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The Desirability of forgiveness in regulatory enforcement

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Abstract

I present a model that explains two common features of regulatory enforcement: selective forgiveness of noncompliance, and the collection of information on a firm’s compliance activities and not just its compliance status. I show that forgiving noncompliance is optimal if the information on a firm’s compliance activities constitutes sufficiently strong evidence of the firm having exerted a high level of compliance effort. The key benefit of forgiving noncompliance is a reduction in the probability with which the firm needs to be monitored.

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Notes

  1. As Scholz and others have observed, the differences between the two approaches are not always clear cut. There is also considerable variation in terminology: the cooperative approach is also referred to as the “compliance” or “ bargaining” approach, and the deterrent approach as the “ sanctioning” or “ rule-oriented” approach, among other possibilities. A third approach that has gained favor in recent years is “ responsive regulation” (Scholz, Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Nielsen 2006). This approach is, roughly speaking, an amalgam of the two approaches: the regulator first adopts a cooperative posture, but resorts to deterrence if the firm proves recalcitrant.

  2. Further evidence of selective enforcement in the U.S. can be found in Harrington (1988), who describes studies of U.S. environmental enforcement that reveal penalties are rarely imposed when violations are discovered. This is not simply a manifestation of lax enforcement, since compliance rates appear to be high. Hunter and Waterman (1996) present similar results, and report that for 30 percent of the pollution violations examined, no action was taken by regulators beyond telephone calls and meetings with firms. Lofgren (1989) in a study of OSHA enforcement of safety and health regulations, reports that violations routinely go unpunished, yet OSHA enforcement has been deemed quite effective (Weil 1996). For evidence of selective enforcement in Europe, see, for example, the fascinating account by Hawkins (1984) of field-level environmental enforcement in Britain.

  3. For example, the U.S. EPA’s compliance inspection manual for water pollution regulations requires inspectors to collect information on a host of plant characteristics and practices, and not just information on its pollution discharges (United States Environmental Protection Agency 2004).

  4. A distinguishing feature of Heyes and Rickman’s model is that forgiveness is not motivated by firm inspections (or audits) being costly.

  5. An exception is Malik (2007), who presents a model of environmental regulation that incorporates information on firm behavior other than its observed emissions. The focus of his paper is the design of optimal environmental regulation rather than selective enforcement of regulations.

  6. Malik (1993), Nyborg and Telle (2004), and Telle (2009), among others, also model compliance as being probabilistic.

  7. Harford (1991), Jost (1997), and Rousseau (2009), among others, allow for imperfect observation of compliance.

  8. Two different types of variables may be contained in the signal \(s\): (1) variables that are a deterministic function of effort level \(a\) but can only be observed by the regulator with error, and (2) variables that are inherently randomly related to \(a\). An example of the first type of variable would be the regulator’s observation of the degree to which the firm followed procedures consistent with achieving compliance, based on inspections of the firm’s records and interviews with its employees. An example of the second type of variable would be the state of equipment needed to achieve compliance, specifically whether or not the equipment was in working order. Equipment break downs are presumably random, with the probability of one occurring depending on the firm’s compliance effort. See Sinclair-Desgagne (1994) for the theory of multi-signal principal agent problems.

  9. As implied by the above formulation, the firm’s (true) compliance status and the signal \(s\) are assumed to be conditionally independent given the firm’s effort level. This assumption, that the signals of the agent’s effort observed by the principal are conditionally independent, is common in the related literature on optimal auditing, e.g., see Dye (1986). The assumption is relevant only when the regulator’s assessment technology is imperfect. When the technology is perfect (\(\alpha =1\)), \(s\) is acquired by the regulator only when the firm is actually in noncompliance.

  10. The absence of a participation constraint and the inclusion of a limited liability constraint are quite common in principal-agent models of regulation. See, for example, Innes (1999) and Malik (1993). This type of model structure is plausible to the extent that regulation of the firm is socially desirable and \(F\) is not so large as to induce the firm to shut down. Inclusion of a participation constraint restricting the magnitude of the firm’s total costs (which consist of effort costs plus expected fine costs) would not mitigate the desirability of forgiveness. As shown below, forgiveness invariably lowers the firm’s expected fine costs. Therefore, for a given effort level, a participation constraint that is binding when the regulator never engages in forgiveness would not be binding when the regulator engages in forgiveness; similarly, a constraint that is not binding in the first scenario also would not be binding in the second one.

  11. The condition is both necessary and sufficient for a unique optimum if the firm’s objective function is strictly convex,

    $$\begin{aligned} C^{\prime \prime }(a)+m\left\{ [\theta _{N|N}-p\alpha ]\sum _{s\in S}q_{aa}f-2p^{\prime }\alpha \sum _{s\in S}q_{a}f-p^{\prime \prime }\alpha \sum _{s\in S}qf\right\} >0. \end{aligned}$$

    The first term on the LHS and the third term in braces clearly have the correct sign. This is also true of the second term in braces given (3) and the result obtained below that \(f(s)=F\) unless \(q_{a}(s|a)/q(s|a)\) is positive and sufficiently large, in which case \(f(s)=0\). The sign of the first term in braces is ambiguous, but the inequality will clearly hold even if the term is negative, provided it is not too large.

