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Net Neutrality and Universal Service Obligations: It’s All About Bandwidth

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Abstract

This paper analyzes whether repealing net neutrality (NN) improves or decreases the capacity of a regulator to make internet service providers (ISPs) extend broadband coverage through universal service obligations (USOs). We model a two-sided market where a monopolistic ISP links content providers (CPs) to end users with a broadband network of a given bandwidth. A regulator determines whether to subject the ISP to NN or to allow it to supply paid priority (P) services to CPs. She can also impose a broadband USO to the ISP: She can mandate the broadband market coverage. We show that the greater is the network bandwidth, the more likely is the repeal of NN to increase ISP profits and social welfare. Regulation can still be necessary, however, as there are bandwidth ranges for which the ISP would benefit from a repeal of NN while such a repeal is detrimental to society.

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Notes

  1. Early contributions are Anton et al. (2002) and Valletti et al. (2002).

  2. Valletti et al. (2002) and Gautier and Wauthy (2010) study the impact of uniform pricing on entry and the extent of competition; Poudou and Roland (2014) provides an efficiency justification for imposing uniform pricing constraints, while Poudou and Roland (2017) study the consequences on inequality among consumers.

  3. See BroadbandNow (2021).

  4. On November 1, 2023, the FCC launched a notice of inquiry to increase the national fixed broadband speed benchmark to 100/20 Mbps (FCC, 2023)

  5. For instance, the EU defines a 30 Mbps download speed as fast broadband and a 100 Mbps as ultrafast broadband (Bourreau et al., 2017). Coverage targets are given in both terms. Canada sets broadband coverage targets in terms of 50/10 Mbps download/upload speeds (CRTC, 2021).

  6. All of the variables that are used in our model are reported in the nomenclature of variables in Table 2.

  7. Choi et al. (2015, p. 452). The M/M/1 queue system is also used in Choi and Kim (2010), Krämer and Wiewiorra (2012), Bourreau et al. (2015), Reggiani and Valletti (2016) and Choi et al. (2018).

  8. The reason is that a CP should not need a contract with the ISP to be delivered to consumers. Usually content is stored in data warehouses that are outside of the ISP’s network, and the ISP cannot refuse to deliver the content that is requested by the consumers. Legal content cannot be blocked by the ISP. In this context, the ISP cannot charge content providers for being in the slow lane: The basic service should necessarily be free.

  9. A more plausible alternative, but at the cost of tedious complications, would be that the average waiting time is dependent of the number of locations: \({\bar{\omega }} =1/(\mu -\lambda n X)\). In this case, an increase in n increases congestion; it means that the budget constraint is stronger when n expands, so that the (derived below) utility functions \(V^i\) decrease with n. As a consequence, optimal coverages for both the regulator and the ISP are lower.

  10. An equivalent interpretation is to say that \(X_{0}\) and \(X_{1}\) must meet capacity constraint \(\omega _{0}X_{0}+\omega _{1}X_{1}=\mu -1.\)

  11. Economides and Hermalin (2012) do not consider this price effect. As a result, in their model, utility increases with total consumption.

  12. The shape of the curves is given as an illustration.

  13. The profit maximizing coverage under P depends on the ability of the ISP to collect revenue from the prioritized CP. A lower \(\eta\) reduces the ISP’s revenue under P and therefore its coverage.

  14. This is an illustration of the classical Tinbergen insight that multiple policy goals cannot generally be achieved with a single instrument.

  15. Note that even in the range \(\left( \mu _{R},\tilde{\mu }_{u}\right)\), where welfare is higher under TMR than under USO, USO nevertheless brings a coverage \(n_{*}^{P}\) that is higher than the coverage \(n_{I}^{N}\) that is brought about by the regulator’s choice of net neutrality under TMR.

  16. See for instance the contributions on the subject of Chone et al. (2000, 2002) and Gautier and Wauthy (2012).

  17. An alternative would be to finance the USO fund with money from taxation, as is done in some countries. In this case, the optimal coverage would be reduced as taxation is distortionary.

  18. For instance, it can be difficult to recover taxes from small CPs as their activities are difficult to monitor for the government—think for instance of bloggers or influencers. And large CPs can, for instance, practice tax shifting across countries. Fuchs (2018) gives empirical evidence that some big digital companies intensively employ intangibles that are registered in low tax jurisdictions (as Ireland) and can operate in the market without necessarily being physically present.

  19. This representation of preferences in a model of monopolistic competition is borrowed from Belleflamme and Peitz (2015, p. 88).

