Abstract
The following article will examine three argumentative strategies to address a recent topic of debate in the philosophy of religion known as the “Gap Problem.” It aims to study the “Stage II” of cosmological arguments, where the goal is to establish the theistic properties or attributes that identify the first cause or necessary being with the concept of God. The unique contribution of this study lies in the formalized and systematic presentation of the various solutions proposed by authors in the philosophical field, synthesizing their central ideas and presenting them in the form of arguments.
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Notes
There are some notable exceptions, particularly Thomas Aquinas, who dedicates almost the entire first book of his Summa Contra Gentiles to establish the divine attributes of esse subsistens (subsisting being). See Thomas Aquinas, Saint. Summa contra Gentiles I.
This version of the cosmological argument based on contingency has been taken from Rasmussen, Joshua., 2021. The Argument from Contingency. In Rullof and Horban (eds.) Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology: God and Rational Belief. Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 20.
Certain naturalistic models reject the possibility of the existence of an entity with necessary existence, postulating instead the presence of brute contingency at the most fundamental levels of reality. In these cases, Stage I is sufficient to dismiss such models.
Byerly, T. Ryan, 2018. From a necessary being to a perfect being. Analysis 79 (1), pp. 10-17.
Miksa, Ryan, 2023. From Aesthetic Virtues to God: Augmenting Theistic Personal Cause Arguments. TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 7(2).
Of course, this does not imply that there cannot be disagreements regarding certain judgments about beauty. But even in these contexts, even if there are no precise and certain principles, such disagreements can be arbitrated and resolved without implying relativism. Also, some subjectivist theories of beauty (i.e. Humean or Kantian accounts) can concede this point as a valid social intersubjective judgement.
Note the use of the modal operator of possibility (◊) when it is asserted that "can be causally explained," making C1 exceptionally modest. Also, C1 presents a slight modification that simplifies the one presented by Rasmussen.
More specifically, for any set M of contingent properties that includes the contingent properties of N, N could not explain M because it would be circular. Rasmussen refers to these sets of contingent properties and relations as "gridscapes.".
Another simpler way to establish this point is as follows: If N is a primary necessary being in w (in the sense that every contingent thing or substance is logically posterior or derived from the causal power of N), then nothing external to N can explain its contingent powers. But every contingent property can (at least) have a causal (external) explanation for its existence or instantiation. Therefore, a contradiction arises in which its powers cannot and can have an explanation. Therefore, N cannot have contingent powers but essential ones.
An interesting consequence of this argument is that the contingency of every possible world is explained by the action of a single creator being, N, something akin to the usual concept of omnipotence. Due to this, it could avoid a possible objection that the argument initially assumes that there is only one necessary being explaining contingent reality in each possible world since the existence of a "committee" of necessary beings that together explain a contingent reality implies the possibility of conflicts in creating, and ultimately impotence.
In this argument, when we talk about properties, we refer to real or intrinsic properties, inherent to the being in question, and not external or relational properties with respect to other objects. For example, being "the creator of heaven and earth" does not constitute an example of intrinsic property but an extrinsic or relational one. Likewise, these types of contingent extrinsic properties will not serve to differentiate two necessary beings, as in that case, there will be a possible world where N1 exemplifies that property, and N2 does not, and vice versa, so they cannot be differentiated under this criterion. This means that the only basis for distinguishing two objects or beings is based on their individual essence (or intrinsic properties). On the impossibility of differentiating two deities based on an extrinsic contingent property, see Zagzebski, Linda, 1989. Christian Monotheism. Faith and Philosophy.
Throughout this article, a certain conceptual neutrality will be maintained regarding the definition of divine attributes. In practical terms, establishing the possession of these properties to a maximum or unlimited degree does not deviate (if it does) from what is required to qualify for having these omni-properties.
Some may argue that certain states of affairs are necessary, and therefore it would be trivially true that N, for example, could actualize the state of affairs "2 + 2 = 4." Due to this, the argument could be defined in terms of contingent states of affairs, and the final conclusion would still be the same, that N is omnipotent.
The argument does not require assuming anything about the finitude or eternity of the universe. Whether it is finite in the past or has existed eternally, N has a type of explanatory priority over it since it is the ultimate causal foundation upon which it relies. Therefore, the argument's conclusion holds in either case.
When we speak of N's knowledge, we refer to the state of knowledge or its capacity to know a certain set of true propositions, and not the truth value of the propositions themselves. This avoids the confusion of thinking that since N cannot have a limited and contingent knowledge state, then the propositions known by N will not be contingent either, leading to a modal collapse. One thing is the state or capacity for unlimited knowledge (non-contingent) of N, and another thing is the propositions (contingent or not) known by N.
For a defense of moral realism (or cognitivism), see: DeLapp, Kevin, 2013. Moral Realism. Bloomsbury Academic; Shaffer-Landau, Russ, 2003. Moral Realism: A Defence. Oxford University Press; Enoch, David, 2011. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford University Press.
In the literature, these attributes are also known as great-making properties.
When we speak of fundamental nature, we refer to all those basic attributes (i.e., attributes not grounded or explained by other attributes) possessed by an entity, such that the rest of the attributes supervene in virtue of these basic ones.
As with the previously developed principle (C1), this principle of dependence or explicability of limits can be modally weakened with the possibility operator (◊). Thus, the principle becomes exceptionally modest, and the same conclusion is still maintained since (as will be seen below) N does not admit the possibility of external dependence or explicability of its fundamental nature.
This minimal concept of perfection provides the starting point for philosophical theology, particularly the method of perfect being theology, to develop a comprehensive theory of the divine nature. Therefore, it leaves open the field of research into what these specific perfections that N must possess when constituting as perfect are. Because of this, the argument is compatible with theistic worldviews, both in its classical and neoclassical forms.
This argument is compatible with the doctrine of the Trinity. In that case, it could be argued that the number of persons is explained in terms of another fundamental attribute or aspect, such as supreme love. For such a proposal, see Swinburne, Richard, 1994. The Christian God. Oxford University Press, pp. 343-345. Along similar lines, see Sijuwade, Joshua, 2021. Love and the Necessity of the Trinity: An A Posteriori Argument. Religions 12. Koons, on the other hand, proposes an explanation of the Trinity in conceptual and relational terms. See Koons, Robert C., 2018. Divine Persons as Relational Qua Objects. Religious Studies 54, 3, pp. 1-21.
The deductive strategy discussed earlier can be seen as cumulative in the sense that the various independent arguments can be brought together to establish theistic conclusions. However, traditional-style cumulative cases are constructed by employing several arguments from natural theology, such as cosmological, teleological, moral or ontological ones, etc., rather than specific stage II arguments aimed at establishing general theistic properties or aspects of the first cause/necessary being.
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Ocampo, S.T. Strategies for stage II of cosmological arguments. Int J Philos Relig (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09911-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09911-7