Abstract
The happiness of people is formulized by an Underground Hedonic Theory taking into account several levels. A formal way to think of and measure Underground happiness passes through the idea of Hedonic Inertia. This is the “residual happiness”, the “substratum of feeling” given by our experiences lived in each different moment of our days. The concept of happiness as the temporal integral of momentary utility is focused, pointing out the role that one or more events in our day can influence our mood throughout the entire day. We also refer to the underground happiness coming from our general situation (love, career, money, national politics, etc.), and from the underground scenario of our daily activities (urban beauty, noisiness, comfort, etc.). Finally we summarize the logical steps to design a certain Profile of Hedonic Response for a certain person, or personality typology, as a set of particular Curves of Hedonic Ponderation. This is also explained in a mathematical way by an “equation of happiness”.
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Notes
“direct subjective consequences from engaging in some activities to the exclusion of others… For instance, how much an individual likes or dislikes the activity ‘painting one’s house’, in conjunction with the amount of time one spends in painting the house, is as important determinant of well-being independent of how satisfied one feels about having a freshly painted house” (Juster et al. 1985).
We are proposing this formula just to coarsely give a numerical and graphical example of the concept of hedonic inertia, but we are certain that it can have some mistakes and that it has missing parts.
The reader will notice that, in the case of unexpected activities of the day (when one does not know of them before they will happen), the sum of w during the day will not give the global psychological sum, the comprehensive judgment of the happiness of the entire day as we previously explained.
If the scores of all the other activities do not change, it could mean that: (1) or the person did not include in his scores the hedonic inertia effect, because he evaluated in a very rational way his feeling only right connected to each specific action; (2) or there is no hedonic inertia effect. But, it is difficult to imagine the last case, which would mean that one wonderful activity in our day does not influence part of our mood.
We call indifferently event or activity.
Relative for them: that means, not doing the same activities, but feeling the same h, and same hi results from activities of the day.
Remembering what we mentioned in the previous paragraph, in this case the reply will probably be “w” because we are asking how do you feel in this moment; for this we added as a condition: “with the same level of underground happiness u and a similar type of day, that means a similar HI”. In fact, without these conditions, the replies will not be accurate for the scope to deduce the Ponderation Curves.
The quantification of the charm of a specific sunset, or the beauty of a certain view, etc. in an objective scale, would be quite questionable. To quantify Is, for example of the factor “love”, we can use as an objective scale, not numbers, but some standard state such as: being attracted, falling in love, marrying, some love problems with the partner, a big love problem with the partner, separation… Each person will have a different reaction (u), in according to the importance (if linear relation, angular coefficient of the straight line u/Is), that “love” has in his life. Idem, to give a scale of measurement of Is for the factor “job”, we can use: joblessness, having an unattractive job (unattractive for the person, or typology of person), having a neutral job, having a stimulating job … Idem for the factor “money”, “health”, etc. To quantify Isc for the factor “silence” we can use the noise level (this time then we are able to have a real objective, rational scale like the decibel); for the factor “aesthetics” we can compare a same set of appropriate images with different aesthetic levels, to find out the reaction (Us) of different people. Etcetera for other factors we like to test. In the same way, to quantify Ij we can refer to a set of states rather than to numbers. For example, for j = “doing a physical activity”, we can present a set of states related with the physical effort-satisfaction level. For j = “having breakfast”, we can use some reference points as Ij, such as: very small and fast breakfast, discrete breakfast, normal breakfast, satisfying breakfast, big breakfast. A person could feel h′ = 1 for a small breakfast, another h′ = 0 because maybe for him breakfast is a very important moment and meal. If we imagine the case of a linear relation, the inclination of the straight line will be proportional (angular coefficient) to the importance that that kind of factor/activity has for the person. For some j the relation Ij and h′ can be negative; e.g. the activity “doing a physical activity”: if one loves it, the stronger the physical activity the higher he will enjoy. Vice versa if one hates it. For some j we cannot have any kind of measurement.
For h, the maximum value is 5, but can be another we prefer. For hi, it is realistic to believe that its maximum value could not be more than the maximum value of the h with whom it is related (hi j < h j ). Us is automatically evaluated when the person judges h j for the specific activity j. However, if we want to build a simulated scenario for a j activity (“working in an office”), rather than for a specific activity (“working at the office of Street … number …, 2nd floor, room n.3, desk n.5”), Us will not be included in h j , and we would need to know a value of Us to add it to h j ′. To do it we should at least be able to know how much Us can influence h′; that means, how much more, or how much less, can shift the value of h′ when you work in a specific office but changing (ceteris paribus), the quality of the view (facing a great window in front of a park, or facing a gray wall), the silence (being in a room facing a main traffic street, or a quiet court), etc.
In this case, to be punctilious, we should include the consideration that one can usually love “3” reading a book, but can love “3.5” if he does it after dinner, “2.5” if before. However, in most cases, we could be able to include this kind of “shrewdness” thanks to Us, by investigating the right range of sc.
As we noticed in a previous note, in this case (w), if there is an unexpected nice or bad event, the sum of w along the day will not be able to give a global psychological sum of the happiness, but will provide an algebraic sum. This because the hi effect of that unexpected event cannot be spread along the antecedent period. In this case the algebraic sum informs about the total sum of the happiness felt during each moment of the day. However the global feeling of the entire day, (as a post-evaluation), could amplify a single event independently from when it happened during the day (in the morning, in the afternoon, at night). This amplification in order to give the global phsycological sum, is numerically allowed (even if just symbolically, because without any empirical support), by spreading the hi along the entire day, and not just after the time it happened.
We remind how, in general, for every “s”, the fact of “being aware”, is crucial in the evaluation of u. For example one could not adequately appreciate the situation to be healthy until some serious health problem will happen to him, or to a person close to him. Idem for the money situation, the political-economic national situation, and so forth.
Frey and Stutzer (2002), Frey et al. (2002), Hanh (1984). The literature suggests to call Procedural Utility the satisfaction given by the process of reaching the goal, and calling the instrumental utility that one received when we reach the intended goal. Then the psychological well-being concerns both the final state and the procedure.
Solomon and Corbit (1974).
Hirt et al. (2008).
Diener et al. (2006).
Gendolla (2000).
Lench et al. (2011).
Dambrun and Ricard (2011).
Kristjánsson (2010).
Higgins (1987).
Lyubomirsky (2001).
Johnston (1999).
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It is a pleasure to express my gratitude to lady Anna Elizabeth.
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D’Acci, L. Hedonic Inertia and Underground Happiness. Soc Indic Res 113, 1237–1259 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-012-0137-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-012-0137-2