross-national differences? Effects of economic inequality on protest participation. Social Science Quarterly, 101, 256–268.
Lakshmanasamy, T., & Maya, K. (2020). Is it income adaptation or social comparison? The effect of relative income on happiness and the Easterlin paradox in India. The Indian Economic Journal, 68, 477–495.
Leighley, J. E., & Nagler, J. (2013). Who votes now? Demographics, issues, inequality, and turnout in the United States. Princeton University Press.
Li, L. (2018). Financial inclusion and poverty: The role of relative income. China Economic Review, 52, 165–191.
Luttmer, F. P. E. (2005). Neighbors as negatives: Relative earnings and well-being. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(963–1), 002.
Marien, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2010). Inequalities in non-institutionalised forms of political participation: A multi-level analysis of 25 countries. Political Studies, 58(1), 187–213.
Maurer, J., & Meier, A. (2008). Smooth it like the Joneses? Estimating peer-group effects in intertemporal consumption choice. Economic Journal, 118, 454–476.
Meiring, T., Kannemeyer, C. & Potgieter, E. (2018). The gap between rich and poor: South African society’s biggest divide depends on where you think you fit in. Working Paper No. 220. Cape town: Southern African labour and development research unit (SALDRU), University of Cape Town.
Melo, D. F., & Stockemer, D. (2014). Age and political participation in Germany, France and the UK: A comparative analysis. Comparative European Politics, 12(1), 33–53.
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 914–927.
Miller, D. L., & Paxson, C. (2006). Relative income, race, and mortality. Journal of Health Economics, 25(979–1), 003.
Moav, O., & Neeman, Z. (2010). Status and poverty. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8(2), 413–420.
Nollert, M. (1995). Neocorporatism and political protest in the Western democracies: A cross-national analysis. In J. C. Jenkins & B. Klandermans (Eds.), The politics of social protest: Comparative perspectives on states and social movements (pp. 138–164). University College of London Press.
Northmore-Ball, K. (2010). Income inequality and political engagement in Eastern Europe. Unpublished master’s dissertation. University of Oxford.
Obikili, N. (2018). Unfulfilled expectations and populist politics: examining the emergence of the EFF in South Africa. Working Paper 722. Cape town: Economic research southern Africa (ERSA).
Orum, A. M. (1974). On participation in political protest movements. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 10(2), 181–207.
Polacko, M., Heath, O., Lewis-Beck, M. S., & Dassonneville, R. (2021). Policy polarization, income inequality and turnout. Political Studies, 69(2), 455–477.
Posel, D. R., & Casale, D. M. (2011). Relative standing and subjective well-being in South Africa: The role of perceptions, expectations and income mobility. Social IndicatorsResearch, 104(2), 195–223.
Posel, D. R., & Rogan, M. (2019). Inequality, social comparisons, and income aspirations: Evidence from a highly unequal country. Journal of Human Development and Capabilities, 20(1), 94–111.
Putnam, R. D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community. Simon & Schuster.
Quintelier, E., & Hooghe, M. (2012). Political attitudes and political participation: A panel study on socialization and self-selection effects among late adolescents. International Political Science Review, 33(1), 63–81.
Ravallion, M. & Chen, S. (2017). Welfare-consistent global poverty measures. Working Paper No. 23739. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).
Ritter, M., & Solt, F. (2019). Economic inequality and campaign participation. Social Science Quarterly, 100, 678–688.
Runciman, W. (1966). Relative deprivation & social justice: A study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England. Routledge Kegan Paul.
Sakketa, T. G. & Gerber, N. (2016). Relative deprivation and well-being of the rural youth. Working Paper No. 296. Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire: African Development Bank.
Schneck, S. (2011). The effect of relative standing on considerations about self-employment. SOEP Working Paper No. 426. Berlin: German Institute for Economic Research.
Senik, C. (2009). Direct evidence on income comparisons and their welfare effects. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 72(1), 408–424.
Shi, S., Chen, Y. C., & Yip, P. S. F. (2023). Relative deprivation patterns in social and geographical references for health trajectories in China: Investigations of gender and urban-rural disparities. Social Science & Medicine, 317, 115589.
Shifa, M., & Leibbrand, M. (2018). Relative economic position and subjective well-being in a poor society: Does relative position indicator matter? Social Indicators Research, 139, 611–630.
Solnick, S. J., & Hemenway, D. (1998). Is more always better? A survey on positional concerns. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 37, 373–383.
Solnick, S. J., & Hemenway, D. (2005). Are positional concerns stronger in some domains than in others? American Economic Review, 95(2), 147–151.
Solt, F. (2008). Economic inequality and democratic political engagement. American Journal of Political Science, 52(1), 48–60.
Solt, F. (2015). Economic inequality and nonviolent protest. Social Science Quarterly, 96(5), 1314–1327.
Stark, O., Micevska, M., & Mycielski, J. (2009). Relative poverty as a determinant of migration: Evidence from Poland. Economics Letters, 103(3), 119–122.
Stevenson, B., & Wolfers, J. (2008). Economic growth and subjective well-being: Reassessing the Easterlin paradox. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 39(1), 1–102.
Stewart, Q. T. (2006). Reinvigorating relative deprivation: A new measure for a classic concept. Social Science Research, 35(3), 779–802.
Szewcyk, J., & Crowder-Meyer, M. (2022). Community income inequality and the economic gap in participation. Political Behavior, 44, 479–504.
Van Soest, A., Andreyeva, T., Kapteyn, A., & Smith, J. P. (2012). Self-reported disability and reference groups. In D. Wise (Ed.), Investigations in the economics of aging (pp. 237–264). University of Chicago Press.
Vassallo, F. (2018). The evolution of protest research: Measures and approaches. Political Science and Politics, 51(1), 67–72.
Vendrik, M. C. M., & Woltjer, G. B. (2007). Happiness and loss aversion: Is utility concave or convex in relative income? Journal of Public Economics, 91, 1423–1448.
Verba, S., Schlozman, K., & Brady, H. E. (1995). Voice and equality: Civic voluntarism in American politics. Harvard University Press.
Vernazza, D. R. (2013). Does absolute or relative income motivate migration? London School of Economics, Mimeo. [Online] Available: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/vernazza/_private/Job%20Market%20Paper.pdf. [2022, July 3].
Weinschenk, A. C., Dawes, C. T., Oskarsson, S., Klemmensen, R., & Nørgaard, A. S. (2021). The relationship between political attitudes and political participation: Evidence from monozygotic twins in the United States, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark. Electoral Studies, 69, 1–7.
Wong, M. Y. H., & Wong, S. H. (2022). Income inequality and political participation: A district-level analysis of Hong Kong elections. Social Indicators Research, 162(3), 959–977.
Yu, K. C. D. (2012). Using household surveys for deriving labour market, poverty and inequality trends in South Africa. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Stellenbosch: Stellenbosch University.
Zeballos, E. 2015. Catching up or pulling down? Interpersonal comparisons and destructive actions: experimental evidence from Bolivia. [Online] Available: elianazeballos092015.pdf (ucdavis.edu) [2022, July 18].
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Derek Yu and Servaas van der Berg for useful feedback. Tina Fransman acknowledges funding from the National Research Foundation of South Africa.
Funding
Open access funding provided by Stellenbosch University.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflict of interest
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendix
Appendix
See Tables 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20.
Rights and permissions
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
About this article
Cite this article
Fransman, T., von Fintel, M. Relative Standing and Political Participation. Soc Indic Res (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-024-03383-y
Accepted:
Published:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-024-03383-y