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Accounting information and left-tail risk

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Abstract

Several recent studies attribute stock price crashes to firms withholding bad news from financial disclosures before a stock price crash. Contrary to this notion, we find evidence of a robust link between information in a firm’s financial disclosures and potential left-tail risk. We document that the sophisticated equity options traders incorporate information derived from financial statements about left-tail risk into prices of out-of-the-money put options on a firm’s equity, implying that a firm’s financial disclosures contain significant information relevant to pricing expected crash risk. However, we find that stock market investors at large appear to overlook this link and fail to incorporate information in financial disclosures about left-tail risk into stock prices in a timely fashion, potentially contributing to the severity of the eventual crash. These findings contradict the notion that managers can fully conceal information pertinent to left-tail risks and highlight the role of potential errors by investors in processing accounting information pertinent to left-tail risks. Our study is amongst the first to link financial statement analysis to expected crash risk.

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Notes

  1. Support for this idea is drawn from studies that suggest that managers are incentivized to release news in an asymmetric fashion. For example, Kothari et al. (2009) report evidence that managers delay the release of bad news while readily leaking good news. Baginski et al. (2018) and Jiang et al. (2020) link this behavior to managerial incentives to conceal bad news to prevent negative career outcomes. Furthermore, Hamm et al. (2020) report release of bad news is frequently preceded by optimistic guidance by managers to disguise the delay in revealing bad news.

  2. Investors may react to information in a delayed fashion due to a host of cognitive biases documented in earlier studies. Some examples include overconfidence (Daniel et al. 1998), conservatism bias (Barber et al. 1998), representativeness bias (Kahneman and Tversky 1982), and limited attention (Daniel et al 2002). To our knowledge there is very limited work on whether such cognitive errors play a role in investors underestimating tail-risk.

  3. Intuitively, all else equal, an out-of-the money put option is less valuable than an at-the-money call option because the left tail of the stock price distribution is limited at $0 while no such limitation exists in the right tail. As the probability of extreme downside risk increases, the out-of-the money put option becomes relatively more valuable.

  4. In our tests, we control for the previously documented relation between the fundamentals and stock returns to ensure that our findings are incrementally informative about the left-tail of the return distribution.

  5. Additional details are provided in Sect. 3.2 of the paper and in the appendix.

  6. Similarly, Banerjee and Deb (2017) show that the profitability of value strategies relies on the strong performance of a few firms with strong fundamentals that outperform less robust value counterparts.

  7. Francis et. al. (2016) finds that ability of discretionary accruals predict crash risk has essentially disappeared in the post-SOX period. Instead, they find that deviations from real operations to be positively correlated with future crash risk.

  8. An extensive body of empirical literature that examines how financial markets react to a wide range of news events has found that on the whole, markets appear to initially underreact to both positive and negative news. A few of these include the works of: Hong and Stein (1999), Hong et al. (2002). Ikenberry et al (1995), and, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002).

  9. An extensive review of literature that has examined investor psychology in capital market can be found in Daniel et al. (2002)

  10. For example, Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke (2000) examine interplay of multiple fundamental signals and report that higher leverage is associated with earnings that are less informative for valuation. Thus, a myopic focus on a single fundamental signal (i.e., high earnings) while disregarding an alternative fundamental signal (i.e. high leverage) can lead to valuation errors.

  11. Some studies examine investor characteristics related to crash risk. For example, foreign ownership (Vo 2018), low liquidity (An et al. 2018), and greater margin trading volatility (Lv and Wu 2019) predict greater crash risk. Additionally, Bai et al. (2020) report that superstition affects crash risk in the Chinese market due to investor overreaction to negative news when a firm has an “unlucky” listing number. Moreover, stock forum-induced panic predicts stock price crashes on the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market (Yang et al. 2020a, b).

