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A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics

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Abstract

A common intuition is that there is a moral difference between ‘making people happy’ and ‘making happy people.’ This intuition, often referred to as ‘the Asymmetry,’ has, however, been criticized on the grounds that it is incoherent. Why is there, for instance, not a corresponding difference between ‘making people unhappy’ and ‘making unhappy people’? I argue that the intuition faces several difficulties but that these can be met by introducing a certain kind of reason that is favouring but non-requiring. It is argued that there are structural similarities between the asymmetry and moral options and that the asymmetry can be defended as an instance of a moral option.

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Notes

  1. It is important, on this view, to distinguish between the personal value of a life (how good a certain way of life is for a person) and the ‘contributive value’ of a life (the difference a certain life makes to the impersonal value of a population). See Arrhenius (2000, p. 7) and Broome (2004, p. 65).

  2. For completeness sake we should perhaps also say that a neutral life is a life where the good and bad things are evenly matched, or if there is a complete lack of both. I will not consider neutral lives in what follows however.

  3. I borrow this distinction between Weak and Strong Asymmetry from McMahan (2009).

  4. See Harman (2004). Another proponent of this view is W. D. Ross who says that ‘non-maleficence is apprehended as a duty distinct from that of beneficence, and as a duty of more stringent character’ (Ross 2002, p. 21). It should be noted that Strong Asymmetry is not incompatible with there being reasons in favour of bringing people into existence; it only states that such reasons cannot be grounded in the well-being this person would have.

  5. McMahan (2009) argues for a similar conclusion. He lists four consequences of Weak Asymmetry which he finds ‘very difficult to believe’ and notes that Strong Asymmetry ‘may be the only view that captures our strongest intuitions about the morality of procreation’ (McMahan 2009, p. 67).

  6. This is of course not an uncontroversial assumption. Broome (1999) argues that existence cannot be better or worse for a person than non-existence since if the person does not exist then ‘there would have been no [person] for it to be worse for’ (Broome 1999, p. 168). See also Bykvist (2007). For attempts to account for comparisons of this kind, see for example Holtug (2001) and Roberts (2003a, 2010).

  7. See McMahan (1981, p. 100) and Heyd (1994, p. 111) for a similar treatment of the Asymmetry.

  8. This is view is endorsed by for example Narveson (1967, pp. 63–64) and (1973, p. 66, 73). Parsons (2002, p. 137) seems to accept a similar view.

  9. See Bykvist (2007, p. 348) for a discussion of this principle.

  10. For example, Shiffrin (1999) couches her defence of the Asymmetry in Kantian terms and Benatar (2006) uses both personal and impersonal values. As we will see, neither of these are necessary to formulate this particular way of defending the Asymmetry.

  11. Parfit (1984, appendix G) entertains this idea. See also Harman (2004) and Bykvist (2007).

  12. See Parfit (1984, Pt 4). For a critical discussion of this problem, see Woodward (1986), Hanser (1990) and Roberts (2010, Appendix B).

  13. Roberts (2003b, 2010) accepts that in some cases where there is non-identity it is permissible to create the person with less well-being, though she argues that this does not mean that we have to say this about all non-identity cases.

  14. This is also argued by McMahan (2009, p. 53, p. 61).

  15. Benatar (2006) endorses this view while Shiffrin merely says that procreation is not a ‘morally innocent endeavor’ (Shiffrin 1999, p. 118).

  16. This is only true of requiring reasons on my view. That is, I can still accept that if an act is favoured by the balance of requiring reasons then it is morally required.

  17. See Urmson (1958) and Heyd (1982).

  18. This difference is even more striking if we consider non-standard ways of creating new people. Suppose that, in the far future, people are born in pretty much the same way as they are in science fiction novels like Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World. Here it seems clear that no one is doing anything praiseworthy in creating new people.

  19. The possibility of saving the Asymmetry by classifying procreation as supererogatory is noted by Heyd (1982, p. 115).

  20. For a more detailed discussion, and some criticism, of options, see Kagan (1989).

  21. Persson (2009) argues for a similar conclusion but thinks that the Asymmetry is intimately connected with rights. It is unclear however whether Persson thinks of rights as deontic constraints, options or both.

  22. For an attempt to save the Asymmetry which is compatible with consequentialism, see Roberts (2010, pp. 88–92).

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Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Kent Hurtig, Gustaf Arrhenius, Eric Carlson and an anonymous referee for their many helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden

    Per Algander

  2. Filosofiska institutionen, Uppsala Universitet, Box 627, 751 26, Uppsala, Sweden

    Per Algander

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Algander, P. A Defence of the Asymmetry in Population Ethics. Res Publica 18, 145–157 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9164-0

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