Abstract
In recent years Mullins and Craig have argued that there is a problem for a timeless God creating, with Mullins formulating the argument as follows:
(1) If God begins to be related to creation, then God changes.
(2) God begins to be related to creation.
(3) Therefore, God changes.
(4) If God changes, then God is neither immutable nor timeless.
(5) Therefore, God is neither immutable nor timeless.
In this paper I argue that all the premises, (1), (2), and (4) are false, and then provide a revised formulation of the argument which more clearly represents what Mullins and Craig wish to argue, given the explication and commentary they give when discussing this objection to timelessness. I then call into question this argument, and conclude by stating what I think Mullins and Craig should really be arguing given the specific views they have about creation ex nihilo and in virtue of what timelessness requires.
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Notes
There have been several forms of objections against timelessness based on God creating (Pike, 1970, 104–110; Davis, 1983, 11–13; Padgett, 1992, ch.4; Swinburne, 1993, 216). I will focus my attention on Mullins’s, but note that Craig’s concerns are similar. However, one difference is that Craig runs what I’ve called the creation objection together with what Mullins thinks of as a distinct objection to timelessness which is based on God’s conserving/sustaining action. I follow Mullins (2016, 103–108) and take the conservation/sustaining problem as distinct, and so deal with it elsewhere.
Note that these arguments assume that a timeless God can create and/or be causally related to the created world. Yet they think that in virtue of this, difficulties for timelessness emerge. As such, arguments that say timeless causation is in principle impossible, for instance, will be ignored here.
I don’t want to affirm 3, in virtue of denying 1 and 2, and so I treat 1 as a counterfactual rather than a material conditional. As such I say that 2 is false, but even if the antecedent were true, the consequent doesn’t necessarily follow.
For how Mullins suggests we should think the classical tradition conceives of divine simplicity see (Mullins & Byrd, 2022, 21–26).
I do not wish to question the former entailment here, only the latter.
Mullins references Rogers’s Perfect Being Theology (2000), albeit without a page number, but whilst I can see that Rogers claims that simplicity entails timelessness (2000, 32), and that eternity preserves simplicity (2000, 55), I cannot find her claiming, or arguing, that timelessness entails simplicity. Mullins’s reference to McCann is to his Creation and the Sovereignty of God (2012, 12–14), but nothing in this section of McCann implies this entailment; McCann doesn’t even speak of timelessness here. Similarly the references (Mullins & Byrd, 2022, 22) to Dolezal (2011, 198–199) and Dugby (2016, 50–51), which are meant to explain why a weak doctrine of divine simplicity would undermine timelessness and immutability, also do nothing to show that timelessness entails simplicity.
To give three examples, Leftow thinks God is timeless (1991), doesn’t think that God is simple due to the position on modality he holds (2012), and that simplicity doesn’t entail timelessness (1991, 70–71). Mawson thinks God is timeless (2019), and not simple (2019, 54), at least in the way Mullins thinks of simplicity. Finally, Craig holds that God is timeless sans creation (2001a, 283–284), and that divine simplicity is false (2017, 145).
One might think I’m being unfair to Mullins, and that he should be understood as only arguing against those who think God has all of the four classical attributes mentioned above. I have some sympathies here, since Mullins, in the introduction of The End of a Timeless God does say that he will be examining the timelessness research program, which he suggests will include ‘divine timelessness, simplicity, strong immutability, and strong impassibility.’ (2016, 10) Yet in the book itself, Mullins criticises Leftow’s view and Mawson’s. But given this, it seems he is targeting views that do not fit under the research program he initially stated. In any case, if the target was only views where God is both timeless and simple, perhaps the book deserved a different title, maybe, The End of a Timelessly Simple God? The book, if successful, would still be showing a lot, but just not that any conception of timelessness is ruled out.
For a good discussion of this see Oderberg (2003).
Mullins speaks of a first moment throughout the paper. My reference to his paper refers to what I take to be Mullins’s own view, where the first moment is what he calls the ‘precreation moment’, which has no intrinsic metric even though it is temporal (Mullins, 2020b, 234).
I will speak throughout in terms of a first instant due to ease, but supposing instants are not possible, I can also adopt a view where there is a first member which has the shortest possible temporal length. What I need to be the case is that the first member is finite in length, so to prevent it being infinite and thereby implying that it did not begin.
Some suggest that contemporary cosmology supports the idea of time having a beginning, whilst others are less sure (Callender & McCoy, 2022, 707–718). I’m no cosmologist, so I don’t attempt to adjudicate who is right, but I do take it that it is at least in principle possible that time had a beginning.
In personal correspondence, Josh Rasmussen has suggested to me that the definition of begins to exist that Pruss and himself (2018, 71) give is consistent with this claim even if there is no first instant. For ‘in the case where there is no first instant, there is no instant when it begins. So there is no change when it begins.’ I ignore views of beginnings without a first due to ease of explication, and since Craig and Mullins endorse a view of creation having a first member.
I can make the same point on views where there are not instants but the shortest possible temporal moments, where to change would require more than one moment. Note that this will require me to deny that qualitative heterogeneity within the finite interval is sufficient for something to change. I do deny this, and say instead that all there would be in this case is variation. (Thanks to Claudio Calosi for raising this with me).
