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Ignorance at Risk: Interaction at the Epistemic Boundary of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme

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Abstract

Most long-lived organizational deceptions require the cooperation of outsiders who are close enough to the deception to suspect it, yet deliberately limit their knowledge so as to maintain plausible deniability. The interaction of such “proximate outsiders” with insiders—those who are fully “in the know”—can be a delicate affair, yet its careful management is essential to the survival of the deception. I analyze a phone conversation between Ponzi schemer Bernard Madoff and executives at Fairfield Greenwich, the investment firm that funneled him the most money, in which they discussed an impending SEC examination. First I examine Madoff’s attempts to cajole the executives into affirming (to Madoff and eventually to the SEC) that their hands-off approach to his operation was unremarkable. Next I consider two instances in which Madoff floundered in his explanations, repeatedly aborting and restarting sentences as he attempted to explain the inexplicable and reconcile the irreconcilable. Finally, I analyze Madoff’s handling of two of the executives’ more intrusive questions, and the part that each side played in the resulting non-answer. The three parts of the analysis illustrate what I argue are recurring and generalizable challenges of interaction at the epistemic boundary, associated with coaching, reconciling, and answering.

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Notes

  1. We could also view secrecy to be a form of lying, the (implicit) lie being that nothing important is being withheld. Privacy complicates this, however, by providing for secrets without the pretense that none exist.

  2. Typically, one purchases “put options,” which allow one to sell a stock at a certain price even if the market value drops below it, and pays for these by selling “call options,” which allow the counterparty to buy those shares at a higher price even if the market value rises above it. This limits the amount one can lose in purchasing a stock, since it can always be unloaded for a respectable price, at the expense of limiting what one can gain through its resale, assuming the counterparty exercises the call option, as a result of which the stock is taken off one’s hands for less than a sale on the open market would have yielded.

  3. Picard v. Fairfield Sentry Limited. 2010. Complaint against Fairfield Sentry Limited, amended. 97, 108, 119, 135. Southern District of New York: United States Bankruptcy Court. http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/072110madoff1.pdf.

  4. In May 2001, an article was published in Barrons reporting skepticism in the investment community about Madoff’s purported trading strategy (Arvedlund 2001). Spurred by anxious investors, Tucker visited Madoff’s offices, where he was shown a computer terminal that seemed to confirm that Madoff was, in fact, trading in the appropriate stocks. The terminal, however, was a fabrication contrived by Frank DiPascali, who ran the money management business (Henriques 2011, 119). While Tucker’s visit might be seen as a sincere attempt to uncover the truth, his eagerness to accept Madoff’s self-presentation without seeking independent evidence of trading activity, in spite of the mounting evidence that something was seriously amiss, suggests that Tucker was there merely to appease his clients, who demanded due diligence.

  5. Massachusetts Securities Division v. Fairfield Greenwich. 2009. Consent order. Commonwealth of Massachusetts. No. 2009-0028.

  6. Picard v. Fairfield Sentry Limited. 2010. 154.

  7. Picard v. Fairfield Sentry Limited. 2010. 85.

  8. Madoff may have feared that this component of his putative strategy was especially implausible, given the quantity of options contracts he would have needed to hedge all of his investments, and thus most likely to arouse suspicion—as it did (Markopolos 2010).

  9. Picard v. Fairfield Sentry Limited. 2010. 91.

  10. The State of Massachusetts subpoenaed the recording in connection with a lawsuit against Fairfield, filed in April of 2009 (Massachusetts Securities Division v. Fairfield Greenwich. 2009. 11, n. 4). Fairfield settled in September of that year by agreeing to pay $8 million (http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/15_madoff_investors_in_mass._to_share_8m_fairfield_settlement/). At this writing, the recording and transcript are available at www.cbsnews.com/news/madoff-coached-witness-on-duping-sec/.

  11. The SEC did not accept this, and the main result of the examination was that Madoff was compelled to register as an investment adviser.

  12. The SEC examiners did not buy it, and left their call with Fairfield even more firmly believing that Madoff had been lying to them about the role of options in his trading strategy—though not to the point of suspecting that he had never entered into any options contracts (SEC 2009, 276–78).

