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Firms’ Information Acquisition with Heterogeneous Consumers and Trend

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Abstract

This paper analyzes firms’ location choices and information acquisition in a model of product differentiation with trend. The presence of an uncertain trend spot induces the firms not to follow the principle of maximal differentiation, unless the trend spot is expected to be near the ends of the city. Second, each firm has an incentive to acquire information about the exact trend spot. Consumer surplus is also higher when both firms are informed. Third, firms’ choice of product differentiation is excessive relative to the social optimum. Furthermore, in the social optimum, welfare is also higher when the planner is informed.

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Notes

  1. We take the number of firms as given in this paper. The possibility of entry is studied in Eaton and Lipsey (1975), Prescott and Visscher (1977), and Salop’s (1979) circular city model, among others.

  2. According to Tirole (1989, p. 280),

    The linear-cost model is not very tractable if the firms are located inside the interval, because when a firm lowers its price to the point that it just attracts the consumers located between the two firms it also attracts all consumers located on the other side of the rival. The firms’ demand functions are discontinuous. Their profit functions are discontinuous and nonconcave.

  3. The derivation is available from the author upon request.

  4. The second-order condition for maximization is satisfied: 2 Π i /∂p 2 i  = – 1/[z(1 – b a)] < 0.

  5. Recall that firm 2 locates at 1 – b, and not at b, from the left end of the city.

  6. I am grateful to the editor for pointing out this effect to me.

  7. It is assumed that E(t) is an unbiased estimator of t. Alternatively, one could consider a case in which firms’ beliefs about t are based on highly ambiguous information, so that E(t) = 1/2. It can be shown that the results of the paper continue to hold for this case as well.

  8. Corner solutions (a B = 0 or b B = 0) are analyzed in Sect. 4.2. Recall once again that firm 2 chooses to locate at 1 – b B, and not at b B, from the left end of a linear city.

  9. I am grateful to a referee and the editor for pointing out the two effects of information discussed here.

  10. This subsection follows the analysis of Tirole (1989, p. 282). I thank the editor and the two referees for suggesting that I should analyze the issues that are discussed in Sects. 3.3, 3.4, and 4.

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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank the editor and the two referees for extremely insightful reviews that greatly improved the content of the paper, and Pierre Regibeau, Masayoshi Honma, and Toshiyuki Iwamoto for helpful discussions. Of course, all errors are mine alone.

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Correspondence to Yukiko Hirao.

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Appendix: Derivations of (38) and (39)

Appendix: Derivations of (38) and (39)

1.1 A.1 Derivation of (38)

$$ E \varPi_{1}^{C} = \left( {z/15,552} \right)[\alpha^{3} {-}24 \alpha^{2} E \left( t \right) + 192 \alpha E \left( {t^{2} } \right){-}512E \left( {t^{3} } \right)], $$
(37)

where α ≡ 27 + 8E(t) – 3(9 – 8var(t))1/2.

$$ \begin{aligned} E \varPi_{1}^{B} & = z\left[ {\left( {3/8} \right) + \left( {var \left( t \right)/3} \right) + \left( {2/27} \right)\left( {var \left( t \right)} \right)^{2} } \right] \\ & = \left( {z/1944} \right)\left[ {729 + 648 var \left( t \right) + 144 \left( {var \left( t \right)} \right)^{2} } \right]. \\ \end{aligned} $$
(27)

Let Δ 1 C 1 B 1 . Δ 1 is increasing in var(t):

$$ \begin{aligned} \partial \Delta_{1} /\partial var\left( t \right) = \left( {z/15,552} \right)\{ [3\alpha^{2} {-}48\alpha E\left( t \right) + 192\alpha \left( {\left( {E\left( t \right)} \right)^{2} + var\left( t \right)} \right)]\partial \alpha /\partial var\left( t \right) + 192\alpha \} \hfill \\ {-}\left( {z/1944} \right)\left[ {648 + 288var\left( t \right)} \right]. \hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$
(52)
$$ \partial \alpha /\partial var\left( t \right) \, = \, 12/\left( {9 \, {-} \, 8var\left( t \right)} \right)^{1/2} . $$
(53)

Substituting (53) and the value of α into (52) and organizing, we get

$$ \partial \Delta_{1} /\partial var\left( t \right) = (z/1296\sqrt {} )[1998 + \left( {128E\left( t \right){-}486{-}192var\left( t \right)} \right)\sqrt {} + 360var\left( t \right)], $$
(54)

where \( \sqrt {} \equiv (9 - 8 var (t))^{1/2}\) for ease of notation.

Calculation shows that the terms in the square brackets [] on the RHS of (54) is itself increasing in var(t), so that ∂Δ 1 /∂var(t) > ∂Δ 1 /∂var(t) evaluated at var(t) = 0. Therefore,

$$ \begin{aligned} \partial \Delta_{1} /\partial var(t) > \partial \Delta_{1} /\partial var(t)|_{{var (t ) { = 0}}} \hfill \\ \quad = [z/(1296 \times 3)][1998 + \left( {128E\left( t \right){-}486} \right) \times 3] > 0. \hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$
(55)

Accordingly, Δ 1 C 1 B 1 takes the minimum value at var(t) = 0.

