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Implications of the integral approach and earnings management for alternate annual reporting periods

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Abstract

We compare the last 12 months’ earnings ending in quarter four (i.e., fiscal year earnings), three, two and one. Lipe and Bernard (2000) offer two competing explanations for higher volatility in fourth quarter earnings relative to other quarters. First, under the integral approach, any estimation errors in the earlier quarters are corrected through fourth quarter earnings, which could make them more volatile. Second, earnings management concentrated in the fourth quarter renders fourth quarter earnings more volatile. While both explanations have similar implications for the properties of quarterly earnings, their implications differ for the properties of annual earnings ending in each quarter. Our result comparing earnings variability is more consistent with earnings management than the integral approach. We examine the relative earnings attributes and find that fiscal year earnings attributes rank lower. Finally, we re-investigate the accrual anomaly and find that the accrual anomaly is more pronounced for fiscal year earnings.

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Notes

  1. See Rangan and Sloan (1998) for a more complete description of the integral approach to annual earnings and its implications.

  2. Some debt contracts are based on earnings for rolling annual periods (Jacob and Jorgensen 2007). However, Bartov (1993) finds that over half of the sales of long-lived assets take place in the fourth quarter, and Elliott and Shaw (1988) find that the majority of write-offs take place in the fourth quarter.

  3. For example, Dhaliwal et al. (2004) find that firms adjust effective tax rates (i.e. “last chance earnings management”) from the third to fourth quarter to meet annual targets. Das et al. (2009) examine earnings reversals in the fourth quarter but within the fiscal year to identify firms that engage in earnings management. They find evidence that reversal firms are more likely to have other indicators of earnings management including just meeting annual earnings targets. Dechow and Shakespeare (2009) find that managers engage in securitizations towards the end of the quarter, concentrated within the last five days of the quarter.

  4. For example, consider the Microsoft example presented in Table 1. Earnings for annual period 2008 ending in Q3 consists of quarterly earnings for 2007 Q4, 2008 Q1, 2008 Q2, and 2008 Q3. Therefore, for the annual period ending in Q3 earnings are not settled up with 2008 Q4 earnings. The same is true for the 2008 annual period ending in one and two–they do not get settled up with 2008 Q4 earnings. However, fiscal year earnings consists of quarterly earnings from Q1 through Q4 and any errors, omissions, or estimates in the first three quarters are likely settled up no later than through Q4 earnings.

  5. We also conducted simulations (unreported) to show that these explanations offer distinct implications for the properties of annual earnings ending in quarter four (i.e., fiscal year earnings), three, two and one. We simulated independent earnings series assuming specific forms of earnings management and settling up, respectively, and found simulation results consistent with Lipe and Bernard (2000) for a broad range of parameter values.

  6. Our sample begins in 1988 so we can obtain operating cash flows from the statement of cash flows per Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 95. Hribar and Collins (2002) suggest calculating accruals from the statement of cash flows excludes the effects of acquisitions and foreign currency translation adjustments. Our sample ends in 2009 so we can obtain one-year-ahead stock returns from CRSP starting four months after the fiscal year-end for the Sloan accrual anomaly analysis (i.e. stock returns through April 2011).

  7. We assume that some of the effects of the big bath reverse in following quarters and therefore the effects are not as pronounced on the earnings of other annual earnings periods.

  8. Higher values of the skewness rank imply less negative skewness.

  9. As the reporting of EPS has changed over time, we use primary EPS under APB15 and basic EPS under SFAS 128. SFAS 128 became effective for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1997. In unreported sensitivity tests, we reran our analysis for a sample starting in 1998 and found qualitatively similar results.

  10. The sample size for operating cash flows (4,926) is lower than for earnings (6,374). Our earnings results are not sensitive to differences in sample size and robust if we use the 4,926 firms used in the operating cash flow analysis.

  11. This measure assumes that cash flows are less manipulated than earnings. Several papers find managers engage in real activities manipulation that may have cash flow implications (Roychowdhury 2006; Gunny 2010) and engage in classification shifting with respect to cash flows from operations (Lee 2012; Gordon et al. 2012).

  12. Timely reviews became mandatory in 2000 (see Manry et al. 2003). Ettredge et al. (1994) found that 8% of firms voluntary conducted timely reviews prior to becoming mandatory.

  13. High values of the average rank for the correlation imply less negative correlations.

  14. A parallel literature discusses methodological concerns related to inferences from cross-sectional pooled populations regarding earnings management to meet or beat thresholds (Durtschi and Easton 2009; Jorgensen et al. 2013; Burgstahler and Chuk 2013). This paper differs in two important respects. First, we compare alternate annual periods, therefore each individual firm acts as its own control. Second, we consider general earnings management without reference to meeting or beating thresholds. However, as pointed out by Burgstahler and Chuk (2013), aggregation of ranks across three alternate annual periods might combine idiosyncratic noise across periods and smooth the distribution for the alternate annual periods. This effect could bias us towards our findings. To mitigate this concern, we report individual test statistics in Table 4. Our inferences from these tests are the same as in Tables 2 and 3.

  15. Our results are robust to alternative scalars such as the number of shares outstanding and fixing the scalar in calendar time. In addition, our results are robust to the potential confounding issues associated with restatements of Compustat quarterly data. Since we are aggregating data across fiscal years, we could be combining restated and nonrestated data within an annual aggregation. For the earnings (earnings per share) sample, there are 1,885 (1,770) firms with restated quarterly data. Our results reported in Tables 3 and 4 are robust to removing these firms from the sample.

  16. While Fairfield et al. (2003) suggest firm growth lowers accrual persistence, Richardson et al. (2006) suggest accounting distortions lower accrual persistence.

