Abstract
Using individual bank account data from South Korea, where joint accounts are rare and the legal system emphasizes the individuality of financial transactions, we examine the distribution of financial resources between spouses within households. We find that each member’s share of household savings depends on the balance of bargaining power. We also find that the wife’s bargaining power increases total household savings. The findings deviate from the unitary model.
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Acknowledgments
We are thankful of the editor and an anonymous referee for their constructive comments. We also like to thank David Allen, Li Gan, Daniel Hamermesh, Steve Trejo, and seminar participants at the 2003 annual conference of Southern Economic Association and the Center for East Asian Studies, the University of Texas at Austin. Lee acknowledges the grant from the Bank of America Research Fund honoring James H. Penick. Pocock acknowledges funding from the Ward Fellowship. The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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Lee, J., Pocock, M. Intrahousehold allocation of financial resources: evidence from South Korean individual bank accounts. Rev Econ Household 5, 41–58 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-007-9004-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11150-007-9004-3