  12. As in Hutton et al. (2009), discretionary accruals ($$D{iscAcc}_{i,t}$$) are measured using the modified Jones model (Dechow et al, 1995):

    \(\frac{{TA_{i,t} }}{{Assets_{i,t - 1} }} = \alpha_{0} \frac{1}{{Assets_{i,t - 1} }} + \alpha_{1} \frac{{\Delta Sales_{i,t} }}{{Assets_{i,t - 1} }} + \alpha_{1} \frac{{PPE_{i,t} }}{{Assets_{i,t - 1} }} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\)

    where \({TA}_{i,t}\) are the total accruals, \({\Delta Sales}_{i,t}\) is the change in sales, and \({PPE}_{i,t}\) is the property, plant, and equipment value for firm i during year t. We measure total accruals as in Sloan (1996): Total Accruals = [Change in Current Assets (ACT) – Change in Cash (CH) – Change in Current Liabilities (LCT) + Change in Debt in Current Liabilities (DLC) – Depreciation (DP)]/Assetsi,t-1. Compustat variables are in parentheses.

  13. We refer the reader to Kim et al. 2016 for a description of how this variable is calculated. We follow their approach in calculating this variable.

  14. We do run tests using simple logit models and find stronger results but do not tabulate them in the paper.

  15. Accounting fundamentals, including the F-score, have previously been shown to predict cross-sectional differences in future stock returns; a portfolio of firms with weak fundamentals achieves lower future returns while a portfolio of firms with strong fundamentals achieves higher future returns. While our tests focus on extreme negative returns, we would like to ensure that we are not simply picking up previously documented effects. To address this, we follow Piotroski and So (2012) to form portfolios of firms based on the F-score and adjust the annual return of each firm by subtracting the return of a portfolio of firms with similar fundamentals. This procedure is similar to numerous prior studies that subtract returns of size-based portfolios to control for the size effect.

  16. Also shown are coefficient estimates for several control variables, defined in the appendix, along with overall model fit statistics.

  17. Calculated as \({e}^{\widehat{\beta }}\) per Eq. (4) in Sect. 3.2. This statistic is shown at the bottom of the panel along with a 95% Wald confidence interval.

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Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Variable Definitions

  • \(ATM\_IV_{i,t} \) – is the daily open interest-weighted implied volatility of at the money (ATM) call options, computed as the average over the fiscal year.

  • \(Beta_{i,t}\) – is the market beta estimated from the CAPM using daily stock and market returns over the fiscal year (used in Table 6).

  • \(BidAskSpread_{i,t}\) – is the mean daily relative bid-ask spread over the year, where relative bid-ask spread as the absolute difference in daily ending bid and ask divided by the average of daily ending bid and ask.

  • \(Cashflow\_Vol_{i,t}\) – is the standard deviation of operating cash flow (OANCF) (scaled by lagged total assets) over the past five years.

  • \(CRASH_{i,t,t + 12}\) – an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if firm i experiences a negative one-year stock return of -50% or worse (in other models we use -70% or worse) during year t,t + 12, and 0 otherwise. Year t,t + 12 is defined as the 12 months starting with four months after the most recent fiscal year-end. For generalized logit models, a value of -1 is assigned to firms with a one-year positive stock return of + 50% or greater (in other models + 70% or greater).

  • \(Earnings\_Vol_{i,t}\) – is the standard deviation of income before extraordinary items (IB) (scaled by lagged total assets) over the prior five years.

  • \(HHI_{i,t}\) – is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index measured within each three-digit SIC industry-year.

  • \(Idosy\_Vol_{i,t}\) – is the standard deviation of weekly firm-specific returns over the fiscal year.

  • \(Illiquidity_{i,t} -\) is the median daily price impact over the year where price impact equals the daily absolute price change in percent divided by US$ trading volume (measured in thousands) from Amihud (2002). We omit zero return days to avoid misclassifying low trading activity days as highly liquid and multiply Illiquidity by 1,000. Smaller values indicate greater liquidity.

  • \(IV\_SKEW_{i,t}\) – a proxy for expected crash risk calculated as the average daily implied volatility skew over either the three months (\(IV\_SKEW3_{i,t}\)) or 12 months (\(IV\_SKEW12_{i,t}\)) beginning in the fourth month following the fiscal year-end.

  • \(Ln\left( {Mktval} \right)_{i,t}\) – the natural log of the market value of firm i's equity calculated as the shares outstanding (CSHO) times the stock price (PRCC_F) as of the fiscal year-end t.

  • \(Ln\left( \frac{B}{M} \right)_{i,t}\) – the natural log of the ratio of firm i’s book-value of equity (CEQ) to its market value as of fiscal year-end t.

  • \(Ln\left( {Leverage} \right)_{i,t}\) – the natural log of the ratio of firm i’s long-term total debt to its balance sheet value of assets as of fiscal year-end t.

