This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Notes
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights. 1981, Article 23.1.
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 1965, Article 5.D.vi.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948, Article 12.
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights. 1969, Article 7c.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 1966. Article 12.1.
There are of course many other problems with this putative right, including the question of how its substance could be enjoyed by individuals. My argument here does not assume that there is a human right to international peace. I claim only that certain dismissals of such a right are premature. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out the need for this clarification.
Griffin argues that this right is particularly lavish, and is “not even a reasonable social aim” (2001b, 25). He sees it as a particularly egregious example of drafters of rights conventions losing sight of the difference between an aspiration and a right. Nickel agrees that this claim “departs from the idea of human rights as minimal standards in demanding optimization of health rather than setting a threshold” (p142). This is too quick a condemnation. All of the rights in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights must be read in conjunction with Article 2.1, which obliges each state party “to take steps..., to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant...” When interpreted in light of these two qualifications, the right to the highest attainable standard of mental and physical health appears less demanding and is a more plausible candidate as a human right.
Of course, in some contexts sustained pinching could form part of a regime of torture, or constitute serious disrespect of a person’s dignity, in which case the infringement would be considered more serious.
References
Cranston, Maurice. 1973. What are human rights? Bodley Head.
Griffin, James. 2001a. Discrepancies between the best philosophical account of human rights and the international law of human rights. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101(1), 1–28.
Griffin, James. 2001b. First steps in an account of human rights. European Journal of Philosophy 306–327.
Jarvis Thomson, Judith. 1990. The realm of rights. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Kamm, F.M. 2002. Rights. In The Oxford handbook of jurisprudence and philosophy of law, eds. J.L. Coleman S. Shapiro, K.E. Himma, 476–513. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1995. Personal rights and public space. Philosophy and Public Affairs 24(2): 83–107.
Tasioulas, John. 2002. Human rights, universality and the values of personhood: Retracing Griffin’s steps. The European Journal of Philosophy 79–100.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Ferreira, N. The Expanding Realm of Human Rights. Res Publica 14, 57–64 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-007-9043-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-007-9043-x