Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Liquidity and Information Asymmetry in the Real Estate Market

  • Published:
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

George Akerlof’s asymmetric information theory explains why lemons are rarely, if at all, transacted. We extend his theory to explain liquidity in the second-hand real estate market. The idea is to decompose real estate into two components: land and the building structure. While sellers may know more about the quality of their structures than buyers, information on land, predominantly its locational attributes, is much more transparent. Without assuming any credit constraints or loss aversion behaviour, our information asymmetry model shows that: 1) the liquidity of real estate increases with the share of its land value; 2) there is a positive relationship between real estate prices and turnover rates when land supply is more inelastic than the supply of structures; 3) the positive relationship is stronger when the land value component gets smaller; and 4) while the availability of first-hand real estate may divert demand away from the second-hand market, such a substitution effect is weaker when the land value component is large. These four implications were confirmed with panel data analysis using Hong Kong’s housing transactions from 1992 to 2008 across 50 districts.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In Hong Kong, professional inspection or certification is not common in the condo market because the cost involved is very high. Apart from professional fees, many building problems (e.g. the testing of water seepage) have to be inspected from outside a condo unit, and prior permission has to be sought from neighbours and tenants (if any).

  2. Levitt and Syverson (2008) examined a principal-agent problem, in which brokers distorted information to induce their clients to sell their houses quickly, but at a lower price. The current study examines asymmetric quality information between buyers and sellers. Brokers may have a good sense of market sentiment and individual preferences, but they do not necessarily know more about the quality of individual properties.

  3. Here we assume that there are only two types of product: high and low quality. Their shares (w and 1-w) are always larger than zero.

  4. As LPGk is a sample estimate from another regression, it may measure %L with a sampling error. The consequence is that the coefficients of the regressions in Eqs. 6a and 6b are still consistent, but their standard errors are incorrect (Murphy and Topel 1985). Correcting for the standard errors, however, does not appear to change our results in any significant way. This is because LPGk was estimated from a huge sample (see the “Data” section) that substantially reduces the problem of sampling error.

  5. These expensive properties are mostly located in high land value districts (hence, high LPG k ) as a result of the high land-to-building value ratio in Hong Kong (see also an illustration in the “Data” section).

  6. An alternative to first differencing is a fixed or random effects model. Neither model, however, was employed because some variables, notably the property price index, were not stationary in level terms.

  7. See http://www.gov.hk/en/about/abouthk/factsheets/docs/population.pdf.

  8. See http://www.rvd.gov.hk/en/doc/statistics/rvd1_1.pdf.

  9. The housing price index of one of the largest housing estates (Mei Foo) showed a 100-fold increase from 1969 to 2008, while the tender price index grew from 100 in 1970 to only 140 in 2008 (see http://www.dlsqs.com/).

  10. See http://www.ird.gov.hk/eng/pdf/sd_pty_rates.pdf.

References

  • Akerlof, G. A. (1970). The market for “Lemons”: quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berkovec, J., & Goodman, J. (1996). Turnover as a measure of demand for existing homes. Real Estate Economics, 24, 421–440.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Breitung, J. (2000). The local power of some unit root tests for panel data. In B. H. Baltagi (Ed.), Advances in Econometrics, Volume 15: Nonstationary Panels, Panel Cointegration, and Dynamic Panels (pp. 161–178). Amsterdam: JAY Press.

  • Chau, K. W., Wong, S. K., Yiu, C. Y., & Leung, H. F. (2005). Real estate price indices in Hong Kong. Journal of Real Estate Literature, 13(3), 337–356.

    Google Scholar 

  • Engelhardt, G. V. (2003). Nominal loss aversion, housing equity constraints, and household mobility: evidence from the United States. Journal of Urban Economics, 53(1), 171–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garmaise, M. J., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2004). Confronting information asymmetries: evidence from real estate markets. Review of Financial Studies, 17(2), 405–437.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Genesove, D., & Mayer, C. (1997). Equity and time to sale in the real estate market. The American Economic Review, 87(3), 255–269.

    Google Scholar 

  • Genesove, D., & Mayer, C. (2001). Loss aversion and seller behavior: evidence from the housing market. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1233–1260.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Im, K. S., Pesaran, M. H., & Shin, Y. (2003). Testing for unit roots in heterogeneous panels. Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krainer, J. (2001). A theory of liquidity in residential real estate markets. Journal of Urban Economics, 49(1), 32–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levitt, S. D., & Syverson, C. (2008). Market distortions when agents are better informed: the value of information in real estate transactions. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(4), 599–611.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Levin, A., Lin, C. F., & Chu, C. (2002). Unit root tests in panel data: asymptotic and finite-sample properties. Journal of Econometrics, 108, 1–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murphy, K. M., & Topel, R. H. (1985). Estimation and inference in two-step econometric models. Journal of Business & Economics Statistics, 3(4), 370–379.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ortalo-Magne, F., & Rady, S. (2006). Housing market dynamics: on the contribution of income shocks and credit constraints. The Review of Economic Studies, 73, 459–485.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parks, R. W. (1967). Efficient estimation of a system of regression equations when disturbances are both serially and contemporaneously correlated. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 62, 500–509.

    Google Scholar 

  • Qian, W. (2009). Heterogeneous agents and housing market dynamics, Working Paper, Available at SSRN.

  • Rothschild, M., & Stiglitz, J. (1976). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 629–649.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spence, M. (1974). Market Signaling. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stein, J. (1995). Prices and trading volume in the housing market: a model with downpayment effects. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 379–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

This project was financially supported by the General Research Fund (Project Reference: HKU 755210). We are grateful for the comments from participants at the Building and Real Estate Workshop at Hong Kong Polytechnic University and the Asia Pacific Real Estate Research Symposium at the University of Southern California.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Siu Kei Wong.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Wong, S.K., Yiu, C.Y. & Chau, K.W. Liquidity and Information Asymmetry in the Real Estate Market. J Real Estate Finan Econ 45, 49–62 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-011-9326-z

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-011-9326-z

Keywords

JEL

Navigation