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On good government

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Abstract

Besley’s treatment of principled agents is a major contribution to public choice and political economy. By focusing on politics as an agency problem, he has shown the way to a new generation of research on the interface of politics and economics.

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Notes

  1. See Blankart and Koester (2006) for commentary on this point.

  2. The inclusion of distributional issues muddies the waters of what constitutes “better policies.” Why not focus on policies with higher net benefits?

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, SC, USA

    Robert D. Tollison

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  1. Robert D. Tollison
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Correspondence to Robert D. Tollison.

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Tollison, R.D. On good government. Rev Austrian Econ 22, 127–130 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0076-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-009-0076-6

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