Abstract
It will be argued that the values of liberalism and peace are essential elements of the moral identity of Europe, as well as universal moral values. They will be contrasted to Europe’s history of warfare. An essential point of reference for the moral identity of Europe is going to be sought in Kant’s notions of the “ethical commonwealth” and “perpetual peace”. The link between this identity and cosmopolitanism will be established. In addition to that, the moral superiority of cosmopolitanism vis-à-vis its alternatives will be asserted on the basis of the concept of the “normative will”. This concept is going to be situated in the framework of four paradigmatic formulations of cosmopolitanism. The primary conclusion will be that a pre-condition for the preservation of the moral identity of Europe is a redefinition of the concept of “being European” in the direction of increasing cultural inclusiveness. In other words, Europe is to reformulate its cultural underpinnings in order to preserve its moral identity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Some relevant critiques include the following arguments:
-
(1)
Serious crises between democratic states did not result in wars, but did in “near misses” [7];
-
(2)
Doyle and other proponents of his “democratic peace (DP) thesis” have selectively adopted definitions of key variables so that their data analysis yielded the results they were seeking [11];
-
(3)
The evidence that DP advocates stipulated is so sparse that statistical evidence cannot confirm their hypothesis [11].
-
(1)
Zum ewigen Frieden.
By “republican” Kant means a political society that combines individualism and social order. In such a society, the individual is a self-legislator making laws that apply equally to all citizens (himself included). It is warranted to avow that Kant’s conception of republican societies resembles the contemporary notion of liberal societies.
Cosmopolitan law, however, is to be limited to “conditions of universal hospitality”.
Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft. The notion that Kant distinguishes two phases (at least) in the path of humanity toward perpetual peace and a global state, an intermediate phase being addressed in Toward Perpetual Peace and The Metaphysics of Morals, and the final stage elaborated on in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, is not a generally accepted notion. It is one that I elaborated on in [10].
Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgelicher Absicht.
For the reasons behind Kant’s decision to elaborate in TPP on this halfway stage, see [10].
The concept of European peace goes hand in hand with the notion of reconciliation (or “Vergangenheitsbewältigung”). Both of them have closely related moral foundations that are in a dialectical relationship: reconciliation facilitates a lasting peace, while peace is a pre-condition for reconciliation.
For an extended formulation of my argument, see [9].
Wendt specifies five stages, calling them “a system of states”, “a society of states”, “a world society”, “collective security” and “a world state” [13].
Similar to my very brief elaboration on the relationship between justice and freedom from the previous section, here I will also use a concise formulation of my more extensive argument in History and Future of Justice [9]. Since a broader elaboration of that argument would negatively affect the thematic unity of this article, I use here only very condensed formulations from my previous work. A full insight into my line of thought on the issues of justice, freedom and the normative will, the reader can obtain from the mentioned piece.
For an extended statement on the issue of the “normative will of humanity”, see again [9], pp. 31–34.
A nice illustration of the normative will of humanity one can find in Kant’s Conflict of the Faculties, although Kant does not use the term “normative will” [6]. He very rightly observes that the “enthusiasm” for the French Revolution might have been simply a consequence of it being moral. Unlike enthusiasm for Hitler etc., which encompassed one nation or a limited number of nations, enthusiasm for the French revolution was one of humanity. The moral support for something by humanity is precisely its normative will!.
This does not imply, as will be clarified later, that the cultural identity of Europe is one toward which non-European cultures ought to converge. Cultural identity is largely based on conventions, whereas moral identity is marked by a more universal sense of what is right and wrong.
One possible scenario is the following. The problem of an increasingly old population in Europe (and most of the developed world) implies a smaller workforce. To be able to address this problem, Europe might attract ever more immigrants, it can set higher age requirements for retirement or it can even consider the use of “cosmetic neuro-pharmacology”. Ritalin, for example, as well as some medications that are primarily administered for the treatment of anxiety disorders, frequently have primary or side-effects, such as an increase in motivation and concentration, normal functioning with less sleep—to mention only some of them. A similar “cosmetic” enhancement of the cognitive function can also be carried out by DBS (Deep Brain Stimulation). Hence, it might become possible to increase productivity by the use of new bio-technologies, i.e. by means that are not limited to the immigration of workers from non-European countries. But are “cosmetic neuro-pharmacolgy” and “cosmetic neurosurgery” ethical, are they politically feasible? How will they impact our individual and collective identities, including our European identity? Whatever answers we give to these questions, it seems unavoidable that Europe has to address its increasing cultural diversity through some form of redefinition of its identity.
For an interesting elaboration on the relationship between European identity and EU enlargement, see [12]. Thiel notes that the widening of the EU has reached a “critical mass” and that hence “deepening” ought to reflect the changed identity of the EU. Thiel believes, however, that this deepening ought to be “more intergovernmental and less federational to (re-)gain and retain popular support” ([12], p. 9).
References
Beitz, C. 1979. Political theory and international relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Doyle, M.W. 1983. Kant, liberal legacies, and foreign affairs (parts I ands II). Philosophy and Public Affairs 12-3: 205–235 (I) and 12-4: 323–353 (II).
Held, D. 2002. Law of people, law of states. Legal Theory 8-1: 1–44.
Held, D. 2003. From executive to cosmopolitan multilateralism. In: Taming globalization: Frontiers of governance, 160–186. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Kant, I. 1793. Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft (Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason), erste Ausgabe.
Kant, I. 1907. Konflikt der Fakultäten (Conflict of the Faculties). Ausgabe der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.
Layne, C. 1996. Kant or cant: The myth of the democratic peace. In Debating the democratic peace, ed. M.E. Brown, S.M. Lynn-Jones, and S.E. Miller. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Marchetti, R. 2008. Global democracy: For and against. London, New York: Routledge.
Rakić, V. 2004. History and future of justice. Belgrade: VVMZ and Faculty of Organizational Sciences.
Rakić, V. 2009. Kant and cosmopolitanism in international relations. Human Security 17(1): 19–31.
Spiro, D.E. 1996. The insignificance of the liberal peace. In Debating the democratic peace, ed. M.E. Brown, S.M. Lynn-Jones, and S.E. Miller Brown. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Thiel, M. 2006. European identity and the challenge of enlargement. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 5(31): 1–9.
Wendt, A. 2003. Why a world state is inevitable. European Journal of International Relations 9: 491–542.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rakić, V. The Moral Identity of Europe: From Warfare and Civil Strife to “In Varietate Concordia”. Int J Semiot Law 25, 249–261 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9218-9
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11196-011-9218-9