Abstract
Serving as an introduction to the essays in this volume, we put forward an intellectual hardcore for a shared research agenda between Austrian and Virginia political economy. This research agenda rests on three pillars: exchange, rules, and social cooperation. Each of these pillars forms the distinctive flavor of Austrian and Virginian political economy with respect to theoretical approach, types and applications of empirics, and even to normative questions. Our essay explores the meaning of these pillars with respect to the broader study of political economy, as well as the intellectual superstructure of each respective school.
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Notes
Stringham (2005) presents a re-evaluation of and challenge to this literature by a younger generation of Austrian and public choice inspired economists.
Other participants included Philip Bagus, Tony Carilli, Daniel D’Amico, Joshua Hall, Jeremy Horpedahl, Sanford Ikeda, Peter Lewin, Roderick Long, Edward Lopez, Jochen Runde, Daniel Smith, Richard Wagner, and Tyler Watts.
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Lea, G.S., Martin, A.G. From Vienna to Virginia: Exchange, rules, and social cooperation an introduction to the symposium. Rev Austrian Econ 27, 1–9 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-013-0240-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-013-0240-x