Maybe God simultaneously causes time, or maybe time depends upon God in some other way. Mullins it seems wouldn’t like the former (2020b, 224) but might opt for the latter (2020b, 230–237). For he appears to think it virtuous if causes temporally precede their effects, thereby ruling out simultaneous causation (2020b, 224, 229, 231–232, 235). By contrast, I think it a vice. Whilst simultaneous causes might be ‘abnormal cases’ of causation (Paul & Hall, 2013, 67), although that depends on one’s metaphysical outlook, a view of causation which in principle rules them out I take to be too narrow.
One could add an extra condition on what it is to begin in order to rule out God beginning to exist in this example. For instance, the assumption that something which necessarily exists cannot begin to exist, even at time’s first instant (Leftow, 2012, 341; 1991, 269). Making this addition would not negatively affect my counterexample, for all it would mean is that God didn’t begin to exist, although He did begin to be related to time, since there is a first instant at which God is related to time, subsequent instants at which He is related, and time is not necessarily existent. Obviously if one thought time was necessarily existent, then this would cause issues, since it would be the case on this revised definition of beginning that time never began either, and one might think that two necessary things cannot begin to be related to each other.
As Hasker says, ‘the most essential attribute of divine timeless eternity is that in it there is no such thing as change, and therefore no temporal succession.’ (2022, 768).
Augustine (Confessions XI. xi, 13) also contends that eternity lacks succession whereas time is characterised by it.
Eternity here, I take as synonymous with timelessness. In reality it’s more complicated than this, since there are different grades of timelessness (Leftow, 2005, 51–58). However for my purposes, we can treat them as speaking of the same thing since all agree there is no succession in eternity.
Anselm (e.g. Monologion 24) and Aquinas (e.g. Summa Theologica I, q.10, a.1, Co.), also largely follow Boethius in their conceptions of eternity.
See Stump (2003, 132–134) for a nice discussion.
As always, things are a bit more complicated when considering the incarnation, but not in such a way that it renders the divine to have undergone succession (Pawl, 2016, Ch.8).
Note that this present is distinct from the temporal present which moves. This means that if one adopted a presentist view of time and this view of eternity, there would be two distinct presents. I discuss this in greater detail elsewhere (Page, manuscript a). Further, note that this view rules out God being wholly timeless and being without any of what Leftow calls typically-temporal-properties (2002, 22–23), since presentness is a typically-temporal-property, but on this view, not one that is sufficient for something to be temporal. However, if one finds this view too odd, one can adopt a position where God has no typically-temporal properties. This view of timeless entities is even compatible with many forms of presentism, since numerous presentists allow for them (Bourne, 2006, 79–80; Crisp 2004, 46; Craig 2000, 227). Whether a timeless entity such as this could be God, so that a timeless God is compatible with presentism, would require more discussion but Leftow (2018) and myself (Page, manuscript a) have done so elsewhere.
For a nice discussion see (Leftow, 1991, Ch.6).
As Leftow notes (1991, 137–143), Chronons, temporal atoms, appear to be thought of in this way.
See Leftow (2002, 22–23) for further discussion.
One may ask questions about how a timeless God could cause a temporal world. But as noted in footnote 3, I take it that the creation objection allows this to be possible and argues there is a problem given that God has created.
For the remainder of this section I’ll only speak of timelessness, as this is what this paper focuses on.
To avoid confusion, let me note that Leftow thinks Cambridge properties don’t help when it comes to discussions of divine simplicity and God’s freely willing a particular state of affairs (2009, 29–33). Yet this is distinct from their use within discussions about God’s relationship to time. Nevertheless, whilst Leftow does think Cambridge changes are compatible with a timeless God, he doesn’t think one has to go this route (1991, 312).
See also Summa Theologica I, q.13, a.7, ad 2.
Mullins does mention Anslem (2016, 51, n.33), but seems to suggest that Anselm shouldn’t be thought of as speaking about Cambridge changes. This is somewhat odd, as change in height, Anselm’s example, is often given as a paradigm case of a Cambridge change (Blackburn, 2008, 51; Bunnin & Yu 2004, 96), and is taken to be an instance of this type of change by Anselm scholars (Visser & Williams, 2009, 106).
Mullins (2016, 51, n.30; 2021, 87) quotes Helm as being one defender of timelessness who supposedly argues a timeless God cannot undergo Cambridge changes. I contend that it’s actually rather tricky to understand exactly what Helm thinks on this score, for it does seem that early on in his book Eternal God he doesn’t allow an immutable God to undergo these types of changes (2010, 19–20), but then later in the book it seems an immutable God can undergo them (2010, 45), with this being apparent in his more detailed discussion of immutability (2010, 86), seemingly contrasting ‘merely Cambridge change’ with ‘real change’, a distinction he made previously (2010, 45). In other work it is clear that in contrast to Mullins, Helm doesn’t think a ‘mere extrinsic relation’ is enough to make a timeless God temporal. For on Mullins’s view ‘when temporal creatures refer to God it would seem that God would undergo an extrinsic change and thus Himself be temporal.’ (2016, 51) I take it Mullins would think much the same about other potential timeless entities, such as when anyone has thoughts about numbers. However Helm, by contrast writes, ‘God certainly has a relation to the creation which he would not have had had there been no creation, but what does this show? It certainly does not show that God must be temporal any more than if I think about the number seven for five minutes then the number seven is temporal’ (2001, 162). As such, since ‘extrinsic’ and ‘Cambridge’ are often used synonymously in these contexts (e.g. Stump 2003, 97; Marshall & Weatherson 2018), I take it that Helm doesn’t think an extrinsic or Cambridge change would make a timeless God temporal.
