Abstract
In this article, I attempt to address some enduring problems in formulation and practical use of the notion of structure in contemporary social science. I begin by revisiting the question of the fidelity of Anthony Giddens’ appropriation of the idea of structure with respect to Levi-Strauss. This requires a reconsideration of Levi-Strauss’ original conceptualization of “social structure” which I argue is a sort of “methodological structuralism” that stands sharply opposed to Giddens’ ontological reconceptualization of the notion. I go on to show that Bourdieu’s contemporaneous critique of Levi-Strauss is best understood as an attempt to recover rather than reject the central implication of Levi-Strauss’ methodological structuralism, which puts Bourdieu and Giddens on clearly distinct camps in terms of their approach toward the idea of structure. To demonstrate the—insurmountable—conceptual difficulties inherent in the ontological approach, I proceed by critically examining what I consider to be the most influential attempt to resolve the ambiguities in Giddens structuration theory: Sewell’s argument for the “duality of structure.” I show that by retaining Giddens’ ontological focus, Sewell ends up with a notion of structure that is at its very core “anti-structuralist” or only structuralist in a weak sense. I close by considering the implications of the analysis for the possibility of developing the rather neglected “methodological structuralist” legacy in contemporary social analysis.
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Notes
This history appears to be in accord with Thompson’s (1989, p. 62) assertion that “[f]ew concepts in the social sciences are more basic and essential, and yet more ambiguous and contested, than that of structure.”
Bourdieu’s own attempt to go beyond Sartrean subjectivism and Levi-Straussian objectivism in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977; French original: 1972) and in the later Logic of Practice (1990a; French original: 1980) during the same period (1972–1980), while having acquired equally influential status of late was not as immediately influential in Anglophone sociology as Giddens.
Giddens devoted an entire section of The Constitution of Society (1984, pp. 205–213) to a criticism is this “objectivist” idea of structure as it manifested itself in the work of some prominent American network structuralists of the time such as Bruce Mayhew and Peter Blau.
In contrast to network structuralism, structuralists in sociology who depart from Giddens’ structuration theory tend to emphasize the inherently cultural nature of structure as embodied in “virtual” cognitive schemas (Sewell 2005b, p. 151).
This division between the concrete and the abstract versions of structure itself reappears in mid-twentieth century linguistics, separating the “Anglosaxon” (like Radcliffe-Brown, empiricist) conceptualization of linguistic structure as a corpus of observable and “recordable utterances” proposed by Zelig Harris and the “American” structuralist school from language as an unobservable “system” proposed by members of the Prague school who themselves drew on the formative influence of Saussure. The problem with the empiricist definition of structure is, as Benveniste notes, that “this language realized in recordable utterances could be considered the manifestation of a hidden substructure” (Benveniste 1971, p. 14).
The term “methodological structuralism” was first used—to my knowledge—by Boudon in 1971 in reference to Levi-Strauss, in order to distinguish his approach from what he referred to as “philosophical structuralism,” which is closer to what I refer to as ontological structuralism below (Boudon quoted in Kurzweil [1980: 2]).
Sewell (2005b, p. 129) errs in thinking that Giddens’s notion of structure as rules fundamentally changes from a “Levi-Straussian” notion of structure as cultural rules analogous to the Saussurean langue in Central Problems in Social Theory to a more Wittgenstenian notion in the Constitution of Society. The Wittgenstenian critique of classic structuralism is already present in the earlier work in its entirety (see for instance Giddens 1979, pp. 37–38). In fact it would be easy—but outside of the scope of this article to demonstrate rigorously—to show that there is little that is fundamentally new at a conceptual level—outside of extending the structuration critique to other sociological thinkers (Goffman, Blau, et al.) and developing the linkages to Ericksonian psychoanalytic theory (e.g., the notion of “ontological security”)—in the 1984 exposition of the theory of structuration in comparison to that offered in the earlier book. In fact the 1979 work is in many ways a paragon of clarity of argumentation and analytical sharpness in comparison to the conceptual mélange offered in the Constitution of Society, and as such represents a much more useful source of theoretical exegesis regarding the conceptual origins of the theory of structuration than the latter tome.