  12. In general, a constraint \(m\le 1\) is also required. To avoid clutter, I have omitted this constraint, and assume that the parameters of the problem ensure a solution with \(m\in (0,1]\).

  13. For a given value of \(a\), the optimal values of \(m\) and \(f(s)\) are no different when acquisition of \(s\) is not contingent on the firm’s perceived compliance status. This stems from the fact that: (i) the incentive compatibility constraint remains the same, and (ii) the regulator’s objective function in (6) changes only to the extent that the expression in braces is replaced by one. A comparison of the modified objective function and the original one yields the conclusion that, given \(\alpha >0\), the regulator’s costs are lower when acquisition of \(s\) is contingent on the firm’s compliance status.

  14. If \(\mu \) were negative, (10) would imply that \(f(s)=F\) when the expression in braces is positive, but if this were true then (5) could not hold because the expression in braces in (5) would be positive.

  15. Depending on the exogenously given values of \(\theta _{N|N}\), \(\alpha ,\) \( q(s|a)\), \(q_{a}(s|a\)), \(p(a)\) and \(p^{\prime }(a)\), the expression in braces in (10) could take on a value of zero for some \(s\). In such cases, the magnitude of the fine is irrelevant, for ease of exposition, I assume it is set equal to \(F\).

  16. Nyborg and Telle, and Telle, describe another possibility, drawn from Norwegian regulatory practice. Some regulations limit the amount of pollution a firm can emit over a period of a year. In such cases, the level of pollution observed during a monitoring visit may tell the regulator little about the firm’s compliance with the annual limit. As a result, the regulator is more inclined to make inferences about the firm’s compliance effort on the basis of other information collected during a monitoring visit.

  17. For this case, given (3), the denominator in (9) reduces to \(p^{\prime }(a)\alpha F\).

  18. A similar result can be obtained if \(s\) is a multidimensional signal and \(S\) is a lattice that has a component-wise partial ordering. If \(L_{S}(s,a)\) satisfies the monotone likelihood ratio property (see Sinclair-Desgagne 1994), then forgiveness is associated with large values of the vector \(s\).

  19. The revelation principle allows us to restrict attention to incentive compatible policies that induce truthful reporting. I assume, as usual, that if the firm is indifferent between being honest and dishonest, it chooses to be honest.

  20. Once again, to reduce clutter, I omit the constraint for the monitoring probability and assume that the parameters of the problem ensure \(m_{C}\in (0,1]\).

  21. An alternative motivation for collecting information on compliance effort rather than compliance status is the presence of a weak link between effort and compliance status, as would be true if factors beyond the firm’s control play a large role in determining its compliance status. In such cases it would be reasonable to regulate effort instead of outcomes. One example of this is the use of negligence rules to regulate accidental harms. Such rules specifically target effort levels, with sanctions determined by the firm’s choice of effort level.

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Acknowledgments

I thank Thomas Lyon, Roberto Samaniego, Jorge Soares, Chen Song, as well as two anonymous referees and the editor of this Journal for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Any errors are my own.

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Correspondence to Arun S. Malik.

Appendix

Appendix

1.1 Proof of result 2

This result is most easily established by working with the reciprocals of the optimal monitoring probabilities with and without forgiveness, and examining the difference (\(1/m^{*}-1/\overline{m}^{*}\)). The larger is this difference, the larger is the reduction in the monitoring probability achieved by forgiveness. Using Result 1, along with (3) and (9), the difference can be written

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{m^{*}}-\frac{1}{\overline{m}^{*}}\equiv \frac{F}{C^{\prime }(a)}\left\{ [\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]\sum _{s\in S_{0}}q_{a}(s|a)-p^{\prime }(a)\alpha \sum _{s\in S_{0}}q(s|a)\right\} . \end{aligned}$$
(24)

We can establish that the expression in braces is positive as follows. By definition, for \(s\in S_{0}\), noncompliance is forgiven and the expression in braces in the first condition in (10) is positive. Summing the expression in braces in (10) for all \(s\in S_{0}\) yields the expression in braces in (24), which, in turn, must be positive.

