Abstract
In this paper, we investigate whether lenders alter their degree of monitoring of loans given to a firm after a credit default Swap (CDS) becomes available for the firm. Using a sample of nearly 21,000 loans taken by nearly 4600 non-financial U.S firms over the period of 1996–2014, we find that lenders decrease their degree of monitoring on loans granted to a firm after the inception of the firm’s CDS. The reduction in degree of monitoring is not dependent on whether the lender holds the CDS or not. The availability of the CDS motivates the lenders to decrease the degree of monitoring of loans granted to the firm evidenced by relatively lower degree of comprehensiveness and intensity of both financial and non-financial covenants attached to the post-CDS loans. These findings are robust to loan and firm characteristics, and different measures of covenant comprehensiveness and intensity.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
I conducted OLS regressions as well. I find qualitatively similar results.
References
Acharya V, Johnson T (2007) Insider trading in credit derivatives. J Financ Econ 84:110–141
Ahn S, Choi W (2009) The role of bank monitoring in corporate governance: evidence from borrowers’ earnings management behavior. J Bank Financ 33:425–434
Amihud Y, Garbade K, Kahan M (1999) A new governance structure for corporate bonds. Stanford Law Rev 51:447–492
Amiram D, Beaver W, Landsman W, Zhao J (2017) The effect of credit default swap trading on information asymmetry of syndicated loans. J Financ Econ 126:364–382
Arentsen E, Mauer D, Rosenlund B, Zhang H, Zhao F (2015) Subprime mortgage defauls and credit default swaps. J Financ 70:689–731
Ashcraft A, Santos J (2009) Has the CDS market lowered the cost of debt? J Monet Econ 56:514–523
Bai X, Hu N, Liu L, Zhu L (2017) Credit derivatives and stock return synchronicity. J Financ Stab 28:79–90
Batta G, Qui J, Yu F (2015a), Credit derivatives and earnings announcement, Working Paper
Bharath S, Shumway T (2008) Forecasting default with the Merton distance to default model. Rev Financ Stud (21):1339–1369
Bolton P, Oehmke M (2011) Credit default swaps and the empty creditor problem. Rev Financ Stud 24:2617–2655
Bradley M, Roberts M (2015) The structure and pricing of corporate debt covenants. Q J Financ 5:36–74
Campello M, Matta R (2012) Credit default swaps and risk-shifting. Econ Lett 117:639–641
Chakraborty I, Chava S, Ganduri R (2015b), Credit default swaps and moral hazard in bank lending. Working Paper
Chang X, Chen Y, Wang S, Zhang K, Zhang W (2017a) Credit default swaps and corporate innovation. J Financ Econ 134(2):474–500
Chava S, Roberts M (2008) How does financing impact debt investment? The role of debt covenants. J Finan 63(5):2085–2121
Che Y, Sethi R (2014) Credit market speculation and the cost of capital. Am Econ J 6:1–34
Danis A, Gamba A (2018) The real effects of credit default swaps. J Financ Econ 127:51–76
Danis A (2016) Do empty creditors matter? Evidence from distressed exchange offers. Manage Sci 63:1285–1301
Datta S, Datta M, Patel A (2000) Some evidence on the uniqueness of initial public debt offerings. J Financ 55:715–743
Datta S, Datta M, Patel A (1999) Bank monitoring and the pricing of corporate public debt. J Financ Econ 51:435–449
Demiroglu C, James C (2010) The information content of bank loan covenants. Rev Financ Stud 23:3700–3737
Drucker S, Puri M (2009) On loan sales, loan contracting, and lending relationships. Rev Financ Stud 22:2835–2872
Frankel R, Litov L (2007) Financial accounting characteristics and debt covenants. SSRN J 145:42. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.978711
Fuller K, Yildiz S, Uymaz Y (2018) Credit default swaps and firms’ financing policies. J Corp Financ 48:34–48
Gorton G, Kahn J (2000) The design of bank loan contracts. Rev Financ Stud 13:331–364