  20. Notice that if the ISP does not find it profitable to invest in bandwidth expansion, imposing such an obligation reduces the ISP’s revenue, and this may therefore limits its possibility to finance network extension. In the case of a budget-constrained ISP, imposing bandwidth obligations conflicts with coverage obligations, and the regulator must choose between greater coverage and lower bandwidth: covering more locations with a relatively lower \(\mu\), or fewer locations with a higher \(\mu\).

  21. Indeed, the quadratic polynomial \(\alpha \mu ^{2}+\left( \beta -3\alpha \right) \mu +\beta\) has no real roots if \(\beta <9\alpha\), and only negative roots if \(\beta \ge 9\alpha\).

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Acknowledgements

We thank all participants at the MRE seminar at University of Montpellier, at the 61th Congress of the Société canadienne de science économique (Montréal, Québec), at the 49th Annual Conference of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (Vienna, Austria), and at the 9th Summer School of Association Francophone de Recherche en Economie Numérique (Avignon, France) and the editor L. White and the referees for their useful comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are our own.

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Appendix

Appendix

Nomenclature of variables We provide a nomenclature of variables that are used in our model. Depending on the regimes that are studied all of them can be stared, tilded or hatted and adorned with a subscript or superscript letter/number (see Table 2).

Table 2 Nomenclature of variables

Proof of Lemma 1

  1. (a)

    Directly for Net Neutrality, \(B^{N}(\mu )-R^{N}\left( \mu \right) =aX^{N}\left( \mu \right) >0\). For Prioritization, \(B^{P}(\mu )-R^{P}\left( \mu \right) =a\left( X_{1}^{P}\left( \mu \right) +X_{0}^{N}\left( \mu \right) \right) >0\).

  2. (b)

    Let us define \(v^{i}\left( \mu \right) :=\frac{\partial V^{i}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu },r^{i}\left( \mu \right) :=\frac{ \partial R^{i}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }\) and \(b^{i}\left( \mu \right) :=\frac{\partial B^{i}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }\). With Net Neutrality we have

    $$\begin{aligned} v^{N}\left( \mu \right) =\left( \alpha +\beta \right) v\left( \mu -1\right) ^{\alpha +\beta -1}=\frac{\alpha +\beta }{\mu -1}V^{N}\left( \mu \right) >0, \end{aligned}$$

    so \(v^{N}\left( \mu \right)\) decreases with \(\mu\). Moreover \(r^{N}\left( \mu \right) =v^{N}\left( \mu \right)\) and \(b^{N}\left( \mu \right) =v^{N}\left( \mu \right) +a\), which decreases with \(\mu\), and \(b^{N}\left( \mu \right) >r^{N}\left( \mu \right)\) for all \(\mu \ge 1\). With Prioritization,

    $$\begin{aligned} v^{P}\left( \mu \right) =\frac{H\left( \mu \right) }{\mu \left( \mu -1\right) ((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )}V^{P}(\mu )>0, \end{aligned}$$

    where \(H\left( \mu \right) =(2\alpha +\beta )\left( 1-\rho \right) {\mu } ^{2}-\alpha \left( 1-2\rho \right) \mu +\beta \rho >0\), as \(H\left( 1\right) =\alpha +\beta >0\); \(H^{\prime }\left( 1\right) =2\left( 1-\rho \right) \beta +(3-2\rho )\alpha >0\) and \(H^{\prime \prime }\left( \mu \right) =(2\alpha +\beta )\left( 1-\rho \right) >0\). Consequently

    $$\begin{aligned} r^{P}\left( \mu \right) =v^{P}\left( \mu \right) +a\frac{\partial \Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }\text { with }\frac{\partial \Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }=\frac{2\alpha }{\left( \alpha +\beta \right) }(\mu -1)(1-\rho )>0; \end{aligned}$$

    and

    $$\begin{aligned} b^{P}\left( \mu \right)= & {} v^{P}\left( \mu \right) +a\frac{\partial X^{P}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu } \\ \text { with }\frac{\partial X^{P}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }= & {} { \frac{\rho \beta }{{\mu }^{2}\left( \alpha +\beta \right) }}+{\frac{\alpha +\beta \left( 1-\rho \right) \ }{\alpha +\beta }+\frac{\partial \Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }>\frac{\partial \Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }}. \end{aligned}$$

    Indeed \(b^{P}\left( \mu \right) >r^{P}\left( \mu \right)\) for all \(\mu \ge 1\), as

    $$\begin{aligned} b^{P}\left( \mu \right) -r^{P}\left( \mu \right) =a\left( {\frac{\rho \beta }{{\mu }^{2}\left( \alpha +\beta \right) }}+{\frac{\alpha +\beta \left( 1-\rho \right) \ }{\alpha +\beta }}\right) >0. \end{aligned}$$
  3. (c)