For instance, the idea that structures do not have a “real” existence but only a “virtual” existence until they are “instantiated” by actors (a position that Giddens never abandons) is a clear-cut extension of the paradigmatic linguistic situation to the case of social action in general; it is straightforward to show that this analogy is not warranted, and furthermore leads to fundamental (and predictable) distortions of the nature of social action (see Bourdieu 1973: 58–59). However, what has not been adequately realized is that the illicit move is not due to some inherent flaw in the idea of structure—as argued by King (2000)—but to Giddens ’s illicit construal of properties of models (virtuality, lack of extension in time and space, etc.) as properties of real-world objects and processes that the new notion of structure comes to “denote.”
Bourdieu isolates Levi-Strauss as one of the most influential examples of the aforementioned fallacy; but as we have seen Giddens is responsible for a similar mistake in his ontologization of structure as rules (and resources) productive of the chronic instantiation of practices.
The original article was published in 1992 in the American Journal of Sociology.
For instance, among the “structures” considered by Sewell (2005b, pp. 140–151) are: modes of production based on private property in capitalist societies, institutionalized forms of labor organization, the “theological modes” that constrain religion in Christian societies, language, the nation state, military structures, financial structures, and a whole host of other heterogeneous entities and competences.
This important set of problems in Sewell’s account has already been noted by Ann Swidler (2001, p. 79), who remarks that thinking of “... everything from capitalism to handshakes as structured practice can be liberating, but it can also lead to trouble.” The reason for this has to with the tension that is introduced between the usual idea of a structure as implying a simple ordered organization and the newer idea of structure as containing contradictory elements characterized by contingency, unpredictability, and heterogeneity. Swidler notes that “... we can say a great deal about what any one part of such system implies about the other parts ...” when holding on the former view of structure. “But if there is multiplicity, multivocality... and contradiction between structures ... then the reinterpretation of structures may lead to its own dead ends.”
I acknowledge an anonymous reader for bringing this commonality to my attention.
For instance, in the prologue to The State Nobility, entitled “Social Structures and Mental Structures”—to take the clearest out of many possible examples—Bourdieu (1996a, p. 1) notes that it is “the goal of sociology to uncover the most deeply buried structures of the different social worlds that make up the social universe, as well as the ‘mechanisms’ that ensure their reproduction and transformation.”
I am skeptical of this argument for the necessary coupling between so-called quantitative methods and a “mechanistic” ontology. As Fararo (1989) has noted, the underlying mathematical model objects that form of the core of traditional quantitative methods can also be thought of as implying a non-substantialist “process-ontology” strictly antithetical to a mechanistic one.
A chapter that appropriately opens with an epigraphic quote from Lewin.
Richard Nice translates the French phrase espace hodologique as “traveling space” (but is judicious enough to leave the French original in brackets in the English translation). This translation is somewhat unfortunate, since it is clear that in this context Bourdieu is referring to Kurt Lewin’s term “hodological space,” which the latter used as synonymous to the individual “life-space” and “psychological space.” Rendering this term “traveling space” breaks the “family resemblance” that Bourdieu’s methodological structuralism bears to Lewin’s field theory (the only other major theorist in the social sciences who seriously dealt with the question of the relationship between formal models constructed by the analyst and real psycho-social processes that those models are designed to shed light on).
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Ron Breiger, John Levi Martin, Michael Strand, and in particular the Theory and Society Ediros and reviewers for their very helpful comments and suggestions. This article benefited in more ways than I can count or remember from their feedback. All remaining errors and omissions are my responsibility.
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Lizardo, O. Beyond the antinomies of structure: Levi-Strauss, Giddens, Bourdieu, and Sewell. Theor Soc 39, 651–688 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-010-9125-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-010-9125-1