Abstract
Misrecognition from other individuals and social institutions is by its dynamic or ‘logic’ such that it can lead to distorted relations-to-self, such as self-hatred, and can truncate the development of the central capabilities of persons. Thus it is worth trying to shed light on how misrecognition differs from adequate recognition, and on how misrecognition might differ from other kinds of mistreatment and disregard. This paper suggests that misrecognition (including nonrecognition) is a matter of inadequate responsiveness to the normatively relevant features of someone (their personhood, merits, needs etc.), and that if the kind of mistreatment in question obeys the general dynamic or ‘logic’ of mutual recognition and relations-to-self, then it may be called ‘misrecognition’. Further, this article considers the multiple connections between misrecognition and human fallibility. The capacity to get things wrong or make mistakes (that is, fallibility) is first of all a condition of misrecognition. Furthermore, there are two lessons that we can draw from fallibility. The first one points towards minimal objectivism: if something is to count as a mistake or incorrect response, there must accordingly exist a fact of the matter or a correct response. The other lesson points towards public equality: if our capacity to get things right on our own is limited, then public, shared norms will probably help. Such norms are easier to know and follow than objective normative truths, and they may contain collective cumulative wisdom; and of course the process of creating public norms embodies in itself an important form of mutual recognition between citizens.
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Notes
In Laitinen (2010a) I discuss the variety of responses, and the variety of features of persons in more detail.
To the extent that we relate to them ‘esteem-wise’ at all—which may well be optional normatively speaking (the other option being not having a view about their merits at all) and non-optional only given special relations or previous commitments.
See also Ikäheimo (2010).
Note however, that it may often be possible to be responsive to such reasons also without the attitudes—if one has other motivations that make one responsive to them.
Arguably both cognitive and moral autonomy are involved in recognitive competence—the competence to recognize others, and indeed personal and political autonomy as well.
This question can be understood as concerning the nature of recognition (is it a matter of attitudes, actions, expressions, statuses?), or the scope of recognition (narrower or broader). I will here put aside the question about the nature of recognition and use phrases like ‘take or treat’ (see Brandom 2007) to refer to it.
Note however, that justified harming may be a case of adequate recognition, for example in the just punishment of criminals. I thank Annette Dufner for posing the question.
I discuss critically various narrow views in Laitinen (2010a).
On further variations of the failure of recognition, see Thompson and Hoggett (2011).
This concerns also remedies: after an injustice has achieved public attention, the remedy must also be publically exercised.
Christiano characterizes the interest in ‘being at home’ through the following seven ideas: (1) having an array of meaningful choices in life, (2) understanding the institutions under which one lives, (3) understanding the ways in which the institutions affirm or discourage practices, (4) connection to and identification with the projects of other people, society as a whole and its parts, (5) having others affirm and identify with one’s own projects (no sense of anomie), (6) having one’s intimate self protected in ways which do not disgust or humiliate one, (7) having one’s intimate self ‘provided for’ in ways which do not disgust or humiliate others (Christiano 2008, pp. 90–93). Earlier, it is characterized as an interest in appreciating and enjoying the world; it is at the heart of one’s well-being—having a sense of fit, connection and meaning in the world in which one lives (pp. 61–63). Thus people have an interest in the world conforming to their judgements—otherwise it is opaque or hostile to one’s interests. ‘It is like playing a game whose rules do not make sense to one. One is at a loss’ (p. 62). As a permanent state, it is a serious setback to one’s interests.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the participants in the conferences ‘The Politics of Misrecognition’, Bristol, January 2010, and ‘The Social Ontology of Personhood: A Recognition-Theoretical Approach’, in Münster, February 2011 for discussions, and Simon Thompson and Nasar Meer for very helpful comments and suggestions.
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Laitinen, A. Misrecognition, Misrecognition, and Fallibility. Res Publica 18, 25–38 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9183-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-012-9183-5