    We have

    $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial ^{2}R^{N}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial a\partial \mu }=0< \frac{\partial ^{2}B^{N}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial a\partial \mu }=1, \end{aligned}$$

    and

    $$\begin{aligned} 0<\frac{\partial ^{2}R^{P}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial a\partial \mu }= \frac{\partial \Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }<\frac{ \partial ^{2}B^{N}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial a\partial \mu }=\frac{ \partial X^{P}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }. \end{aligned}$$

Proof of Lemma 2

  1. (a)

    From (5) and (11), we form

    $$\begin{aligned} \Delta X\equiv X^{P}\left( \mu \right) -X^{N}\left( \mu \right) =\Delta X\equiv X^{P}\left( \mu \right) -X^{N}\left( \mu \right) , \end{aligned}$$

    which writes

    $$\begin{aligned} \Delta X=\left( \alpha \left( 1-\rho \right) \mu -\beta \rho \right) \frac{ \left( \mu -1\right) ^{2}}{\left( \alpha +\beta \right) \mu }\lesseqqgtr 0 \text { as }\mu \lesseqqgtr \mu _{X}\equiv \frac{\beta }{\alpha }\frac{\rho }{ 1-\rho }, \end{aligned}$$
    (23)

    with \(\mu _{X}>\frac{\rho }{1-\rho }\) as \(\beta >\alpha\). Note that \(\mu _{X}>1\) iff \(\frac{\beta }{\alpha +\beta }>\rho\). So if \(\rho \ge \frac{ \beta }{\alpha +\beta }\) then \(\Delta X\ge 0\) for all \(\mu >1.\)

  2. (b)

    From (12) and (13), we form

    $$\begin{aligned} \frac{V^{P}}{V^{N}}=\frac{((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )^{\alpha +\beta }}{\mu ^{\beta }}, \end{aligned}$$

    so that

    $$\begin{aligned} V^{P}\lesseqqgtr V^{N}\text { as }G\left( \mu \right) \equiv \frac{\ln ((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )}{\ln \mu -\ln ((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )}\lesseqqgtr \frac{ \beta }{\alpha }. \end{aligned}$$
    (24)

    Indeed, \(G\left( \mu \right)\) is well defined as for all \(\mu >1\) and \(\rho \in ]0,1[\) we have \(\mu>(1-\rho )\mu +\rho >1\). Note that one can also write \(G\left( \mu \right) =\left( g\left( \mu \right) -1\right) ^{-1}\), where \(g\left( \mu \right) =\frac{\ln \mu }{\ln ((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )}>1\) is decreasing and convex with respect to \(\mu >1\). As \(G^{\prime }\left( \mu \right) =-G^{2}\left( \mu \right) g^{\prime }\left( \mu \right) >0\) then \(G\left( \mu \right)\) is a strictly increasing and concave function of \(\mu\) such that \(\lim _{\mu \rightarrow 1}G\left( \mu \right) =\frac{1-\rho }{\rho }\) and \(\lim _{\mu \rightarrow \infty }G\left( \mu \right) =\infty\). So, if \(\frac{\beta }{\alpha +\beta }>\rho\), there exists \(\mu _{V}:G\left( \mu _{V}\right) =\frac{\beta }{\alpha }\Leftrightarrow \frac{\rho }{1-\rho } G\left( \mu _{V}\right) =\mu _{X}>1\). Moreover as \(\lim _{\mu \rightarrow 1}G^{\prime }\left( \mu \right) =-\left( \frac{1-\rho }{\rho }\right) ^{2}\left( -\frac{1}{2}\frac{\rho }{1-\rho }\right) <\frac{1-\rho }{\rho }\) and by concavity of \(G\left( \mu \right)\), we have

    $$\begin{aligned} 1\le \frac{\rho }{1-\rho }G\left( \mu \right) \le \mu \text { for }\mu \ge 1. \end{aligned}$$
    (25)

    This implies that \(\mu _{V}>\frac{\rho }{1-\rho }G\left( \mu _{V}\right) =\mu _{X}\).

  3. (c)

    From (23) we see straightforwardly that \(\frac{\partial \mu _{X}}{\partial \rho }>0\). Differentiating \(G\left( \mu _{V}\right) = \frac{\beta }{\alpha }\) with respect to \(\rho\) yields \(G^{\prime }\left( \mu _{V}\right) \frac{\partial \mu _{V}}{\partial \rho }=-\frac{\partial G\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }\). As \(\frac{\partial G\left( \mu \right) }{ \partial \rho }=\) \(\frac{\left( \mu -1\right) \ln \mu }{((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )\left( \ln ((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )-\ln \mu \right) ^{2}}<0\); this implies \(\frac{\partial \mu _{V}}{\partial \rho }>0\).

