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Do credit default swaps impact lenders’ monitoring of loans?

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Abstract

In this paper, we investigate whether lenders alter their degree of monitoring of loans given to a firm after a credit default Swap (CDS) becomes available for the firm. Using a sample of nearly 21,000 loans taken by nearly 4600 non-financial U.S firms over the period of 1996–2014, we find that lenders decrease their degree of monitoring on loans granted to a firm after the inception of the firm’s CDS. The reduction in degree of monitoring is not dependent on whether the lender holds the CDS or not. The availability of the CDS motivates the lenders to decrease the degree of monitoring of loans granted to the firm evidenced by relatively lower degree of comprehensiveness and intensity of both financial and non-financial covenants attached to the post-CDS loans. These findings are robust to loan and firm characteristics, and different measures of covenant comprehensiveness and intensity.

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Notes

  1. I conducted OLS regressions as well. I find qualitatively similar results.

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The authors acknowledge financial support from CPA Ontario.

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Correspondence to Naceur Essaddam.

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Appendix 1

Appendix 1

See (Table

Table 16 Regression Variable Definitions and Data Sources

16).

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Essaddam, N., Hossain, M. & Hussain, T. Do credit default swaps impact lenders’ monitoring of loans?. Rev Quant Finan Acc 61, 567–600 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-023-01159-y

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