Guest P, Karampatsas N, Petmezas D, Travlos NG (2016) Credit default swaps and corporate acquisitions. Working Paper
Halle G, Santos J (2009) Do banks price their information monopoly? J Financ Econ 93:185–206
Halle G, Santos J (2008) The decision to first enter the public bond market: the role of firm reputation, funding choices, and bank relationships. J Bank Financ 32:1928–1940
Holmstrom B, Tirole J (1997) Financial intermediation, loanable funds, and the real sector. Quart J Econ 112:663–691
Hong L, Sirmans S, Xie K (2017b) Credit default swaps, equity risks, and corporate risk taking. Working Paper
Hong J, Na W (2021) The effects of credit default swaps on corporate investment. Eur J Financ 27:260–277
Hu H, Black B (2008) Debt, equity, and hybrid decoupling: governance and systematic risk implications. Eur Financ Manag (14):663–709
Jensen M, Meckling W (1976) Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J Financ Econ 3:305–360
Kim J, Shroff P, Vyas D, Wittenberg-Moerman R (2018) Credit default swaps and managers’ voluntary disclosure. J Account Res 56:953–988
Mansi S, Qi Y, Wald JK (2012) Debt covenants and bankruptcy risk. SSRN Electron J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1805038
Martin X, Roychowdhury S (2015) Do financial market developments influence accounting practices? Credit default swaps and borrowers׳ reporting conservatism. J Account Econ 59:80–104
Murfin J (2012) The supply-side determinants of loan contract strictness. J Financ 67:1565–1601
Nini G, Sufi A, Smith D (2012) Creditor control rights, corporate governance and firm value. Rev Financ Stud 25:1713–1761
Nini G, Sufi A, Smith D (2009) Creditor control rights and firm investment policy. J Financ Econ 92:400–420
Parlour C, Winton A (2013) Laying off credit risk: Loan sales versus credit default swaps. J Financ Econ 107:25–45
Qui L, Liu R, Jin Y, Ding C, Fan Y, Yeung A (2022) Impact of credit default swaps on firms’ operational efficiency. Prod Oper Manag 31:3611–3631
Rajan R, Winton A (1995) Covenants and collateral as incentives to monitor. J Financ 50:1113–1146
Roberts MR, Whited TM (2013) Endogeneity in empirical corporate finance1. Elsevier. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-44-453594-8.00007-0
Saretto A, Tookes H (2013) Corporate leverage, debt maturity and credit supply: the role of credit default swaps. Rev Financ Stud 26:1190–1247
Shan C, Tang D, Winton A (2019) Do banks still monitor when there is a market for creditor protection? J Account Econ 68:101241
Shan SC, Tang DY, Yan H (2014) Credit default swaps and bank risk taking. SSRN Electron J. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2378272
Smith C, Warner J (1979) On financial contracting: an analysis of bond covenants. J Financ Econ 7:117–161
Subrahmanyam M, Tang D, Wang S (2014) Does the tail wag the dog?: the effect of credit default swaps on credit risk. Rev Financ Stud 27:2927–2960
Susteric J (2012) Do traded credit default swaps impacts lenders’ monitoring activities? Evidence from private loan agreements. Ohio State University, UK
Vashishtha R (2014) The role of bank monitoring in borrowers’ discretionary disclosure: evidence from covenant violations. J Account Econ 57:176–195
Wu W, Fok R, Chang Y, Chen C (2022) Credit default swaps and corporate performance smoothing. J Corp Finan 75(1–24):102240
Zhao C, Li Y, Govindaraj S, Zhong Z (2022) CDS trading and analyst optimism. Br Account Rev 54(1–17):101109
Funding
The authors acknowledge financial support from CPA Ontario.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendix 1
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Essaddam, N., Hossain, M. & Hussain, T. Do credit default swaps impact lenders’ monitoring of loans?. Rev Quant Finan Acc 61, 567–600 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01159-y
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01159-y