Proof of Proposition 1

Note that for all \(\mu >0\), \(\Delta B\left( \mu \right) =\Delta V\left( \mu \right) +a\Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) +a\Delta X_{1}\left( \mu \right) <\Delta V\left( \mu \right) +a\Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) =\Delta R\left( \mu \right)\) since \(\Delta X_{1}\left( \mu \right) <0\). When \(\alpha <\beta\), since \(\Delta V\left( \mu \right) \lesseqqgtr 0\) as \(\mu \lesseqqgtr \mu _{V}\), \(a\Delta X_{0}\left( 1\right) =0,a\lim _{\mu \rightarrow \infty }\Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) \rightarrow \infty\) and, \(\forall \mu ,\) there exists a \(\mu _{R}<\mu _{V}\) such that \(\Delta R\left( \mu \right) =\Delta V\left( \mu \right) +a\Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) \lesseqqgtr 0\) as \(\mu \lesseqqgtr \mu _{R}\). As a result \(\Delta R\left( \mu \right)\) is locally increasing around \(\mu =\mu _{R}:\frac{\partial \Delta R\left( \mu _{R}\right) }{ \partial \mu }>0\), then \(\frac{\partial \mu _{R}}{\partial \rho }=- \frac{\partial \Delta R\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }\Big / \frac{ \partial \Delta R\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }>0\) since \(\frac{ \partial \Delta R\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }=\frac{\partial \Delta V\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }+a\frac{\partial \Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }<0\) because

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \Delta X_{0}\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }= & {} -\frac{ \alpha }{\alpha +\beta }\left( \mu -1\right) ^{2}<0;\quad \text {and } \\ \frac{\partial \Delta V\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }= & {} -\left( \alpha +\beta \right) ~\left( \mu -1\right) ~((1-\rho )\mu +\rho )^{\alpha +\beta -1}V^{N}(\mu )<0. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, since \(\Delta R\lesseqqgtr 0\) as \(\mu \lesseqqgtr \mu _{R}\), \(a\left( \Delta X\left( 1\right) \right) =0\), \(\lim _{\mu \rightarrow \infty }a\left( \Delta X\left( \mu \right) \right) \rightarrow \infty\), and \(\Delta B\left( \mu \right) <0=\Delta R\left( \mu \right)\) at \(\mu =\mu _{R}\), there exists a \(\mu _{B}>\mu _{R}\) such that \(\Delta B\left( \mu \right) \lesseqqgtr 0\) as \(\mu \lesseqqgtr \mu _{B}\). As \(\mu _{X}<\mu _{V}\), \(\Delta B\left( \mu _{X}\right) =\Delta V\left( \mu _{X}\right) <0\), so that \(\mu _{B}>\mu _{X}\), and \(\Delta B\left( \mu _{V}\right) =\Delta X\left( \mu _{V}\right) >0\), so that \(\mu _{B}<\mu _{V}\). With the use of same arguments as above, \(\frac{\partial \mu _{B}}{\partial \rho }=- \frac{\partial \Delta B\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }Big/ \frac{\partial \Delta B\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \mu }>0\) as \(\frac{\partial \Delta X\left( \mu \right) }{\partial \rho }=-\left( \alpha \mu +\beta \right) <0\). \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 2

Assume that \(\mu <\mu _{R}.\) From Lemma 1, \(\Delta R<0\) so that \(n_{I}^{P}<n_{I}^{N}\). \(\Delta R<0\) also implies that \(\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right) <\Pi ^{N}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right)\); since profits \(\Pi ^{i}\left( n,\mu \right)\) are strictly concave in n, \(n_{I}^{N}\) is a unique maximum to \(\Pi ^{N}\) and \(\Pi ^{N}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right) <\Pi ^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N},\mu \right)\). We thus have \(\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right) <\Pi ^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N},\mu \right) .\) The proof is similar for \(\mu \ge \mu _{R}\). \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 3

As \(B^{i}(\mu )>R^{i}(\mu )\) for all \(\mu\), by definitions (15) and (16) of coverages, we have the first result. Now, consider the case where \(\mu <\mu _{B}\). From Lemma 1, \(\Delta B<0,\) so that \(n_{*}^{P}<n_{*}^{N}\). Moreover, \(\Delta B<0\) also implies that \(W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P},\mu \right) <W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{P},\mu \right)\); since welfare \(W^{i}\left( n,\mu \right)\) is strictly concave in n, \(n_{*}^{N}\) is a unique maximum to \(W^{N}\) and \(W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{P},\mu \right) <W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{N},\mu \right)\). We thus have \(W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P},\mu \right) <W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{N},\mu \right)\). The proof is similar for \(\mu \ge \mu _{B}\). \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 4

