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Towards a New Analytical Framework for Legal Communication

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Abstract

This article develops a model first proposed in my book Jurisprudence and communication [67]. It takes as its starting point the generally conception that legal rules are valid norms, involving a normative content and expressing themselves in reality through observable conduct. This dualistic character of law is central. Law is both fiction and factual, ideal and real. But the viewpoint that a legal rule is a manifestation of validity in reality, through empirical acts, raises the question how rules as (valid) fictions can be known and understood in their linguistic form. How is meaning attributed to the legal words and how do these words relate to the world of fact? Taking an institutional-pragmatic approach as a starting point, an analytical model is created that can be used as an instrument for the relationship between legal rules as thought objects existing only in the mind, and legal rules as observable conduct. This model seeks to revise the classical models of legal communication that basically focus on the unilateral flow of legal information between ‘senders and receivers’ and their claim of linear causality between rules and conduct. The model here constructed in the theoretical part is then applied to several case studies, in order to analyze the construction of meaning in actual use. Two fundamental rights—the older codified in 1798 and the more recent codified in 1983—in the Dutch Constitution have been analyzed using the model as an instrument. Further, the remarkable shifts in article 96 of the Constitution, the declaration of war, and its consequences, resulting in a new category of war—the armed conflict—have been analyzed, as well as the phenomenon of ‘peacekeeping missions’ involving actual warfare. The new war terminology has created vagueness with respect to the clear-cut division between war and peace, which has been reflected in several cases before Court, including the Eric O. case. The present analysis of the case studies indicates that the model was not in all cases completely tailored to the facts: for example, in the case study on article 96 a broad spectrum of observable legal and non-legal actors dominated the facts in such a way that the model did not fully cover it. The observations on my book by the three respondents in this special issue have contributed to the adaptation and extension of the model. In the Postscript my responses suggest some ways in which their ideas can be implemented.

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Notes

  1. For an elaboration and analysis of several communication models see Van Schooten [62], pp. 185–211].

  2. The analytic program in philosophy is ordinarily dated to the work of English philosophers Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore in the early twentieth century. From about 1910–1930, analytic philosophers, Ludwig Wittgenstein being one of them, focused on creating an ideal language for philosophical analysis, which would be free from the ambiguities of ordinary language which, in their view, often got philosophers into trouble. This philosophical trend can be called ‘ideal-language analysis’ or ‘formalism’. In this phase, Russell and Wittgenstein sought to understand language, and hence philosophical problems, by making use of formal logic to formalize the way in which philosophical statements are made. Wittgenstein developed a comprehensive system of logical atomism in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, in which he argued that the world is the totality of actual states of affairs and that these states of affairs can be expressed in the language of first-order predicate logic. A picture of the world can therefore be built up by expressing atomic facts in atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators. Of course, such a “picture” is not the same as the “image” I use in my model. See Wittgenstein [69].

  3. Besides this approach, see Van Hoecke [59, p. 129], meaning is also determined by the context in which words are spoken or written.

  4. For a full elaboration of this viewpoint, see Ruiter [51, p. 361]. For a description of the variety of truth theories, see Pintore [45].

  5. For a full elaboration of the terms ‘referent’ and ‘reference’, see Jackson [25, p. 35].

  6. See further below, Sects. 3a, b.

  7. Ross briefly explains why he prefers the terms indicative and directive speech. See Ross [50, pp. 7–8].

  8. For a diagram in which different types of directives are classified, see Ross [50, p. 60].

  9. Lundstedt proposed to banish the concept of a right. Even the adjective ‘right’ did not meet with his approval. See Lundstedt [34, pp. 268, 274].

  10. Indeed. He stated that it seemed more correct to say that the word ‘right’ does not ‘stand for anything’ in the sense ‘that its meaning can be defined by the substitution method.’ See Ross [48].

  11. Bentham pointed out that the multitude of complex legal concepts can be reduced to sets of rules of conduct, constructed in one of the basic modalities of prohibition, obligation, and (positive or negative) permission. Legal rules, classified on the basis of their fundamental form, obligation, prohibition (positive) permission and (negative) permission, can be put in a logical square (of normative concepts) that expresses the contradictory and contrary relations among them, according to deontic legal logic. See Bentham [4, pp. 93–109], Kelsen [31], Weinberger [68], and Hohfeld [20]. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore Hohfeld’s ‘jural opposites’ and ‘jural correlatives’, as well as the difference between the contradictory and contrary, that determine the relations of the deontic square, see Hohfeld [20]. Bentham points out that there is no complete law which is not imperative or ‘deimperative’. Incomplete rules are fragments of complete rules; thus, legal definitions, exceptions, rules referring to other rules or setting out legal fictions are merely parts of the antecedents of complete rules: a complete rule is equivalent to the complete expression of the legislature’s will in respect of a given provision. See Bentham [4], pp. 93–109, 153–183].

  12. Going back to the early work of Anscombe. See Anscombe [1, pp. 69–72].

  13. Unlike MacCormick, Jackson classifies institutions into three categories: social, legal and religious institutions. See Jackson [28, pp. 221–251].

