Abstract
Founded in December 1958, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was dissolved on 11 May 2018. During its almost sixty years of existence, ETA underwent phases of military offensive and then a decline in its operational activity. In order to understand the limits of these episodes and their reasons, we have created an original database listing all the actions of the armed group. Our analysis contributes to highlighting the strategic developments of the clandestine organisation and stimulating discussion of the conclusions previously drawn from the group’s databases of fatal victims. We will thus consider the consequences of methodological choices on the interpretation of the history of a clandestine organisation.
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Notes
Still in 2013, the number of victims attributed to ETA varied according to the sources (see Carmena et al. 2013, p. 14). In figures provided by the Basque government for the period 1960–2013, the perpetrators of actions that caused thirteen victims are still unidentified.
On the role of victims of terrorism in the public debate and on change in penal policies in Spain, see Truc 2012.
The two most prominent contemporary influences in SMT are 1. New Social Movement (NSM) Theory, which focuses more on macro/structural processes, and Resource, and 2. Mobilization (RM) Theory, which focuses more on contextual processes like group dynamics. A third school of SMT thought, Framing Theory, is also central (Snow & Benford 1988; Snow 2004). Rooted in constructivist assumptions, Framing Theory focuses on how movements and social collectives construct, produce, and disseminate meaning.
https://www.sipri.org/yearbook. The SIPRI-Yearbook is devoted to armaments, disarmament and international security.
See www.march.es/dtv.
At the 5th Assembly, a split developed between ETA-military, ETA-political-military and Frente Obrero (Workers’ Front, which would become the LAIA).
The authors do not specify the nature of the variable.
We had to carry out data cleaning on the GTD database as well as adding supplementary material since, on the one hand, there were no data collected for 1993 and, on the other hand, as we have highlighted, it included at least 79 actions that were not by ETA (but could be attributed to IK, Iraultza, Gatazka, kale borroka (i.e. the urban guerrilla movement between 1990 and 2000)) or it combined actions by ETA with those of extreme right paramilitary groups (e.g. attacks on 29 May 1994 in Muskiz and Artxanda) which resulted in the deaths of ETA members. In this database, there are 321 actions that cannot with certainty be attributed to ETA.
See Madariaga, “Así nació ETA”, Punto y Hora, 25 Aniversario, 13 July 1984, p. 7–9; Zunbeltz 1968, p. 106–107.
“La quema de la bandera en un edificio oficial, a plena luz del día, en un San Sebastián donde el veraneo reunía a lo más selecto del Régimen y del aparato fascista, suponía una operación madurada, calculada y con cierto riesgo.” (Jon Nicolás, Documentos Y, 1979, cited in Nuñez, 1993, vol. I, p. 60).
One example is the adoption of decree 1794/1960 on “Military rebellion, banditry and terrorism” (Rebelion Militar, Bandidaje y Terrorismo) of 21 September 1960. This increased military capabilities in matters of public order and banned any form of demonstration, meeting or strike. It came into force after the first actions by ETA where explosives were used, in December 1959, in this case three homemade bombs went off at the civil government headquarters in Gasteiz, at the offices of the phalanx newspaper Alerta in Santander and at the police station in Indautxu (Bilbao) (Casanova 2007, p. 17).
The most spectacular action in this period was the attempt to derail a train in Usurbi (Guipúzcoa) carrying Franco supporters to San Sebastian, on 18 July 1961, to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the dictator’s victory in the civil war.
Hipercor was not evacuated. ETA apologised for the consequences of the explosion (see Communiqué from ETA to the Basque People, 21 May 1987).
This means that we have cleaned up the lists proposed by sites such as Mapa del terror, Mapa del Olvido, those devoted to victims of the Ertzaintza (Basque autonomous police) or produced by the extreme right (e.g. Nacional Socialismo sin censura). 64 actions, resulting in 43 deaths, were therefore excluded from the GTD.
De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2004) group collateral or accidental deaths and those resulting from blind or indiscriminate attacks into the same category. They differentiate (i) deaths caused intentionally (of security forces as well as the army and civilians); (ii) deaths where ETA was mistaken over the victim; (iii) deaths that were not necessarily intentional, such as those which occurred in armed clashes between the police and ETA, or when police officers died trying to defuse a bomb, and (iv) collateral, accidental or indiscriminate deaths.
As we have pointed out, there could well be continuity between 1977 and 1985 because the year 1981, with the struggle over the Lemoiz power plant, could count for many more actions than those shown in the table.
It involved an amnesty for all Basque political prisoners in Spain; the legalisation of all political parties, including independents; expulsion of Spanish state police and military forces from the Basque Country; improvements in the living and working conditions of the working class and the immediate satisfaction of demands in socioeconomic matters expressed by their representative bodies; an enhanced Statute of Autonomy, recognising the national sovereignty of Euskadi, its right to self-determination, including the right to create an independent Basque State; recognition of Euskara as the official and dominant language in Euskadi; the creation of civil defence units, replacing the forces of repression, these units to be created by and dependent only on the Basque Government; recognition of economic, social and political rights to ensure the well-being and progress of the Basque people (ETAk Euskal Herriari, ETA-m communiqué, January 1978).
Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution states: “La Constitución se fundamenta en la indisoluble unidad de la Nación Española…”, and Article 8: “Las fuerzas armadas… tienen como misión garantizar la soberanía e independencia de España, defender su integridad territorial y el ordenamiento constitucional”.
See ETA communiqué to the Basque people, 30 November 1979.
The actions forming part of this dynamic were not decisive in terms of their numerical weight, as they consisted of targeted operations focusing on specific individuals.
From January 1980, paramilitary groups such as the Spanish Anti-Terrorist Groups (GAE) and the Basque-Spanish Battalion (BVE), increased their actions against civilians.
Some militants from ETA-pm joined ETA-m after the split, namely “ETA-pm 8th pro-KAS Assembly” (the milikis).
On 23 February 1981, Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero, supported by a group of civil guards, entered the Spanish Parliament during the vote on the leadership of the Spanish government.
This involved the creation of two mandates: MULA (Mando Unificado de la Lucha Antiterrorista) and MULC (Mando Único para la Lucha Contraterrorista) following on from an agreement reached between King Juan Carlos I and the head of the Spanish armed forces. The state of emergency was approved by Congress. From March 1981, the army was given the task of border control in the Basque country (Casanova 2007, p. 192). In February 1983, the ZEN plan (Zona Especial Norte) was launched.
This confirmed their determination to “trabajar coordinadamente, desde las exigencias de un Estado de derecho, en la lucha contra la violencia y el terrorismo”.
See also the declaration by ETA in Zutabe, no. 41, May 1985. They recall that the “direct enemy” is indeed the Spanish government while the PNV is merely the “political adversary”.
See also the so-called Bidez Bide march, to claim the right to self-determination, which consisted of several columns marching throughout the Basque country, starting on 17 March 1989 and converging on Pamplona on the day of Aberri Eguna (Casanova 2007, p. 247).
In 1992, Spain was preparing to host the Universal Exposition of Seville, to celebrate the 500th anniversary of the discovery of America, the Barcelona Olympic Games and Madrid as European Capital of Culture. At this time, the country was also involved in the process to enter the European Community and NATO.
As summed up by Etan, “it became more and more difficult after 2001 to establish recognition”. “The attacks on 11 September 2001 marked the turning point. They changed the frame of reference.”.
On 11 March 2004, several bombs exploded in Atocha station, killing 191 people. Although the Aznar government accused ETA of being behind the operation, responsibility was claimed by Al-Qaida.
Irrespective of the logistical constraints that the organisation faced, but which are difficult to penetrate due to its clandestine nature.
Once again, irrespective of its ability to find new members.
See that of 1993 in Elorza, 2000, p. 392.
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Appendices
Appendix 1
References for sources used to compile our database.
1. Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/
2. Sources listing victims of the conflict in the Basque country:
Database created by De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca: www.march.es/dtv
List of ETA’s victims published by Calleja (1997).
Victim associations: Association of Victims of Terrorism (www.avt.org).
Victims of the security forces:
https://mapadelolvido.blogspot.com/
https://ertzaione-1.blogspot.com/
http://especiales.elperiodico.com/graficosEEPI/VICTIMAS/tablavictimas.html#ARRIBA
Victims of the Abertzale or Basque side: http://www.euskalmemoria.eus/
Other databases listing victims of terrorism:
http://www.angelfire.com/pq/terroristas/
http://blogs.libertaddigital.com/in-memoriam/
https://victimas-de-eta.blogspot.com
https://www.abc.es/especiales/eta/victimas/11.asp
https://eu.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zerrenda:ETAk_hildakoak_(1968-1979).
https://ns-markoss88.blogspot.com/
3. National daily newspapers:
https://www.elmundo.es/; https://www.elmundo.es/eta/historia/
http://hemeroteca.lavanguardia.com/
https://www.lainformacion.com/
Regional daily newspapers:
https://www.noticiasdegipuzkoa.eus/
https://www.elnortedecastilla.es/
https://www.elcorreogallego.es
https://www.diariodesevilla.es/
https://borrokagaraia.wordpress.com/
French daily newspapers reporting the group’s actions:
Sources in English:
Basque language newspapers:
5. Government sources from the Spanish Ministry of the Interior:
http://www.interior.gob.es/fallecidos-por-terrorismo
6. Documents produced by the left-wing Abertzale and the clandestine organisation itself
https://borrokagaraia.wordpress.com/acabas-de-llegar-empieza-aqui/
http://www.ehk.eus/es/v-asamblea-cast/revistas-v-asamblea-cast/4292-barneko-gora-beherez-1-1968-cast;
http://euskaletxeak.org/lemoiz/inicio.html
Appendix 2
See Fig. 1.
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Lafaye, C.G., Brochard, P. Methodological approach to the evolution of a terrorist organisation: ETA, 1959–2018. Qual Quant 56, 2453–2475 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-021-01203-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11135-021-01203-w