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Exceptions to the Rules: Variances from Regulatory Standards

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Abstract

In the major areas of regulation, standards can be violated through an appeal process set up as a part of the statutes. This paper formulates a model of the variance appeal process, characterizes the (perfect Bayesian) equilibria of this procedure and studies the welfare properties of these equilibria. I consider two versions of the decision rule used by the appeal board and suggest institutionally feasible alterations in these rules which can improve equilibrium welfare. I also study how obstructionist interest groups can affect the welfare performance of the decision rules.

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Correspondence to Anthony M. Marino.

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Marino, A.M. Exceptions to the Rules: Variances from Regulatory Standards. J Regul Econ 29, 127–150 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-6032-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11149-006-6032-5

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