  13. For an extended example, see Gibson (2012, 14–17).

  14. This is borne out by the fact that while Madoff is in prison for the rest of his life and several of his employees received multi-year prison sentences, so far no one from Fairfield has gone to jail.

  15. For more examples of the withholding of agreement, and its significance, see Gibson (2012, 143–47).

  16. It is unclear whether to consider Madoff’s claim that he was single-handedly in charge of the money management investment decisions a lie, as no investments were being made, or an indisputable truth, as there was certainly no one more in charge of the business than he.

  17. In addition to the (Ponzi) money management business and the legitimate brokerage business, Madoff’s firm made some trades on its own behalf—so-called proprietary trading. At the start of the excerpt, Madoff is explaining how his proprietary traders cannot front-run based on information from his money management business.

  18. This was also a manifest fiction, as Madoff claimed to make a profit even in months when the overall market was down (Markopolos 2010, 60).

  19. This does not mean, contrary to Vijayvergiya’s earlier suggestion, that Madoff favored S&P stocks with the highest capitalizations, only that high capitalizations are a characteristic of all of the stocks included in the index.

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Acknowledgments

For comments on earlier drafts of this article I am grateful to Sarah Cowan, Noah Rankins, and participants in the Notre Dame Culture Workshop.

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Correspondence to David R. Gibson.

Appendix: Conversation-analytic transcribing conventions

Appendix: Conversation-analytic transcribing conventions

Overlapping speech

Vertically aligned partial brackets indicate overlapping talk.

Vijay: busi⌈ness⌉

Madoff: ⌊yes ⌋

Pauses

Numbers in parentheses indicate pauses in seconds, measured to one decimal point. A lone period (.) indicates a “micro-pause,” audible but too short to be measured reliably (generally <.15 s).

other (.6) seedling

Unintelligible speech

The hash sign in parentheses indicates a period of talk, measured in seconds to one decimal point, which cannot be transcribed for reason of unintelligibility. No hash sign is used when the unintelligible speech overlaps with with other, transcribable talk (because the overlap provides sufficient information as to duration).

when I’m (.6#)

Vijay:down that list ⌈( )⌉

Madoff: ⌊ in ⌋ other words

Self-interruptions

A hyphen indicates self-interruption. Sometimes this is a dental or guttural stop, but often the main purpose of hyphens is to indicate apparently incomplete words.

when y-

Intonation

Arrows at the end of words indicate rising (↑) or falling (↓) pitch, with the number of arrows corresponding to the extent of the rise or fall. An arrow at the beginning of a word, or in the middle of a word, indicates a sudden jump or drop in intonation (with no appreciable change in volume; cf. stress, below), relative to the last intonation level.

↑typically↓

know and a↑gain↓

Stress

Bold face is used to indicate stress, a combination of volume and pitch.

you’d be shocked

Volume

Degree marks enclose talk that is significantly softer than surrounding talk.

or °relationships that you have with these people°

Condensed talk

Inward-pointing more-than and less-than signs indicate talk that is faster than that which surrounds it in the same turn.

you >you know < although

Sound stretching

One or more colons indicate that a sound within a word (that preceding the colon) is “stretched,” or prolonged.

not determining:

uh::

Breathing

Audible breathing is transcribed with one or more hs, with the number of hs roughly reflecting the duration (approximately one h for each .2 s of respiration). Inhaling is indicated with a leading period, and exhaling with the lack of a period.

standpoint .hhh

Transcriber’s comments

Brackets enclose explanatory notes. Double parentheses provide other descriptive information.

they [the regulators] know

(okay) ((faintly))

A Note on Spelling

Spelling is standard, except that the two pronunciations of “the” are distinguished: “thuh” versus “thee.” The reason for this exception is that these often conform with, and thus anticipate, the pronunciation of the word that follows (e.g., thuh problem versus thee assignment), so that a self-correction involving a change in article (as in line 7 of excerpt 2) may indicate the suppression of whatever the speaker originally intended to say (Schegloff 2002), and the pronunciation of the original article may provide a clue as to the speaker’s original intentions.

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Gibson, D.R. Ignorance at Risk: Interaction at the Epistemic Boundary of Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme. Qual Sociol 39, 221–246 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11133-016-9336-5

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