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Edgeworth Price Cycles in Gasoline: Evidence from the United States

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Abstract

Studies of gasoline prices in multiple countries have found sequences of a sharp price increase followed by gradual decreases. This pattern is linked to Maskin and Tirole (Econometrica 56:571–599, 1988) duopoly pricing game and labeled Edgeworth price cycles. We examine data on average daily MSA-level retail gasoline prices for 350 MSAs in the US from 1996–2010. We confirm the finding of others and show that a relatively small number of US MSAs in contiguous upper Midwestern states evidence price cycling. However, our lengthy data set allows us to see that these MSAs began cycling in 2000. Thus, we can examine prices in cycling and non-cycling MSAs before and after cycling and find that prices are lower in MSAs that began cycling.

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Notes

  1. A measure of the gross retail margin is the difference between the refiner sale price of gasoline for resale and the price to end users. In 2010 this difference was 13.5 cents per gallon. This is an overestimate of the net retail margin since storage and delivery are not included in this price. See http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_refoth_dcu_nus_a.htm.

  2. See Allvine and Patterson (1974) and Castanias and Johnson (1993).

  3. These are gasoline stations that are not affiliated with major brands.

  4. When a border splits an MSA, there is a separate observation for each state: e.g., Louisville, Kentucky, and Louisville, Indiana. We will refer to each MSA, state observation separately. The data are 7 days a week except from September 2000 through December 2001 where there are only observations on week days. We do a sensitivity analysis on Table 4 column (8) where we drop the 5-day-a-week data.

  5. Similarly, Eckert (2003) counts the number of first differences in retail prices that are equal to zero, where MSAs with a relatively low count of zeros are price cycle MSAs.

  6. See the discussion of Table 2 below for details on the identification of the start of price cycling.

  7. See the Appendix for further details on the Markov switching model.

  8. The Markov model identifies three MSAs as cycling at the 5 % level and seven at the 10 % level that are not listed on Table 2. At the 5 % level, these MSAs are Des Moines, IA; Santa Fe, NM; and Charleston, WV. At the 10 % level, the MSAs are Brownsville, TX; Columbus, AL; Corpus Christie, TX; Huntington-Ashland, OH; Joplin, MO; McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX; and Tulsa, OK.

  9. For information about the summer of 2000 Midwest gasoline spike, see Bulow et al. (2003). For information on the two price spikes in 2001, see Platt’s Oilgram News, “Gasoline Climbs Anew on Wood River Fire,” vol. 79, no. 83, p. 4, May 1, 2001, and “Citgo Seeks EPA Waiver on Midwest ‘Gas’,” vol. 79, no. 166, p. 1, August 28, 2001.

  10. This price deflator data as well as a description of the data series is available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/PCECTPI.txt (accessed on 4/18/21).

  11. The OLS models are implemented in STATA using XTREG with the cluster option. The models with a common autocorrelation term are implemented with XTREGAR. The model that allows the autocorrelation to differ by MSA was implemented using XTGLS.

  12. All of the other specifications that are presented on Table 4 use the \(-\)0.5 cut off. We have estimated all of the additional models on Table 4 using the lower threshold for cycling, and the results only changed by tenths of a cent.

  13. SSA was a subsidiary of Marathon/Ashland petroleum and was formed when Marathon and Ashland merged in 1998. SSA is now a subsidiary of Marathon Petroleum. For a discussion of the assets that were involved in the Marathon and Ashland joint venture, see Taylor and Hosken (2007).

  14. For a history of QuikTrip see http://www.quiktrip.com/Who-is-QT/History (accessed January 11, 2012).

  15. For a description of the transaction see http://www.marathon.com/content/includes/AJAXtwister.asp?type=newsRelease&id=1479644 (accessed January 17, 2012).

  16. Oil Price Information Service, “St. Louis Retail Station Owners Sue QuikTrip for ‘Predatory Pricing’,” OPIS Alert, December 2, 2011.

  17. See FTC (2004). For a discussion of sizeable petroleum mergers, see pp. 35–59. For data on wholesale supply and brand level concentration by state, see pp. 243–246.

  18. See “BPvsSpeedway: a battle of turf” http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2001/07/29/loc_price_wars_fierce_at.html (accessed January 17, 2012).