Note that for all \(\mu\), coverage solutions are given by \(N\left( x,\mu \right) =\frac{x}{c\mu }\), which is an increasing function in x. So we have:

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) -W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) \\{} & {} \quad =N\left( R^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) B^{P}\left( \mu \right) \\{} & {} \qquad -C\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) -N\left( R^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) B^{N}\left( \mu \right) +C\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) . \end{aligned}$$

At \(\mu = \mu _{R},\) we have:

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right) -W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right) \\{} & {} \quad <\left[ N\left( R^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right) -N\left( R^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right) \right] B^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right) \\{} & {} \qquad -C\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right) +C\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right) =0, \end{aligned}$$

where the inequality comes from the fact that \(B^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) <B^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right)\) and the equality, from the fact that \(R^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) =R^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right)\) and \(n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) =n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right)\). Similarly, at \(\mu =\mu _{B}\), we have:

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu _{B}\right) ,\mu _{B}\right) -W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu _{B}\right) ,\mu _{B}\right) \\{} & {} \quad>N\left( R^{N}\left( \mu _{B}\right) ,\mu _{B}\right) \left( B^{P}\left( \mu _{B}\right) -B^{N}\left( \mu _{B}\right) \right) +C\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu _{B}\right) ,\mu _{B}\right) >0, \end{aligned}$$

where the first inequality comes from the fact that \(R^{P}\left( \mu _{B}\right) >R^{N}\left( \mu _{B}\right)\) and the second, from the fact that \(B^{P}\left( \mu _{B}\right) =B^{N}\left( \mu _{B}\right)\). By continuity, there exists a \(\tilde{\mu }_{0}\in (\mu _{R},\mu _{B})\) such that \(W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) ,\tilde{\mu } _{0}\right) =W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) ,\tilde{\mu } _{0}\right)\). Moreover, from Propositions 1 and 2, for \(\mu<\) \(\mu _{R}<\mu _{B}\), \(n_{*}^{N}\left( \mu \right)>n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) >n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right)\) and \(W^{P}\left( n,\mu \right) -W^{N}\left( n,\mu \right) <0\), so that we have

$$\begin{aligned} W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right)<W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right)<W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) <W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) . \end{aligned}$$

This proves that \(W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) -W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) <0\) for \(\mu <\mu _{R}\). Identically, for \(\mu>\) \(\mu _{B}>\mu _{R}\), \(n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) >n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right)\) and \(W^{P}\left( n,\mu \right) -W^{N}\left( n,\mu \right) >0\) so

$$\begin{aligned} W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right)<W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right)<W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) <W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) . \end{aligned}$$

This proves that \(\tilde{\mu }_{0}\) is unique and \(W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) \lesseqqgtr W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right)\) as \(\mu \lesseqqgtr \tilde{\mu } _{0}\).

Proof of Proposition 5

At the second stage, the ISP chooses the regime independently of coverage, so that the regime is N if \(\mu \le \mu _{R}\) and P if \(\mu >\mu _{R}.\) If \(\mu \le \mu _{R}\) or \(\mu >\mu _{B}\), the regime chosen by the ISP is also the regime that is preferred by the regulator, so that the regulator can impose the welfare-maximizing coverage. If \(\mu \in (\mu _{R},\mu _{B}]\), the ISP chooses P while N is the welfare-maximizing regime, so that the regulator chooses \(n_{*}^{P}<n_{*}\). \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 6

First, we prove that there exists a \(\tilde{\mu }_{1}<\mu _{R}\) such that \(B^{P}\left( \tilde{\mu } _{1} \right) -R^{N}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{1} \right) =\Delta V\left( \tilde{\mu } _{1} \right) +aX^{P}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{1} \right) =0\), and \(n_{*}^{P} = n_{I}^{N}\). Indeed, consider a \(\mu <\mu _{R}\) and \(\Delta V(\mu )+aX^{P}(\mu )>\Delta V(\mu )+a\Delta X_{0}(\mu )=\Delta R(\mu )\). Now, since \(\Delta V(\mu )<0\) for \(1< \mu <\mu _{R},\) \(\Delta V\left( 1\right) +aX^{P}(1)=0\), \(\Delta V(\mu _{R})+aX^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) =B^{P}\left( \mu _{R} \right) -R^{N}\left( \mu _{R} \right) >\Delta R\left( \mu _{R}\right) =0\) and the fact that \(X^{P}\left( \mu \right) =\frac{ \mu ^{2}-1 }{2\left( \alpha +\beta \right) }\left( \alpha +\frac{\beta }{\mu }\right)\) is strictly increasing, as \(X^{P \prime }\left( \mu \right) =\frac{\beta +2\alpha \mu ^{3}+\beta \mu ^{2}}{\mu ^{2}}>0\). This completes the proof. \(\square\)

Second, we turn to cases (a)-(e).

