Abstract
In seeking to undermine Mackie’s logical argument from evil, Plantinga assumes that Mackie’s argument regards it as a necessary truth that a wholly good God would eliminate all evil that he could eliminate. I argue that this is an interpretative mistake, and that Mackie is merely assuming that the theist believes that God’s goodness entails that God would eliminate all evil that he could eliminate. Once the difference between these two assumptions, and the implausibility of Plantinga’s assumption, are brought out, Plantinga’s celebrated critique of Mackie’s argument can be seen to be far less compelling than is often assumed to be the case.
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Notes
See e.g. Dougherty (2011, p. 560).
Plantinga (1985, p. 41).
See Plantinga (1974b, p. 26).
Plantinga (1974a, pp. 184–189; 1974b, pp. 49–54). Note that I say that Plantinga’s additional proposition “centres” on the claim that “Every possible person suffers from transworld depravity,” which is not to say that this claim is identical to the relevant proposition. The relevant proposition is in fact a conjunctive proposition consisting of this claim in conjunction with the further proposition that “God created a world containing moral good”; see Plantinga (1974a, p. 189; 1974b, p. 54).
Plantinga (1985, pp. 40–41).
Plantinga (1974b, p. 17).
Plantinga (1974b, p. 20).
Plantinga (1974b, pp. 22–24; cf. p. 54).
Plantinga (1967, p. 117).
Plantinga (1974b, p. 12).
Plantinga (1974b, p. 13).
Plantinga (1974b, p. 14).
Plantinga (1974b, p. 16).
Plantinga (1974b, pp. 16–17).
Mackie (1955, p. 200).
According to a third interpretation, due to Michael Tooley, Mackie isn’t urging a logical argument at all, but is really urging an evidential argument from evil; see Tooley (1981, pp. 361–362). The mistakenness of this interpretation was made clear by Mackie himself one year after the publication of Tooley’s paper, however; see Mackie (1982, pp. 150–151).
Mackie (1955, p. 201) (my emphasis).
Mackie (1955, p. 200).
Mackie (1962, pp. 153–154) (my emphasis).
Mackie (1982, p. 165) (emphasis in the original).
Mackie (1955, p. 201).
Plantinga (1974b, p. 17).
Mackie (1955, p. 201).
Mackie (1955, p. 200) (my emphasis).
Mackie (1955, p. 201).
References
Dougherty, T. (2011). Recent work on the problem of evil. Analysis, 71, 560–573.
Mackie, J. (1955). Evil and omnipotence. Mind, 64, 200–201.
Mackie, J. (1962). Theism and Utopia. Philosophy, 37, 153–158.
Mackie, J. (1982). The miracle of theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Plantinga, A. (1967). God and other minds. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press.
Plantinga, A. (1974a). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Plantinga, A. (1974b). God, freedom, and evil. New York: Harper and Row.
Plantinga, A. (1985). Self-profile. In P. van Inwagen & J. Tomberlin (Eds.), Alvin Plantinga (pp. 3–97). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Tooley, M. (1981). Alvin Plantinga and the argument from evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58, 360–376.
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Kraal, A. Has Plantinga “buried” Mackie’s logical argument from evil?. Int J Philos Relig 75, 189–196 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9448-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-014-9448-3