Notes
See Maharaja (2019).
See Lockwood (1989).
See Strawson (2016).
See Vaidya (2022).
See Garfield (2017).
See Vaidya (2022).
See Block (1995).
See Chalmers discussion of vulcans, zombies, and humans in relation to the trolley problem. While Chalmers doesn’t use the phrase sentience but rather the claim that phenomenal consciousness and not affective consciousness is necessary for morality, I use here the distinction between thin and thick notions of sentience, because sentience theory is always tied to some account of consciousness.
On August 26, 2023, at The Conference on Moral Status at Trinity College Dublin organized by Kenneth Silver, Bob Fischer argued that phenomenal consciousness might not even be able to account for a grade of moral status because phenomenal consciousness as understood under global workspace theory and higher-order thought theory, lacks certain explanatory capacities. His arguments went beyond the Gwen Bradford’s arguments against phenomenal consciousness being the ground of moral standing based on objective list theories and desire satisfaction theories, because he challenged the idea that even under hedonism phenomenal consciousness lacks certain explanatory resources for explaining why something is a welfare subject.
References
Albahari, M. (2018). Beyond cosmopsychism and the great i am: How the world might be grounded in ‘advaitic’ consciousness. In B. Seager (Ed.), The routledge handbook of panpsychism. Routledge Publishing.
Albahari, M. (2020). Perennial idealism: A mystical solution to the mind-body problem. Philosopher’s Imprint, 19(44), 1–36.
Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 227–247.
Bradford, G. (2022). Consciousness and welfare subjectivity. Nous, 1, 17.
Chalmers, D. (1996). The conscious mind: Toward a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press.
Chalmers, D. (2022). Reality+: Virtual worlds and the problem of philosophy. W.W. Norton and Company.
Frankish, K. (2017). Illusionism as a theory of consciousness. In K. Frankish (Ed.), Illusionism a theory of consciousness (pp. 11–39). Imprint-Academic Publishing.
Ganeri, J., & Shani, I. (2022). Cosmopsychism in Indian philosopy. Special issue of the monist. Oxford University Press.
Garfield, J. (2017). Illusionism and givenness. In K. Frankish (Ed.), Illusionism as a theory of consciousness (pp. 73–83). Imprint-Academic Publishing.
Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and fundamental reality. Oxford University Press.
Kammerer, F. (2022). Ethics without sentience. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 29(3–4), 180–204.
Lockwood, M. (1989). Mind, brain, and the quantum. Blackwell Publishing.
Maharaja, A. (2019). Infinite paths to infinite reality. Oxford University Press.
Shepard, J. (2023). Non-human moral status: Problems with phenomenal consciousness. American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience, 14(2), 148–157.
Singer, P. (1975). Animal liberation: A new ethics for our treatment of animals. Random House.
Strawson, G. (2016). Consciousness isn’t a mystery. Matter is. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/16/opinion/consciousness-isnt-a-mystery-its-matter.html
Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 3–31.
Timalsina, S. (2009). Consciousness in Indian philosophy: The advaita doctrine of ‘awareness only.’ Routledge Publishing.
Vaidya, A., & Krishnaswamy, R. (2023b). Susan schneider on artificial consciousness and moral standing. Analysis (forthcoming).
Vaidya, A. (2022). Analytic panpsychism and the metaphysics of rāmānuja’s viśiṣṭādvaita vedānta. The Monist, 105(1), 110–130.
Vaidya, A. (2023). A critical notice on the moral grounding question in chalmers reality+. Sophia, 62(1), 195–200.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vaidya, A.J. Abhinavagupta, the hard problem of consciousness, and the moral grounding problem. Int J Philos Relig 95, 93–101 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09907-3
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-024-09907-3