  1. (a)

    if \(\mu <\tilde{\mu }_{1},\) then \(R^{N}\left( \mu \right) >B^{P}\left( \mu \right)\) so that \(n_{I}^{N}>n_{*}^{P}\), which implies that \(n_{*}^{N}>n_{I}^{N}>n_{*}^{P}>n_{I}^{P}\). As \(n_{I}^{N}>n_{I}^{P}\), this also implies that N is chosen under UM and USO. Moreover, since \(\mu <\mu _{R}\), we have \(R^{N}\left( \mu \right) >R^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\) so that

    $$\begin{aligned} W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N},\mu \right) >W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right) , \end{aligned}$$

    and N is chosen under TMR. Since \(\mu <\mu _{B}\), we have \(B^{N}\left( \mu \right) >B^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\) so that

    $$\begin{aligned} W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{N},\mu \right) >W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P},\mu \right) , \end{aligned}$$

    so that N is chosen under FR.

  2. (b)

    if \(\tilde{\mu }_{1}\le \mu <\mu _{R}\) then \(B^{P}\left( \mu \right) \ge R^{N}\left( \mu \right)\) so that \(n_{*}^{P}\ge n_{I}^{N}\). Since \(\mu <\mu _{B}\), \(n_{*}^{N}>n_{*}^{P}\) and since \(\mu <\mu _{R},\) \(n_{I}^{N}>n_{I}^{P}\), We thus have that

    $$\begin{aligned} n_{*}^{N}>n_{*}^{P}\ge n_{I}^{N}>n_{I}^{P}. \end{aligned}$$

    Since \(\mu<\mu _{B}<\mu _{B}\), arguments in (a) apply to show that N is chosen under all regulatory frameworks.

  3. (c)

    if \(\mu _{R}\le \mu <\tilde{\mu }_{0}\) then \(W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N},\mu \right) >W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right) ,\) so that N is chosen under TMR. Since \(\mu \ge \mu _{R}\), \(n_{I}^{P}\ge n_{I}^{N}\) and \(\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right) \ge \Pi ^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N},\mu \right)\). Since \(\mu <\mu _{B}\), \(n_{*}^{N}>n_{*}^{P}\) and \(W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{N},\mu \right) >W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P},\mu \right) .\) We thus have that

    $$\begin{aligned} n_{*}^{N}>n_{*}^{P}>n_{I}^{P}\ge n_{I}^{N}, \end{aligned}$$

    and that P is chosen under UM and USO, while N is chosen under FR.

  4. (d)

    \(\tilde{\mu }_{0}\le \mu <\mu _{B}\), then \(W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P},\mu \right) >W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N},\mu \right)\), so that P is chosen under TMR. Since \(\mu _{R}>\mu >\mu _{B}\), coverages are set as in (c). Arguments in (c) apply to show that P is chosen under UM and USO, while N is chosen under FR.

  5. (e)

    if \(\mu \ge \mu _{B}\) then \(n_{*}^{P}\ge n_{*}^{N}\) and \(W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P},\mu \right) \ge W^{N}\left( n_{*}^{N}\text {,} \mu \right)\) and P is chosen under FR. Since \(\mu >\tilde{\mu }_{0}\), \(n_{*}^{P}>n_{I}^{N}\) and since \(\mu >\mu _{R}\), \(n_{I}^{P}>n_{I}^{N}\) and

    $$\begin{aligned} n_{*}^{P}\ge n_{*}^{N}>n_{I}^{P}>n_{I}^{N}, \end{aligned}$$

    and P is also chosen under UM, USO and TMR.

Proof of Proposition 7

For \(\mu \in \left( \tilde{\mu }_{0},\mu _{B}\right)\), we have \(n_{U}=n_{*}^{P}>n_{T}=n_{I}^{P}\) so this yields \(W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) >W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right)\), which proves the second part. If \(\mu \in (\mu _{R},\tilde{\mu }_{0}]\), from Proposition 6, \(n_{*}^{N}>n_{*}^{P}>n_{I}^{P}\ge n_{I}^{N}\) and if \(\mu =\tilde{\mu }_{0}:W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) ,\tilde{\mu }_{0}\right)>W^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) ,\tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) =W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) ,\tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) >W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{0}\right) ,\tilde{\mu }_{0}\right)\). Now we have

$$\begin{aligned}{} & {} W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) -W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) \\{} & {} \quad =\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) -\Pi ^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) +a\left( X_{1}^{P}\left( \mu \right) -X_{1}^{N}\left( \mu \right) \right) \\{} & {} \quad <\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) -\Pi ^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) +a\left( X_{1}^{P}\left( \mu \right) -X_{1}^{N}\left( \mu \right) \right) , \end{aligned}$$