  17. If a security delists during a particular year, we use the CRSP delisting return in the delisting month and assume a return equal to the firm’s CRSP size-matched decile portfolio for the remainder of the year. Firms with missing delisting returns are corrected for by using delisting returns of −35 % for NYSE/AMEX and −55 % for NASDAQ firms (Shumway 1997; Shumway and Warther 1999).

  18. Gow et al. (2010) suggest two-way robust clusters are better specified than the Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics in the presence of both cross-sectional and time-series dependence.

  19. Consistent with prior literature, our R2 is low. For example, Shi and Zhang (2012) regress annual size-adjusted returns on the decile rank of accruals (and six other dependent variables that proxy for risk and the earnings response coefficient) and report a mean adjusted R2 of 0.0258. We find comparable levels of goodness of fit when implementing Fama–MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. For the results in Table 5, the R2 is 0.0188 for model (4) and 0.0219 for model (5).

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Acknowledgements

We appreciate the insightful comments of James Ohlson (associate editor), Alastair Lawrence (discussant), an anonymous referee, David Burgstahler, Shuping Chen, Dan Cohen, Peter Easton, Gus De Franco, Suresh Govindaraj, Dave Guenther, Don Hermann, Ole-Kristian Hope, Alan Jagolinzer, Murgie Krishnan, Dawn Matsumoto, Chris Noe, Shiva Rajgopal, Steve Rock, Terry Shevlin, Dinah Shores, Steve Zeff, and seminar participants at 2012 Review of Accounting Studies Conference, Baruch-Columbia-NYU-Rutgers conference, Danish Center for Accounting and Finance annual meeting, Financial Accounting and Reporting Section Conference, and the following universities London School of Economics, Notre Dame, Oklahoma State, Rice, Toronto, SUNY Binghamton, Toronto, Utah, and Washington as well as Morgan Stanley, Society of Quantitative Analysts, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission for their comments and suggestions. Bjorn Jorgensen thanks the Tisone chair for financial support.

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Correspondence to Bjorn N. Jorgensen.

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John Jacob passed away in 2007. He was a terrific friend, colleague, and accomplished scholar. We dedicate this paper to his memory.

Appendix: annual earnings computed over different intervals

Appendix: annual earnings computed over different intervals

In this appendix we consider a setting without earnings management and provide sufficient conditions under which, consistent with our null hypothesis, the fiscal year-end would not affect the variance or skewness of annual earnings.

For exposition, we consider a firm whose fiscal year coincides with the calendar year and denote its quarterly earnings for year y and quarter q by x y,q . Further assume that quarterly earnings are mean reverting and follow a seasonal first order autoregressive process, such that

$$ x_{y,q} = m_{q} + \rho \left( {x_{y - 1,q} - m_{q} } \right) + \widetilde{e}_{y,q} , $$

where m q is the level of quarter q earnings; ρ is the autocorrelation parameter that captures the speed of adjustment to the mean reversion; \( \widetilde{e}_{y,q} \) is the error term that is independently distributed with mean zero and quarter-specific variance, σ 2 q . Annual earnings can be calculated as

$$ X_{y} = x_{y,1} + x_{y,2} + x_{y,3} + x_{y,4} $$

Under the above assumptions,

$$ X_{y} = \mu + \rho \left( {X_{y - 1} - \mu } \right) + \widetilde{\varepsilon }_{y} , $$

where \( \mu = \sum\nolimits_{q = 1}^{4} {m_{q} } \) is the long-run level of annual earnings, and \( \widetilde{\varepsilon }_{y} = \sum\nolimits_{q = 1}^{4} {\widetilde{e}_{y,q} } \) is the random component in annual earnings that is distributed with mean zero and variance, \( \sigma^{2} = \sum\nolimits_{q = 1}^{4} {\sigma_{q}^{2} } \). In this setting, fiscal year annual earnings do not exhibit seasonality because the aggregation is over the business cycle.

In this paper we use quarterly earnings and aggregate to annual earnings in three additional ways that differ from the fiscal year. In particular, we consider the following three alternative annual time-series:

$$ \begin{array}{*{20}c} {X_{y}^{[1]} = x_{y,2} + x_{y,3} + x_{y,4} + x_{y + 1,1} } \hfill \\ {X_{y}^{[2]} = x_{y,3} + x_{y,4} + x_{y + 1,1} + x_{y + 1,2} } \hfill \\ {X_{y}^{[3]} = x_{y,4} + x_{y + 1,1} + x_{y + 1,2} + x_{y + 1,3} } \hfill \\ \end{array} $$

It can easily be verified that

$$ X_{y}^{[n]} = \mu + \rho \left( {X_{y - 1}^{[n]} - \mu } \right) + \widetilde{\varepsilon }_{y} $$

for n = 1, 2, 3. Therefore the assumptions provided above suffice to ensure that the choice of annual period for calculating annual earnings does not matter. This holds true even though quarterly data exhibit seasonality (as suggested by Oyer 1998), captured by quarterly variation in the level of earnings, m q , and even though the variance of earnings, \( \sigma_{q}^{2} \), may change with the calendar quarter, q.

Note, however, that when working with these annualized earnings observations an overlapping observations problem arises. The problem of overlapping observations causes the estimator of the variance of earnings for different annualized data on the same firm to be dependent. This means that standard statistical significance levels on the tests for difference in variances do not apply because they presume independent samples. We circumvent this overlapping observations problem by using ranks for any given firm.

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Gunny, K.A., Jacob, J. & Jorgensen, B.N. Implications of the integral approach and earnings management for alternate annual reporting periods. Rev Account Stud 18, 868–891 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-013-9235-x

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