At var(t) = 0, α = 27 + 8E(t) – 3×3 = 18 + 8E(t), and

$$ \begin{aligned} E\varPi_{1}^{C} {-}E\varPi_{1}^{B} > E\varPi_{1}^{C} {-}E\varPi_{1}^{B} |_{{var (t ) { = 0}}} \hfill \\ \quad = \left( {z/1944} \right)\left[ {729 + 64\left( {E\left( t \right)} \right)^{3} {-}64E\left( {t^{3} } \right)} \right]{-}\left( {729z/1944} \right) \hfill \\ \quad = \left( {8z/243} \right)\left[ {\left( {E\left( t \right)} \right)^{3} {-}E\left( {t^{3} } \right)} \right] \hfill \\ \quad = 0\quad {\text{if the distribution of}}\;t\;{\text{has zero skewness}} .\hfill \\ \end{aligned} $$
(56)

cf. Let μ be the mean and σ the standard deviation of the probability distribution t.

$$ \begin{aligned} {\text{The formula expressing skewness }} & = E\{ [(t{-}\mu )/\sigma ]^{3} \} \\ & = \{ E\left( {t^{3} } \right){-}3\mu [E\left( {t^{2} } \right){-}\mu E\left( t \right)]{-}\mu^{3} \} /\sigma^{3} \\ & = [E\left( {t^{3} } \right){-}3\mu \sigma^{2} {-}\mu^{3} ]/\sigma^{3} \\ \end{aligned} $$

Skewness evaluated at σ 2 = 0 equals [E(t 3) –μ 3]/σ 3.

1.2 A.2 Derivation of (39)

$$ E\varPi_{2}^{C} = \left( {z/15,552} \right)[\alpha \beta^{2} + 8\beta (2\alpha {-}\beta )E\left( t \right) + 64(\alpha {-}2\beta )E\left( {t^{2} } \right){-}512E\left( {t^{3} } \right)], $$
(37)

where α ≡ 27 + 8E(t) – 3(9 – 8var(t))1/2, and β ≡ 9 – 8E(t) + 3(9 – 8var(t))1/2.

$$ \varPi_{2}^{A} = 3z/8 = 729z/1944. $$
(19)
$$ \partial \beta /\partial var\left( t \right) = {-}12/\left( {9{-}8var\left( t \right)} \right)^{1/2} = {-}\partial \alpha /\partial var\left( t \right). $$
(57)

Let Δ 2 C 2 Π A 2 . Δ 2 is decreasing in var(t):

$$ \begin{aligned} \partial \Delta_{2} /\partial var\left( t \right) = & \left( {z/15,552} \right)[(\beta^{2} + 16\beta E\left( t \right) + 64E\left( {t^{2} } \right))\partial \alpha /\partial var\left( t \right) + 64(\alpha {-}2\beta ) \\ & + (2\alpha \beta + 16\alpha E\left( t \right){-}16\beta E\left( t \right){-}128E\left( {t^{2} } \right))\partial \beta /\partial var\left( t \right)]. \\ \end{aligned} $$
(58)

Substituting (53), (57), and the values of α and β into (58) and organizing, we get

$$ \begin{aligned} \partial \Delta_{2} /\partial var\left( t \right) \, & = (z/432\sqrt {} )\{ {-}207 + 8E\left( t \right) + \left[ {\left( {128/3} \right)E\left( t \right){-}5} \right]\sqrt {} + 120var\left( t \right)\} \\ & < (z/432\sqrt {} )[{-}207 + 6 + \left( {32{-}5} \right)\sqrt {} + 120var\left( t \right)] \\ & < (z/(432\sqrt {} )\left[ {{-}201 + 81 + 120var\left( t \right)} \right] \\ & < 0 \, \left( {{\text{cf}}. \, \left( {33} \right)} \right). \\ \end{aligned} $$
(59)

Accordingly, Δ 2 C 2 B 1 takes the maximum value at var(t) = 0.

At var(t) = 0, α = 18 + 8E(t), and

$$ \begin{aligned} E\varPi_{2}^{C} {-}\varPi_{2}^{A} & < E\varPi_{2}^{C} {-}\varPi_{2}^{A} |_{{var (t ) { = 0}}} \\ & = \left( {z/1944} \right)\left[ {729 + 64\left( {E\left( t \right)} \right)^{3} {-}64E\left( {t^{3} } \right)} \right]{-}\left( {729z/1944} \right) \\ & = \left( {8z/243} \right)\left[ {\left( {E\left( t \right)} \right)^{3} {-}E\left( {t^{3} } \right)} \right] \\ & = 0\quad {\text{if the distribution of}}\;t\;{\text{has zero skewness}} .\\ \end{aligned} $$
(60)

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Hirao, Y. Firms’ Information Acquisition with Heterogeneous Consumers and Trend. Rev Ind Organ 50, 323–344 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-016-9534-z

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