as \(\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{I}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) >\Pi ^{P}\left( n,\mu \right)\) for all n. So if \(\mu =\mu _{R}\)

$$\begin{aligned} W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right) -W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right) ,\mu _{R}\right)<a\left( X_{1}^{P}\left( \mu _{R}\right) -X_{1}^{N}\left( \mu _{R}\right) \right) <0, \end{aligned}$$

since \(X_{1}^{P}\left( \mu \right) -X_{1}^{N}\left( \mu \right) =-\frac{ \beta }{2}\frac{\left( \mu -1\right) ^{2}}{\mu \left( \alpha +\beta \right) } <0\). By continuity, there exists a \(\tilde{\mu }_{u}\in (\mu _{R},\tilde{\mu } _{2})\) such that \(W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{u}\right) , \tilde{\mu }_{u}\right) =W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \tilde{\mu }_{u}\right) , \tilde{\mu }_{u}\right)\) and \(W^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) \lesseqqgtr W^{N}\left( n_{I}^{N}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right)\) as \(\mu \lesseqqgtr \tilde{\mu }_{u}\). \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 8

First, let us give a characterization of \(M_{*}^{i}\). Inserting first-best coverages \(n_{*}^{i}\left( \mu \right) =\frac{B^{i}\left( \mu \right) }{c\mu }\) into the ISP participation constraint (17) implies that \(\Pi ^{i}\left( n_{*}^{i}\left( \mu \right) ,\mu \right) =R^{i}\left( \mu \right) -\frac{1}{2}B^{i}\left( \mu \right) \ge 0\). This can also be written as \(\frac{1}{2}\left( V^{i}\left( \mu \right) -aZ^{i}\left( \mu \right) \right) \ge 0\), where \(Z^{N}\left( \mu \right) =X^{N}\left( \mu \right)\) and \(Z^{P}\left( \mu \right) =X^{P}\left( \mu \right) -2X_{0}^{N}\left( \mu \right) =\frac{1}{2}\left( \mu -1\right) \frac{\alpha \mu ^{2}+\left( \beta -3\alpha \right) \mu +\beta }{\mu \left( \alpha +\beta \right) }>0\).Footnote 21 Here \(Z^{N}\left( \mu \right)\) is increasing and linear, and \(Z^{P}\left( \mu \right)\) is increasing and concave for all \(\mu >1\). Then for \(a=0\), we have \(\frac{1}{2}V^{i}\left( \mu \right) -aZ^{i}\left( \mu \right) >0\) and

$$\begin{aligned} \lim _{a\rightarrow +\infty }\left( V^{i}\left( \mu \right) -aZ^{i}\left( \mu \right) \right) =-Z^{i}\left( \mu \right) \lim _{a\rightarrow +\infty }\left( a\right) =-\infty . \end{aligned}$$

So there exists a unique \(a_{\pi }^{i}:\frac{1}{2}\left( V^{i}\left( \mu \right) -aZ^{i}\left( \mu \right) \right) =0\). More precisely

$$\begin{aligned} a_{\pi }^{N}= & {} \frac{V^{N}\left( \mu \right) }{X^{N}\left( \mu \right) } =v\left( \mu -1\right) ^{\alpha +\beta -1}>0;\quad \text {and } \\ a_{\pi }^{P}= & {} \frac{V^{P}\left( \mu \right) }{Z^{P}\left( \mu \right) } =v\left( \alpha +\beta \right) \left( \frac{1}{2}\right) ^{\alpha +\beta -1} \frac{\left( \mu -1\right) ^{\alpha +\beta -1}\left( \mu +1\right) ^{\alpha +\beta }\mu ^{-(1+\beta )}}{\alpha \mu ^{2}+\left( \beta -3\alpha \right) \mu +\beta }>0. \end{aligned}$$

When \(\alpha +\beta <1\), these price thresholds are decreasing functions of \(\mu\) with \(\lim _{\mu \rightarrow +\infty }a_{\pi }^{i}=0\), so that for all a, there exists a unique \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{i}:a_{\pi }^{i}=a\). Then \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{i}\) becomes the inverse function of \(a_{\pi }^{i}\), defined from \(\mathbb {R}_{+}\) to \([1,+\infty )\) and it is decreasing in a. As a result the ISP participation constraint (17) is satisfied for \(\mu \le \bar{\mu }_{*}^{i}\) and \(M_{*}^{i}=[1,\bar{\mu }_{*}^{i}]\). Note that for a given \(\mu\)

$$\begin{aligned} a_{\pi }^{P}<a_{\pi }^{N}, \end{aligned}$$

as for all \(\mu >1\) we have

$$\begin{aligned} \left( \alpha +\beta \right) \left( \frac{1}{2}\right) ^{\alpha +\beta -1} \frac{\left( \mu +1\right) ^{\alpha +\beta }\mu ^{-(1+\beta )}}{\alpha \mu ^{2}+\left( \beta -3\alpha \right) \mu +\beta }<\frac{1}{\mu ^{2}}<1. \end{aligned}$$

This implies that \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{N}\) and \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{P}\) cannot intersect for any a.

