Abstract
For an account of the reference of divine names, I follow Bogardus and Urban (Faith and Philosophy 34(2):176–200, 2017) in advocating in favour of using Gareth Evans’s causal theory of reference, on which a name refers to the dominant source of information in the name’s “dossier”. However, I argue further that information about experiences, in which God is simply the object of acquaintance, can dominate the dossier. Thus, this demonstrative use of names offers a promising alternative avenue by which users of the divine names can refer to the same referent despite having different conceptions of God. I also respond to Burling’s (Faith and Philosophy 36(3): 343–371, 2019) worship-worthiness view.
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Notes
Or, less likely, fixed by a description.
Giving such an answer would be to hold a descriptivist theory, famously defended by Frege (1892), but Kripke had offered four powerful arguments against it (Kripke 75–87).
“Two babies are born, and their mothers bestow names upon them. A nurse inadvertently switches them and the error is never discovered. It will henceforth undeniably be the case that the man universally known as ‘Jack’ is so called because a woman dubbed some other baby with the name.” Over time, the dossier of ‘Jack’ fills up with information that originates with the wrong baby, who is the dominant source of that information. This is what explains our plausible judgement that ‘Jack’ refers to the person who came to be known by that name due to error.
Evans’s theory is different from a theory (e.g., Searle 1958) on which a name corresponds to a cluster of descriptions which pick out the referent, because on Evan’s theory it is a particular source of information (and as we shall see, the name-users’s interests in the object) that explain what information becomes weighted more heavily and thus more central. Also, Evans’s theory implies that another source can subsequently displace the first, but cluster descriptivism cannot easily accommodate such reference shifting.
Generally speaking, these are settings or experiences that people across different religious faiths or even those who are spiritual-but-not-religious might plausibly experience, such as praying in time of need, thinking about God, or circumstances (and associated experiences) that I will mention later that Alvin Plantinga lists. In contrast, settings or experiences peculiar to a particular religion’s practice are those involved in practices such as participating in or attending a church/mosque service, taking the Lord’s supper, doing salat prayer facing Mecca five times a day, fasting during Ramadan, exercising the gifts of the Holy Spirit, etc.
As we will see below, one of the settings he describes is in regards to reading the Bible, but the other ones are not settings involving practices specific to a particular religion.
In Plantinga’s account there may already be a precedent of one circumstance setting the stage for the next: “Upon having done what I know is cheap, or wrong, or wicked I may feel guilty in God’s sight and form the belief God disapproves of what I’ve done. Upon confession and repentance, I may feel forgiven, forming the belief God forgives me for what I’ve done.” (46) This seems to suggest at very least that one circumstance calling forth a properly basic belief can be followed by another related circumstance (and properly basic belief).
Of course, c1 would think that this “God of the theologians” does not exist, and so is fiction. The information for this “God of the [Christian] theologians” originated from fiction and so there is no referent.
Forest Church’s first quoted statement alluded to the Celtic and Franciscan traditions, and I leave it to others to pursue those possibilities. I’m also aware of a project associated with Wesley Theological Seminary in the United States that has published study material entitled “Nature: Our first way of knowing God”. A self-description of the publication states this: “Today, we live largely separate and disconnected from the Earth and its ecological processes, and yet this knowing of God in and through God’s creation is still embedded deep within us. We experience it in a sunrise or a sunset, an awe-inspiring mountain range or a gentle stream. […] This seven-week study is meant to awaken this visceral knowing of the Creator through the creation, reconnect us with the sacred landscapes we call home, encourage us to provide space and time for spiritual reflection in nature, and to live in greater harmony with God’s Earth.” (Norcross 2021).
There are Muslims who report a deeper connection with or awareness of Allah when out in nature: “We also see the greatness of Allah, our creator in the beauty and perfection of nature. Through a continued observation and immersion in nature, I’ve developed a deeper connection with Allah.” (Hadafow) “[T]aking autumn-color pictures, I was overwhelmed by a fantastic feeling. I felt as if I were a tiny piece of something greater, […] It was wonderful! I had never ever felt like this before, totally relaxed, yet bursting with energy, and above all, totally aware of God wherever I turned my eyes.” (“A photographer finds Allah in nature”). Likely, it is easier to find further documentation in Arabic (or other languages) about Muslim communities that are primarily interested in Allah in order to encounter him (in broadly spiritual settings).
If we assume that either Christianity or Islam is true, but we don’t pick a particular perspective, we can still conclude that co-reference would hold at least between Muslims and Christians who both use a divine name demonstratively (under the conditions mentioned before). For as already argued, if we assume the Muslim perspective of Allah, the Christians using a divine name demonstratively would refer to the same referent as any Muslim (both those using a divine name demonstratively and those not). This implies the Christians just mentioned refer to the same referent as Muslims using a divine name demonstratively. If instead we assume the Christian perspective of God, the Muslims using a divine name demonstratively would refer to the same referent as Christians using a divine name demonstratively, by reasoning parallel to the above. So, whether we take the Christian or Muslim perspective, the same conclusion is reached.
The question may arise whether, according to my account, a Hindu or Buddhist community’s divine-name use could co-refer with that, say, of a Christian community’s. The answer would depend on whether the Hindu or Buddhist community even worships a god (some varieties of Buddhism have no deity), whether the name is associated with one particular deity (rather than a whole pantheon), and on factors already mentioned in the foregoing analysis such as whether the god can encounter them in broadly spiritual settings (e.g. not just in a temple or before a shrine/idol, etc.), like through nature or in life events (perhaps such a god worshipped by some Hindus or some Buddhists can indeed interact with human lives in these personal ways).
After all, it is plausible that even some adult “God”-users have not thought of God being worthy and deserving of our worship, even though their conception of God is that he is the object of their worship.
References
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Chan, B. The demonstrative use of names, and the divine-name co-reference debate. Int J Philos Relig 93, 107–120 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-022-09855-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-022-09855-w