Abstract
The paper exploits the “Mad Cow” crisis as a natural experiment to gain knowledge on the behavioral effect of new health information. The analysis uses a detailed data set following a sample of households through the crisis. The paper disentangles the effect of non-separable preferences across time from the effect of previous exposure. It shows that new health information interacts in a non-monotonic way with disease susceptibility. Individuals at low or high risk of infection do not respond to new health information. The results show that individual behavior partly offsets the effect of new health information.
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Notes
Consumers learned about the crisis on March 20, 1996, so their reactions to the news are observed during 13 weeks. This is enough to study their immediate reaction but not longer term behavior.
Adda and Cornaglia (2006) document a related trade-off for tobacco consumption.
The country of origin of the beef was not recorded, because, up to 1997, it was not legal to reveal the country of origin to the consumer for “fear of distortions” on the beef market. Yet, shortly after the crisis, the French retail industry set up a label on domestic beef, which was assumed to be safer than foreign beef. In April 1996, the consumer had then the choice between French and foreign beef, but the precise origin of the foreign beef was not indicated. At the time of the crisis, French cows had also been diagnosed with BSE, so it is not clear whether the label was very meaningful. There is no indication that the introduction of this label changed the aggregate demand for beef.
With hindsight, this does not appear to be a rational behavior as these cuts are closer to the spine and therefore more likely to lead to contamination. However, at the time of the crisis, there was not extensive knowledge about the transmission of the disease, especially among consumers.
In France, the awareness of a link between beef, cholesterol and coronary heart diseases (CHD) is lower than in many other countries. France has the lowest rate of CHD in the world together with Japan. The rate is about three times lower than in the USA, and four times lower than in the UK. The consumption of beef is mostly determined by cultural differences across regions.
The first stage indicates that the instruments have power with F tests with associated p values of 0 for all endogenous variables.
We do not find statistical evidence of gender differences for younger children.
However, the fact that parents cannot split from their teenagers gives these children some bargaining power.
We also estimated a tobit model which takes into account the truncation at zero, as expenditures cannot be negative. Consumers with a small stock might have little scope to reduce their consumption, which might explain why they respond less to the crisis. We found that the results are comparable to the one in Table 3.
We are grateful to W. Kip Viscusi for suggesting this point.
Becker and Mulligan (1997) discuss the case of an endogenous discount factor.
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I am grateful to SECODIP, the Observatoire des Consommations Alimentaires, to Christine Boizot for research assistance, to Gary Becker, Russell Cooper, Christian Dustmann, Valérie Lechene, Costas Meghir, Jean-Marc Robin, W. Kip Viscusi, Tim Besley, an anonymous referee and to seminar participants at Boston University, ESEM, Harvard University, INRA, INSEE, LSE, University of Bristol, University of Chicago, University College London and University of Toulouse for comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
Appendix
Appendix
The first order condition of model 1 is:
where u i and V i denote the partial derivative of the utility function and second period indirect utility function with respect to the ith argument. First differentiating this expression gives:
which can be written more compactly as:
so that:
Standard restrictions on the shape of the utility function imply that u i > 0, u ii < 0, V i > 0, V ii < 0. Moreover, the definition of the survival probability implies that \(\partial \pi(S,\kappa)/\partial S=\pi_1\le 0\) and that \(\partial \pi(S,\kappa)/\partial \kappa=\pi_2\le 0\), if individuals perceive that nvCJD is a threat to life.
If u 12 ≥ 0 (beef and other meat products are complements) and the relationship between survival and beef consumption is concave (π 11 ≤ 0, then \(\tilde{A}_B\le 0\), \(\tilde{A}_p\le 0\) and \(\tilde{A}_y \ge 0\). The effect of health information on consumption of beef is equal to:
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Adda, J. Behavior towards health risks: An empirical study using the “Mad Cow” crisis as an experiment. J Risk Uncertainty 35, 285–305 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-007-9026-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-007-9026-5