Second, define just for the purpose \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{i}\) as functions of a, and let us define the following ad-price threshold

$$\begin{aligned} a_{B}^{P}:\bar{\mu }_{*}^{P}(a_{B}^{P})=\mu _{B}. \end{aligned}$$

It exists and is unique as \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{P}\left( a\right)\) is a decreasing one-to-one mapping from \(\mathbb {R}_{+}\) to \([1,+\infty )\), but \(\mu _{B}\) is from \(\mathbb {R}_{+}\) to \([\mu _{X},\mu _{V}]\). Then by definition, we have, when \(a=a_{B}^{P}:n_{*}^{P}\left( \bar{\mu }_{*}^{P}(a_{B}^{P})\right) =n_{*}^{N}\left( \mu _{B}\right) =n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu _{B}\right)\) and \(\Pi ^{N}\left( n_{*}^{N}\left( \mu _{B})\right) ,\mu _{B}\right) <\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{*}^{N}\left( \mu _{B})\right) ,\mu _{B}\right) =\Pi ^{P}\left( n_{*}^{P}\left( \mu _{B})\right) ,\mu _{B}\right) =0\) as, using Proposition 1, we have that for all \(\left( n,\mu \right) :\Pi ^{P}\left( n,\mu \right) >\Pi ^{N}\left( n,\mu \right)\) if \(\mu >\mu _{R}\), as \(\Delta \Pi =n\Delta R\). Here, \(\mu =\mu _{B}>\mu _{R}\), so the ISP participation constraint for \(i=N\) is violated: this implies that \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{P}(a_{B}^{P})>\bar{\mu } _{*}^{N}(a_{B}^{P})\). As \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{N}(a)\) and \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{P}(a)\) cannot intersect, this proves that \(\bar{\mu }_{*}^{N}<\bar{\mu } _{*}^{P}\). \(\square\)

Proof of Proposition 9

From (5), (11) and ( 20), we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} m_{n}^{\prime }= & {} \frac{1}{2}\left( \frac{aX_{f}^{i}}{F}\right) ^{\frac{1}{2 }}n^{-\frac{1}{2}}>0; \\ m_{\mu }^{\prime }= & {} \frac{1}{2}\left( \frac{an}{F}\right) ^{\frac{1}{2} }\left( X_{f}^{i}\right) ^{-\frac{1}{2}}\left( X_{f}^{i}\right) ^{\prime }>0;\quad \text {and } \\ m_{\mu n}^{\prime \prime }= & {} \frac{1}{4}\left( \frac{an}{F}\right) ^{-\frac{ 1}{2}}\left( X_{f}^{i}\right) ^{-\frac{1}{2}}\left( X_{f}^{i}\right) ^{\prime }>0. \end{aligned}$$

Moreover, since

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta m\left( n,\mu \right) =\left( \frac{an}{F}\right) ^{\frac{1}{2} }\left( \sqrt{X_{f}^{P}\left( \mu \right) }-\sqrt{X_{f}^{N}\left( \mu \right) }\right) <0, \end{aligned}$$

we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta m\left( n,\mu \right)= & {} \left( \frac{na}{F}\right) ^{\frac{1}{2} }\left( \sqrt{X_{f}^{P}\left( \mu \right) }-\sqrt{X_{f}^{N}\left( \mu \right) }\right) \\= & {} \left( \frac{na}{F}\right) ^{\frac{1}{2}}\left( \sqrt{ \frac{1}{2}\frac{\beta }{\alpha +\beta }\frac{\left( \mu ^{2}-1\right) }{\mu }}-\sqrt{\frac{\beta }{\alpha +\beta }\left( \mu -1\right) }\right)<0 \\ \frac{\partial \left( \Delta m\left( n,\mu \right) \right) }{\partial n}= & {} \frac{1}{2} n^{-1}\Delta m<0 \\ \frac{\partial ^{2}\left( \Delta m\left( n,\mu \right) \right) }{\partial n^{2}}= & {} -\frac{1}{4} n^{-2}\Delta m>0. \end{aligned}$$

\(\square\)

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Gautier, A., Poudou, JC. & Roland, M. Net Neutrality and Universal Service Obligations: It’s All About Bandwidth. Rev Ind Organ (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-024-09945-1

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