  19. For more information on these outages, see footnote 9.

  20. As noted by (Neftçi (1984), p. 314), this procedure can handle nonstationarity in the underlying data (i.e., \(p_t )\) given that the implied \(I_t \) will often be plausibly stationary even when the former is not.

  21. See Neftçi (1984, pp. 326–327).

  22. Several studies that use a smaller number of observations than we do have shown that estimating the initial condition along with the transition probabilities does not affect the magnitude of the latter when they are estimated alone; see, e.g., Falk (1986) and McQueen and Thorley (1991). Treating \(\pi _0 \) as a nuisance parameter reduces the computation burden of estimating the transition probabilities (Rothman 2008).

  23. (McQueen and Thorley (1991), p. 243).

  24. See Neftçi (1984, pp. 315–318) for the formula that is used to construct the confidence ellipsoid and further discussion of this test.

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Correspondence to Christopher T. Taylor.

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The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Trade Commission. Comments by Matthew Chesnes, Steven Tenn, and participants at the 2008 International Industrial Organization Conference and excellent research assistance by Elisabeth Murphy and Anne Miles are appreciated.

Appendix: A Markov-switching Model for Identifying Edgeworth Price Cycles

Appendix: A Markov-switching Model for Identifying Edgeworth Price Cycles

We employ a Markov switching model that is based on Neftçi (1984). Let \(p_t\) be the retail price in a given MSA during week \(t\), which is assumed to follow a mean-zero linearly regular stationary process. Define \(\{I_t \}\) as a second-order (“two-state”) Markov switching process:

$$\begin{aligned} I_t =\left\{ {\begin{array}{l} +1\quad \text{ if} \Delta _t p_{t}^{(\ell )} >0 \\ -1\quad \text{ if} \Delta _t p_t^{(\ell )} \le 0, \\ \end{array}} \right. \end{aligned}$$
(2)

where \(\Delta _t\) denotes the first-difference operator.Footnote 20 The associated transition probabilities, denoted \(\lambda _{ij} \) for \(i,j=\{0,1\}\), are given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \left. {\begin{array}{l} \lambda _{11} =\Pr (I_t =+1|I_{t-1} =+1,I_{t-2} =+1) \\ \lambda _{00} =\Pr (I_t =-1|I_{t-1} =-1,I_{t-2} =-1) \\ \lambda _{10} =\Pr (I_t =+1|I_{t-1} =+1,I_{t-2} =-1) \\ \lambda _{01} =\Pr (I_t =-1|I_{t-1} =-1,I_{t-2} =+1) \\ \end{array}} \right\} . \end{aligned}$$
(3)

If a MSA’s retail or wholesale gasoline price series exhibits sharp increases and gradual decreases, as is suggested by the Maskin and Tirole (1988), then \(\{I_t \}\) remains in state \(-1\) longer than it remains in state \(+1\). In this case, the retail price cycle is said to be asymmetric and would imply\(\lambda _{00} >\lambda _{11}.\) If, on the other hand, the series is symmetric over the cycle, then \(\lambda _{00} =\lambda _{11} \).

Our objective is to obtain estimates of the transition probabilities given in Eq. (3). Let \(s_T \) denote a realization of \(\{I_t \}\). The log-likelihood function is then given by:

$$\begin{aligned} L\left( {s_T ,\lambda _{11} ,\lambda _{00} ,\lambda _{10} ,\lambda _{01} ,\pi _0 } \right)&= \ln \pi _0 +\phi _{11} \ln \lambda _{11} +\psi _{11} \ln (1-\lambda _{11} )\nonumber \\&+\phi _{00} \ln \lambda _{00} +\psi _{00} \ln (1-\lambda _{00} ) \\&+\phi _{10} \ln \lambda _{10} +\psi _{10} \ln (1-\lambda _{10} )\nonumber \\&+\phi _{01} \ln \lambda _{01} +\psi _{01} \ln (1-\lambda _{01} ).\nonumber \end{aligned}$$
(4)

The variable \(\pi _0 \) is the initial condition (i.e., the probability of observing the initial two states), while the variables \(\phi _{11} ,\ldots ,\psi _{01} \) represent the number of observed occurrences of the transitions.