Now consider the effect on (24) of a reduction in \(\alpha \) from \(\alpha ^{\prime }\) to \(\alpha ^{\prime \prime }\), due either to a reduction in \( \theta _{N|N}\) or an increase in \(\theta _{N|C}\). We know from Proposition 1 that \(S_{0}\) is weakly larger the smaller is \(\alpha \). Thus we can write \( n(S_{0}^{\prime \prime })\ge n(S_{0}^{\prime })\) with \(S_{0}^{\prime }\subset S_{0}^{\prime \prime }\). First consider the case where \(S_{0}\) is unchanged: \(S_{0}^{\prime }=S_{0}^{\prime \prime }\). A reduction in \(\alpha \) due to an increase in \(\theta _{N|C}\) unambiguously increases the difference (\(1/m^{*}-1/\overline{m}^{*}\)), since it increases the magnitude of the first term in braces in (24) while reducing the magnitude of the second one. The effect of a reduction in \(\theta _{N|N}\) is less transparent, since it reduces the magnitude of both terms. However, we know that the first sum in braces is positive, as is the second sum. As is easily verified, the relative weight attached to the first sum, \([\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]/p^{\prime }(a)\alpha \), is decreasing in \(\theta _{N|N}\). Therefore, a reduction in \(\theta _{N|N}\) increases the difference (\(1/m^{*}-1/\overline{m}^{*}\)).

Now consider the case where \(n(S_{0}^{\prime \prime })>n(S_{0}^{\prime })\). Let \(D\equiv S_{0}^{\prime \prime }\backslash S_{0}^{\prime }\) denote the set of additional signals for which noncompliance is forgiven as a result of the reduction in \(\alpha \). The expression in braces in (24) will now be augmented by the term

$$\begin{aligned}{}[\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]\sum _{s\in D}q_{a}(s|a)-p^{\prime }(a)\alpha \sum _{s\in D}q(s|a). \end{aligned}$$
(25)

This term must also have a positive sign given (10). Thus, the magnitude of the difference \((1/m^{*}-1/\overline{m}^{*})\) is further increased.

Finally, using (14), Eq. (24) can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{m^{*}}-\frac{1}{\overline{m}^{*}}\equiv \frac{\sigma (a)[\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]F}{C{^{\prime }}(a)}\left\{ \frac{\sigma _{a}(a)}{\sigma (a)}-\frac{p{^{\prime }}(a)\alpha }{[\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]}\right\} . \end{aligned}$$
(26)

The expression in braces is the difference in likelihood ratios, \(\Delta ^{\sigma }\), specified in Result 2. As can be seen from (26), an increase in \(\Delta ^{\sigma }\) will imply a larger value for \((1/m^{*}-1/ \overline{m}^{*})\), unless the increase in \(\Delta ^{\sigma }\) is accompanied by a proportionally larger reduction in the value of \(\sigma (a)[\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ].\) The possibility of such a reduction cannot be ruled out.

1.2 Signs of \(\partial K/\partial \theta _{N|N}\) and \(\partial K/\partial \theta _{N|C}\)

Recall that \(K\) represents the RHS of (15). Differentiating \(K\) with respect to \(\theta _{N|N}\) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial K}{\partial \theta _{N|N}}\equiv \frac{-q_{a}(s_{M}|a)}{ p^{\prime }(a)\alpha ^{2}}+\frac{q(s_{M}|a)[1-p(a)]}{[\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]^{2}}. \end{aligned}$$
(27)

It can be verified that this expression is negative given the fact that \( \alpha [1-p(a)]<[\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]\) and the premise that forgiveness is optimal when \(s_{M}\) is observed (so (11) holds).

Differentiating \(K\) with respect to \(\theta _{N|C}\) yields

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial K}{\partial \theta _{N|C}}\equiv \frac{q_{a}(s_{M}|a)}{ p^{\prime }(a)\alpha ^{2}}+\frac{p(a)q(s_{M}|a)}{[\theta _{N|N}-p(a)\alpha ]^{2}}, \end{aligned}$$
(28)

which is positive since \(q_{a}(s_{M}|a)>0\) when forgiveness is optimal, as is true by assumption when \(s=s_{M}\).

1.3 Establishing \(\mu >0\) and \(\tau >0\) given self-reporting

I first rule out \(\mu =0\) and then rule out \(\mu <0\). If \(\tau >0\), then \( \mu =0\) implies that the first condition in (22) always holds as a strict inequality, which in turn implies \(f_{N}(s)=0\, \forall s\). But then (16) cannot be binding, contradicting the premise that \(\tau >0\). If \(\tau =0\), then the following first-order condition for the monitoring probability, \( m_{C}\), cannot hold when \(\mu =0\):

$$\begin{aligned} p(a)[c_{m}+\theta _{N|C}c_{S}]=\tau \theta _{N|N}f_{NC}-\mu \theta _{N|C}p^{\prime }(a)\,f_{NC}. \end{aligned}$$
(29)

Now suppose \(\mu <0\). Then (22) implies \(f_{N}(s)>0\) only if \( [1-p(a)]q_{a}(s|a)-p^{\prime }(a)q(s|a)>0 \), which in turn implies that the sum of the second and third terms in (18) must have a positive sign. But then (18) cannot hold, because the fourth term is non-negative.

We can now rule out \(\tau =0\). Given \(\mu >0\), (29) does not hold if \(\tau =0\).

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Malik, A.S. The Desirability of forgiveness in regulatory enforcement. J Regul Econ 46, 1–22 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-014-9254-y

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