  • \(Ln\left( {Ret} \right)_{i,t}\) – the natural log of one plus the one-year stock return during fiscal year t.

  • \(Ln\left( {Vol} \right)_{i,t}\) – the natural log of the ratio of firm i’s stock return volatility is measured as the standard deviation of its monthly stock returns ending over a 36-month period ending at fiscal year-end t.

  • \(MktBeta_{i,t}\) – the beta of a firm estimated using its past 36 monthly returns regressed against the value-weighted market index as of the end of fiscal year-end t.

  • \(\left( \frac{M}{B} \right)_{i,t}\) – is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity at the end of the year.

  • \(NEG\_SKEW_{i,t}\) – is the negative skewness of weekly stock returns over the fiscal year.

  • \(Sales\_Vol_{i,t}\) – is the standard deviation of sales revenue (scaled by lagged total assets) over the prior five years.

  • \(Stock\_Turn_{i,t}\) – is the average monthly share turnover over the fiscal year.

  • \(Strategy_{i,t}\) – is the business strategy composite measure of Bentley et al. (2013), scaled by 100.

  • \(Total\_Vol_{i,t}\) – is the standard deviation of weekly stock returns over the fiscal year.

  • \(WeakFund_{i,t}\) – defined as (9 – F-score)/9; ranges from 0 to 1, with larger values implying weaker fundamentals. (construction described in Sect. 3.2).

1.2 Calculation of the F-score

Following Piotroski and So (2012), the F-score is calculated for each firm using nine signals derived from its annual financial statements:

$$ \begin{aligned} F - Score \, & = \, I\_ROA + I\_CFO + I\_ACC + I\_DROA + I\_DLEV \\ & \quad + I\_LIQ + I\_SSTK + I\_DM + I\_DTURN. \\ \end{aligned} $$
(A.1)

Variable definitions follow; COMPUSTAT variables are in parentheses:

  • ROAi,t – income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by the beginning of the year total assets (ATi,t-1). The indicator variable I_ROAi,t equals 1 if ROAi,t > 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • CFOi,t – measured as the cash flow from operations (OANCFi,t, measured as funds from operations when OANCF is not available) scaled by the beginning of year total assets (ATi,t-1). The indicator variable I_CFOi,t equals 1 if OANCFi,t > 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • ACCRUALi,t – measured as the difference between income before extraordinary items (IBi,t) scaled by the beginning of year total assets (ATi,t-1) and cash flow from operations as described above. The indicator variable I_ACC equals 1 if ACCRUALi,t < 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • DROAi,t – measured as the difference between the current year’s ROAi,t, and the previous year’s ROAi,t-1. The indicator variable I_DROA equals 1 if DROAi,t > 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • DLEVERi,t – measured as the difference between the current year’s debt-to-assets ratio and the previous year’s debt-to-assets ratio. The debt-to-assets ratio is measured as long-term debt (DLTTi,t) divided by total assets (ATi,t). The indicator variable I_DLEV equals 1 if DLEVERi,t < 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • DLIQUIDi,t – measured as the difference between the current year’s current ratio and the previous year’s ratio. The current ratio is measured as current assets (ACTi,t) divided by current liabilities (CLTi,t). The indicator variable I_DLIQ equals 1 if DLIQUIDi,t > 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • ISSUANCEi,t – measured as the amount of stock issued by a firm in a given year (SSTKi,t). The indicator variable I_SSTK equals 1 if SSTKi,t <  = 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • DMARGINi,t – measured as the difference between the current year’s gross margin ratio and the previous year’s ratio. The gross margin ratio is measured as one minus the ratio of cost of goods sold (COGSi,t) and net sales (SALEi,t). The indicator variable I_DM equals 1 if DMARGINi,t > 0 and 0 otherwise.

  • DTURNi,t – measured as the difference between the current year’s asset turnover ratio and the previous year’s turnover ratio. The asset turnover ratio is measured as net sales (SALEi,t) divided by total assets (ATi,t). The indicator variable I_DTURN equals 1 if DTURNi,t > 0 and 0 otherwise.

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Safdar, I., Neel, M. & Odusami, B. Accounting information and left-tail risk. Rev Quant Finan Acc 58, 1709–1740 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-021-01036-6

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