  14. For a critical evaluation of the Institutional Theory of Law, see Pintore [44, pp. 233–253].

  15. For an analogous classification, see Ruiter [52, p. 25].

  16. Among others, see Ruiter [52, p. 25].

  17. Olivecrona suggests that the original explanation of the sense of a legal command may have been magical. See Olivecrona [41, pp. 98, 226, 231].

  18. This process concentrates not only on what is meant, but also how, where, to whom and under what circumstances. See Bruner [8, p. 72].

  19. In reverse, this view is similar to Charles Peirce’s pragmatic concept of the ‘final interpretant’: the observable action as a ‘living definition’. Peirce states that the description of the action is ‘the most perfect account of a concept that words can convey.’ See Peirce [43, p. 491].

  20. For a full elaboration of this viewpoint, see Mead [39, p. 48]. The complexity of language has been to a great extent an object of research, resulting in many different views, different currents and schools, and semantic and syntactic approaches, which is beyond the scope of this paper.

  21. For an elaboration, see Jackendoff [22, p. 177]. Piaget, however, denies this assumption, arguing that the same set of structures in the mind operates equally upon different forms of sensory input. Image and language are both dependent on ‘cognitive development’, the development of general intelligence, which underlie the growth of language as well as other sense construction mechanisms. See Piaget [43, pp. 46f].

  22. See Van Schooten [67, pp. 57–58], for a brief description of the history and background of the Article.

  23. Memorie van antwoord, Eerste Kamer [Memorandum of Reply, First Chamber] 1997–1998, 25 442, no. 231b, p. 2.

  24. Interpretation of the Court in: HR 7 February 1956, 147 (Arm arrest) [Arm Case].

  25. Tweede bloed-proef arrest [Second Blood Test Case] HR 26 June 1962, NJ 1962, p. 470.

  26. HR 14 June 1974, NJ 1974, p. 436.

  27. HR 15 April 1975, NJ 1975, p. 288.

  28. HR 22 June 1973, NJ 1973, p. 386.

  29. For the historical context of this statement, see Grotius [12].

  30. Notitie inzake het VN-embargo tegen Irak (21 664, nr. 25), p.9. The government stated that since the Second World War the declaration of war at the beginning of an armed conflict between states had passed into disuse in international relations.

  31. However, there is one exception: in 1989 Iran formally declared war against Iraq, with which it had been engaged in hostilities since 1981.

  32. Committee on the cooperation between the government and the States General concerning foreign policy, Final Report, 9 July 1951, pp. 13–14.

  33. English translation: http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/nl00000_.html. In the Dutch language, the text of Article 57, revised in 1953, remained nearly the same: the present Article 96 (the former Article 57) reads as follows: ‘Het koninkrijk wordt niet in oorlog verklaard dan na voorafgaande toestemming van de Staten-Generaal.’

  34. As I discussed in my book. See Van Schooten [67], pp. 97–107].

  35. Eric O. case, Gerechtshof [Court of Appeal] Arnhem, 21-006275-04, www.rechtspraak.nl, LJN: AT4899; Slapende mariniers [Sleeping Marines] case, Rechtbank [District Court] Arnhem, 1 maart 2004, NJ 2004, 206.

  36. Article 39: ‘The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.’

  37. Already in Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) was explicitly authorized in Resolution 836 (1993), ‘acting in self-defence, to take the necessary means, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas’ (free from hostile acts) established by the Council, as well as to protect freedom of movement and humanitarian convoys (Security Council Resolution 836, 48 RDSC 13, 14 (1993). In Resolution 1101 (1997), the multinational protection force in Albania was authorized ‘to ensure the security and freedom of movement’ of its personnel (Security Counsel Resolution 1101, 52 RDSC 58 (1997). Most significantly, ONUM (United National Operation Burundi) was authorized by the Security Council, in Resolution 1545 (2004), ‘to use all necessary means’ to carry out its extensive mandate (Security Council Resolution 1545, 43 ILM 1453, 1455 (2004).

  38. A Glossary of UN Peacekeeping Terms can be found at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/glossary, with a link to the site Peace-keeping Operations: A Bibliography: http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/pkee.htm.

  39. In the aftermath of 9/11/2001, the starting point of the War on Terror.

  40. These facts are derived from statements made by several witnesses, the crane driver among them, and from Eric O.’s testimony. All these statements were used by the District Court as well as by the Court of Appeal. Both Courts stated that the accused did not give an unreasonable account of his actions and that the untruth of his testimony could only be established if it could be proved that he had lied.

  41. LJN: AR4029, Rechtbank Arnhem [Arnhem District Court], 05/097011-03.

  42. Here, the Public Prosecution Service referred to two cases in which the Court had rejected the existence of ‘time of war’ and its consequences, namely the applicability of the Dutch Penal Code and the Dutch Military Penal Code.

  43. Jackson defines such a group as ‘a social and/or professional group’ that distinguishes itself from other social and/or professional groups by the (often overlapping but still distinct) system of signification operating within it. See Jackson [25, pp. 97–98] and [56, p. 6].

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    Hanneke van Schooten

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van Schooten, H. Towards a New Analytical Framework for Legal Communication. Int J Semiot Law 27, 425–461 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-014-9356-y

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