Neftçi argues that it is necessary to estimate \(\pi _0 \) when the number of observations contained in the series is small and when the initial state may contain useful information (e.g., when the process \(I_t\) does not in fact start at \(t=1\), which is usually the case). Neftçi develops a methodology for deriving the limiting probabilities of the initial conditions in terms of the transition probabilities.Footnote 21 If, however, the number of observations that are available in the sample is large (i.e., in an asymptotic sense), the initial state may be treated as a nuisance parameter (Billingsley 1961). Since the number of MSA-specific daily price observations that are available in our dataset covers (1996–2010), ignoring the influence of the initial condition is reasonable.Footnote 22 With \(\pi _0 =0\), the maximum likelihood estimates (MLEs) of the four unknown parameters \(\Lambda =[\lambda _{00} ,\lambda _{11} ,\lambda _{10} ,\lambda _{01} {]}^{\prime }\) are obtained by setting the four score equations of the log-likelihood function equal to zero and solving the parameters in terms of the transition counts.Footnote 23 The general form of the score equations is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda _{ij} }=\frac{\phi _{ij} }{\lambda _{ij} }-\frac{\psi _{ij} }{1-\lambda _{ij} }=0. \end{aligned}$$
(5)

Solving Eq. (5) in terms of \(\lambda _{ij} \) gives:

$$\begin{aligned} \left. {\begin{array}{l} \frac{\phi _{ij} }{\lambda _{ij} }=\frac{\psi _{ij} }{1-\lambda _{ij} } \\ \Rightarrow \phi _{ij} (1-\lambda _{ij} )=\psi _{ij} \lambda _{ij} \\ \Rightarrow \lambda _{ij} (\phi _{ij} +\psi _{ij} )=\phi _{ij} \\ \Rightarrow \lambda _{ij} =\frac{\phi _{ij} }{\phi _{ij} +\psi _{ij} }=\hat{{\lambda }}_{ij} \\ \end{array}} \right\} , \end{aligned}$$
(6)

where \(\hat{{\lambda }}_{ij} \) denotes the (approximate) MLE of \(\lambda _{ij} \). McQueen and Thorley (1991) show that the asymptotic variance of \(\hat{{\lambda }}_{ij} \) is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \sigma ^{2}(\hat{{\lambda }}_{ij} )=\frac{\hat{{\lambda }}_{ij} (1-\hat{{\lambda }}_{ij} )}{\phi _{ij} +\psi _{ij} }. \end{aligned}$$
(7)

Testing for the presence of Edgeworth price cycles (asymmetry) in gasoline prices involves testing the null hypothesis \(H_0 :\lambda _{00} =\lambda _{11} \) against the (two-sided) alternative \(H_1 :\lambda _{00} \ne \lambda _{11} \).

1.1 Hypothesis Testing

Neftçi demonstrates how the test for asymmetry can be evaluated using the estimate of the transition probabilities to construct a confidence region (ellipsoid), the center of which corresponds to the MLEs of \(\lambda _{11} \) and \(\lambda _{00} \). All points within the confidence ellipsoid represent the true value of the latter estimate for a given confidence level.Footnote 24 However, Sichel (1989, p. 1259) demonstrates that this procedure “has low power and is sensitive to noise”. Specifically, he shows that Neftçi’s test may fail to identify asymmetry that is actually present, and instead applies an asymptotic \(t\)-test that appears to give higher power.

McQueen and Thorley (1991) test the symmetry hypothesis in their data by considering asymptotic Lagrange Multiplier, Likelihood Ratio, and Wald tests (all of which are approximately equal for large sample sizes). They note that: “The choice of test statistics is normally a matter of computational convenience” (p. 256). Again, the length of our time series data suggests that we can rely on the direct analytical solutions for the MLEs and (asymptotic) variances of the Markov transition probabilities. This fact motivates the use of the Wald test since it uses the MLEs and asymptotic variance estimates of the unconstrained log-likelihood function, which correspond to the “unrestricted” estimates obtained by appealing to Eqs. (6) and (7). The computed value the Wald test under \(H_0 \) is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{(\hat{{\lambda }}_{00} -\hat{{\lambda }}_{11} )^{2}}{\sigma (\hat{{\lambda }}_{11} )-\sigma (\hat{{\lambda }}_{00} )}\sim \chi _{df=1}^2. \end{aligned}$$
(8)

This test statistic is used to determine whether there is a statistically significant Edgeworth price cycling effect within a given MSA over the sample period.

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Zimmerman, P.R., Yun, J.M. & Taylor, C.T. Edgeworth Price Cycles in Gasoline: Evidence from the United States. Rev Ind Organ 42, 297–320 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-012-9372-6

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