The reason why Chisholm and Zimmerman speak of immutability here is in order to show that this attribute is not threatened by God being temporal and that God could be immutable without being timeless.
In personal correspondence Dean Zimmerman has confirmed to me that the paper was not meant to argue that a timeless God could not undergo Cambridge changes.
I discuss the possibility of this type of example and how these island universes as mirroring a timeless God’s life elsewhere (Page, manuscript a), see also Leftow (2018).
Here is one way in which to make (4) in its present form come out true, namely by contending that changes should be thought of as occurring between events, and that typical Cambridge changes in some way flunk this requirement in virtue of not counting as events or distinct events (Leftow, 2005, 63; Helm, 1975). If one goes this route then extrinsic predications can be true or false of God at different times from within creation, but these won’t properly count as changes. Premise (4) therefore wouldn’t need to remove any ambiguity and so wouldn’t require revision, but equally the supposed difficulty of Cambridge changes bringing about a change in a timeless God would turn out to be no problem at all, since in fact it would turn out that Cambridge changes weren’t of the relevant type to bring about a change in the first place.
I use the language of ‘states of affairs’ since it is primarily what Mullins and Craig talk about (Mullins, 2016, 101; 2021, 92–93; 2020b; manuscript; Craig, 2001a, 254; Copan & Craig, 2004, 161–162). However, they sometimes use other terminology to describe pre-creation, such as referring to a ‘moment’ (Mullins, manuscript; 2020b), ‘phase’ (Mullins, 2020b, 224), ‘state’ (2020b, 233), or as God being some way ‘sans creation/universe’ (Craig, 2001a, 60; Copan & Craig, 2004, 253). I will not quibble on terminology here, and if one prefers one can instead use the terminology of ‘moment’ going forward, so long as one is happy to allow for timeless moments.
As Tim Pawl has suggested to me in personal correspondence, this is a tricky thing to say since it might seem as though we have two things, a ‘state of affairs’ and ‘God’. This may well be a problem for both Craig and Mullins, but here I’ll assume that one can speak of states of affairs without reifying over them and that this is sufficient to dispel this worry.
One may have to further specify (4), given what I said about it above.
It is in the context of real relations that Craig discusses Cambridge changes. Craig’s thought is that Cambridge changes are sufficient for real relations, and that in virtue of God existing without creation ‘sans creation’ and then with creation once He has created, the relation is new and enough to make God temporal (2001a, 73–75). The key work here, once again, is being done by premise (6) in my construal of the argument, with this being a premise I claim defenders of timelessness will deny.
Similar thoughts can be found by diverse authors throughout the text (Burrell et al., 2010, 8, 142, 172, 213, 222).
As far as I can tell Craig never defines creation ex nihilo as requiring an actual pre-creation existence, even though he does think one should endorse it. At times it seems Craig means to imply that creation having a first temporal member implies that there is a pre-creation moment. I think this is a mistake and deal with it elsewhere.
Lebens writes, ‘The word “before” in my formulation should be read loosely as referring either to temporal priority, if you think that God is in time, or logical/ontological priority if you think that God is atemporal.’ (personal correspondence)
Mullins has additionally confirmed this to me in personal communication. Craig’s own view is similar, but he takes (7) to be a temporal state of affairs, such that God is timeless sans creation and temporal since creation (2001a, 60). Yet he too thinks that these two actual states of affairs will not be temporally related (2001a, 272–273). Given this, the argument I am about to give I take it would also work on Craig’s account.
If Mullins and Craig are happy to restrict being alone to merely being alone on an island universe, then a timeless God can be said to exist alone in an actual pre-creation state of affairs, and in an actual state of affairs with creation despite undergoing no change. This, however, is obviously of no help to them given the aim of their argument.
Given that God has created. For defenders of divine timelessness can allow that God could have been alone if He had not created, but given that He has created, there is no moment where He is truly alone.
Note that if Craig claims the relationship between P and Q isn’t non-temporal, then it seems to me that P will no longer be timeless, as is meant to be the case on Craig’s view, at least given the traditional conception of timelessness as exemplified in Boethius and others.
See my (Page, manuscript b).
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Acknowledgements
Many thanks to Tim Pawl, Brian Leftow, Anna Marmodoro, and the participants at Oriel College (University of Oxford) Philosophy group, for discussion and useful feedback in writing this article. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Eton College.
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Page, B. The creation objection against timelessness fails. Int J Philos Relig 93, 169–188 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-022-09844-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-022-09844-z