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Critical notice of Christopher J. Insole: Kant and the Divine: from contemplation to the Moral Law (Oxford University Press, 2020)

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Abstract

In this Critical Review I mainly discuss two predominant features of Christopher J. Insole’s Kant and the Divine. The first concerns his argument that Kant distances himself philosophically from Christianity. Insole argues against the “theologically affirmative” readers of Kant who want the critical philosophy to affirm traditional Christian beliefs. He rightly focusses on autonomy as fundamental to Kant’s approach to both ethics and religion, and contrasts this with the main figures of both Catholic and Protestant forms of Christianity. The second issue concerns the alternate ‘theology’ or philosophical religiosity Insole discerns in Kant’s work, focusing on practical reason. He argues that this approach to religion is as much Platonic as Christian. He claims that dwelling in a type of rational plenitude offered by the will that is good in itself is the aim of Kant’s ethical religiosity. Insole highlights Kant’s brief references to a “proper self” in the Groundwork as expressing this self-contained plenitude. There is a tendency here to disconnect questions of theology from historical and social life. By contrast, I argue that for Kant, knowledge of the moral law and developing a good will are essential steps in rectifying our “life conduct,” and that both Kantian ethics and philosophy of religion are deeply invested in how we conduct our lives in relation to others.

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Notes

  1. See DiCenso (2015) for a more detailed discussion of Kant on grace that substantiates Insole’s argument.

  2. Kant states concerning “all types of faith” that, “the moral philosophers among the Greeks and, later, the Romans did exactly the same thing with their legends concerning the gods… Late Judaism, and Christianity too, consists of such in part highly forced interpretations … the Mohammedans [Muslims] know very well … how to inject a spiritual meaning in the description of their paradise… and the Indians do the same with the interpretation of their Vedas” (Rel, 6: 111).

  3. This point is emphasized by Wood (2020, 188), who argues that the rational ideal is applicable to all historical religions—hence there will be different versions of the “rational religion” should it ever come into being.

  4. It is important to clarify that for Kant, the idea of an intelligible world “is a transcendent concept for us, which is not serviceable for any constitutive principle determining an object and its objective reality, still … it can serve as a universal regulative principle for ourselves and for every being standing in connection with the sensible world” (CJ, 5: 404, emphasis original).

  5. This point is compellingly made by Klemme (2019, 26–27), who explains the normative and bridging functions of obligation and respect in Kant’s ethics.

  6. Similarly, in the 1st Critique, Kant emphasizes: “we must assume the moral world to be a consequence of our conduct in the sensible world” (A811/B839).

  7. Among others, DiCenso (2012) is mentioned as an example of this “deflationary” approach.

  8. In the 3rd Critique, Kant discusses what is “purposive in the whole,” and reminds us: “it is self-evident that this is not a principle for the determining power of judgment but only for the reflecting power of judgment, that it is regulative and not constitutive” (CJ, 5: 379). Subsequently. Kant explains he is concerned with “moral teleology” in which our causality as moral beings is to be realized in the world, involving “the reciprocal relation of the world to that moral law” (CJ, 5: 447). For more on teleology as reflective and regulative, see CJ, 5: 194, 197, 389, 396, 399–400, 416, etc.).

  9. At A826-27/B854-55 Kant associates “doctrinal belief” with the “physico-theology” disproven at A620/B648-A630/B658.

  10. Discussing doctrines concerning supersensible objects in the Religion, Kant argues that if “we restricted our judgment to the regulative principles, which content themselves with only their practical use, human wisdom would be better off in a great many respects” (Rel, 6: 71, Kant’s note). The religion of reason is similarly described as a “practical regulative principle” (Rel, 6: 123, Kant’s note).

References

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  • DiCenso, J. J. (2012). Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason: A Commentary. Cambridge University Press

  • DiCenso, J. J. (2015). “Grace and Favor in Kant’s Ethical Interpretation of Religion.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 78, number 1, 29–51

  • Guyer, P., & Wood, A. (Eds.). (1992-). General co-eds., The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant in English Translation. 16 vols. Cambridge University Press

  • Insole, C. (2020). Kant and the Divine: From Contemplation to the Moral Law. Oxford University Press

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  • Kant, I. (1998). Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, trans. George di Giovanni, in Religion and Rational Theology, trans. and ed. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge University Press. Rel

  • Klemme, H. (2019). “Kant’s Principle of Autonomy in Historical Context,” in Bacin and Sensen

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  • Spinoza, B. (2007/1670). Theological-Political Treatise, trans. M. Silverthorne and J. Israel. Cambridge University Press

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DiCenso, J. Critical notice of Christopher J. Insole: Kant and the Divine: from contemplation to the Moral Law (Oxford University Press, 2020). Int J Philos Relig 92, 183–192 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-022-09849-8

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