Abstract
Using non-agency securitization data consisting of mortgages originated between 1991 and 2007, we find that fraction of defaulted mortgages increases from 10.8% in the pre-crisis period (July 2007) to 19.6% in the post crisis period (July 2009). This paper then applies a split population hazard model, or widely known as a mixture cure model in biometrics literature, to jointly predict incidence (probability) and latency (hazard rate) of mortgage default, and more specifically to analyze the right-tail characteristics of the survival distributions of the sample mortgages. Our results show that negative equity is a highly significant factors driving both default incidence and latency for both adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) and fixed rate mortgages (FRMs). We also show that borrowers’ credit scores have weaker predictive effects on the latency (survival hazard) risks, but both low FICO and subprime borrowers have higher probability to default in an adverse market condition, ceteris paribus. Borrowers with low credit scores have high default probabilities but with a longer time to default (hazard rate). They are more likely to hang onto their mortgages even if they are “underwater” (negative equity). In terms of the “cured” rate, we show that subprime borrowers with underwater (negative equity) FRM mortgages, and prime ARM borrowers have relatively higher “cured” rates in the mortgage sample. More policy experiments can be conducted using the mixture cure model to test the effectiveness of selected financial assistance programs in the future.
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Notes
The FHA-HAMP is an effort under the Making Home Affordable (MHA) Program introduced by the US Department of Housing and Urban Development to help distressed homeowners to retain their homes and reduce the impact of foreclosure on families and communities. Details of the program are available: http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/nsc/rep/hampfact.pdf.
They discuss the HAMP and also the Settlement of the Countrywide Financial Corporation in 2008, and their implications on loan modifications for underwater/delinquent homeowners in great details.
In a The New Yorker article “Living by Default,” by Surowiecki James on Decemember 19, 2011, he commented on the double standard on default placed on the corporations and homeowners. The issues of whether it is morally right for borrowers to walk away from negative equity mortgages have been extensively debated in the presses and academic journals.
These numbers were inferred from a set of hypothetical questions they asked the sample respondents participating in the Chicago Booth Kellogg School Financial Trust Index Survey between 2008 and 2010.
There exists another group of defaulters, who are forced by unforeseen non-pecuniary “events”, such as job losses, etc., to exercise the options; even if they are out-of-the-money (Riddiough 1991). These borrowers who default even on positive housing equity positions are idiosyncratic and not within the scope of this study.
The estimate was published by a research team of Morgan Stanley Research comprising Tirupattur, V., Chang, O. and Egan, J. in the ABS Market Insights, “Understanding Strategic Default” on April 29, 2010,
The numbers were reported by the Experian-Oliver Wyman Market Intelligence Reports, “Strategic Default in Mortgages: Q2 2011 update”, which is available at http://www.marketintelligencereports.com. The study reported that strategic defaulters have nearly doubled from 11% in 2Q2007 to 20% in 4Q2008.
In criminology literature, recidivism is defined as the return to criminal activities by ex-convicts (recidivists). The recidivism is observed only when recidivists are arrested and returned to the prison.
For the competing risk model analyses, we also compute another the two indicators (“status_l” and “survdur_l”) for the left-censored sample using the July 2007 cutoff date.
A dummy variable “ARM”, which has a value of 1 for an adjusted rate mortgage (ARM) type; and otherwise, the value is 0 for a fixed rate mortgage (FRM).
As the current market value is not available in the data, we derive the current market value, “CURMKV”, by adjusting the original housing value, “ORGVAL”, using a simple growth rate, (Pt/Po), between the mortgage origination time of t = 0 and the event occurrence time t, using the S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price (Composite 10) index, Pt. The original house value, “ORGVAL”, is defined as the loan principal divided by the original LTV.
As a policy experiment, it will be challenging to identify those who are “cured” (i.e non-defaulters) and those who “failed” under the government’s assistance schemes. However, due to data limitations, we are not able to identify those distressed borrowers who have been put under various government’s assistance schemes.
We could convert the log-hazard estimates of the Weibull model by dividing the coefficients by the negative scale estimate, and then take the exponential term for the results; and we would get the hazard ratio estimates that are close to the PH estimates.
The estimates for the covariate are not reported due to space constraint.
We thank Corbiere and Joly (2007) for sharing the SAS macro programs for the estimation of the mixture cure models.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Sumit Agarwal, Yongheng Deng, Timothy Riddiough, James Shilling and Shih-Ti Yu for comments and suggestions on the earlier version of the paper. We would also like to thank Long Wang for capable and efficient research assistance. Errors, if any, remain the responsibility of the authors.
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Liu, B., Sing, T.F. “Cure” Effects and Mortgage Default: A Split Population Survival Time Model. J Real Estate Finan Econ 56, 217–251 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-017-9597-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-017-9597-0
Keywords
- Strategic default
- Mixture cure model
- Split population hazard model
- Default incidence
- Latency risks
- Underwater mortgages