Abstract
Political regimes are stable most years, but sometimes they jump. The stable years are periods of political status-quo equilibrium. To break a status quo requires a triggering event. The paper is an attempt to identify and classify what close observers at the time thought were the triggering events in a sample of 262 larger regime changes between 1960 and 2015 in 170 countries. The sample consists of all changes in the Polity index with a numerical rating above 3 (i.e. of 4 or more). The source for the triggering events is country-relevant articles in The Economist. Triggering events are classified in a (2 × 2) table with four cells: domestic political (DP), domestic economic (DE), external political (XP), and external economic (XE), which remains empty. By far the most common is DP, but the domestic political events prove to be very different. Thus, most jumps are exogenous in the perspective of development.
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Notes
The random measurement errors are likely to matter more for the system adjustments; hence, they contribute to the fact that system adjustments are much more difficult to explain than jumps. I should also mention that my coding may add some uncertainty, but I believe that everything is transparent.
Traditional political systems are typically monarchies where the monarch is allied with the small feudal class and the national ‘church’. Such systems typically lasts a long time such as 500 years.
Some papers try to overcome the ex-post problem by cliometric methods. Aidt and Franck (2015) is a fine example, with many tests that cover the three years leading to the 1832 democratic reforms in the United Kingdom. The analysis tells a story that is unlikely to generalize to other democratic reforms.
The closest to our result is Treisman (2017), who argues that many steps toward democracy happened owing to processes that were set into motion for all kinds of reasons.
See Polity index in references. I use Polity2 and delete blanks and zeroes, i.e., periods under foreign domination and periods without a political system.
The negative jumps in (Sub-Saharan) Africa in the 1960 s are: Senegal − 6 (1962–1964), Congo Br (for Brazzaville) − 11 (1963), Benin − 9 (1963–1966), Congo Ki (for Kinshasa) − 6 (1964–1966), Burundi − 4 (1965–1967) Nigeria − 14 (1966), Sierra Leone − 13 (1967), Uganda − 13 (1967), Somalia − 14 (1969), Equatorial Guinea − 9 (1969), Kenya − 7 (1969), Sudan − 14 (1969–1972). That decade saw only two large positive jumps: Sudan +14 (1965) and Sierra Leone +8 (1968). On the confusing names of the two Congos see note 14.
We have looked for other waves. The Arab Spring had a large effect in Tunisia only.
I have made a check of the coding of the countries, using Wikipedia, which devotes one to two pages to the modern history of each country. A few coding errors were found. However, I am glad to say that the sources agree surprisingly well, both with respect to the timing of larger changes and as to their explanations.
The events of 1968 in France are examples of large-scale demonstrations/riots that were caused by a wave of utopian beliefs that came and went away for no concrete reason; see Sect. 5.1.
The fixing of the peso to the US dollar was an attempt to eradicate the high residual inflation left after the peso’s major depreciation in 1972–1975, which was stopped by standard monetary means. The policy had large costs, but inflation did decline.
As usual, the large jumps were of a cyclical nature: − 8 (1966), + 15 (1973), − 15 (1976) and + 16 (1983).
The changes in South Korea and Taiwan happened in overlapping years; and so did the changes in Portugal and Spain. This suggest common background factors. Andersen and Jensen (2017) provide evidence that the change of Catholic doctrine as regards democracy is such a factor. The Economist does no mention this factor.
The two Congos have had several names. To prevent confusion they are referred to by the first two letters in their capitals Brazzaville and Kinshasa: Congo Br was the Republic of Congo before 1963, then it became the Peoples Republic of the Congo until 1990, whereupon it returned to its old name. Congo Ki was the Democratic Republic of the Congo until 1971, then it became Zaïre until 1997, when it reverted to its old name.
Here, I could not resist deviating from the source and make the jump external political.
Chile is home to many fine economists, but none of them were associated with the Allende government, which disliked economic theory in general and neoclassical theory in particular.
When Chile reverted to democracy in 1988–1989 in a two-year sequence of two upward jumps of +5 and +9 polity-points, the change was caused by domestic political events.
A large literature discusses the revolutionary wave of 1848. It proposes various explanations. Berger and Spoerer (2001) survey the literature and claim that the wave was due a sudden international economic crisis, contrary to our findings for the period after 1960. Aidt and Jensen (2014) propose that democratizations in 1948 were due to an international wave of revolutionary zeal, which is a nice example of an external political trigger.
France (2), Tanzania (1), the United States (3) and Vietnam (1) led the foreign military interventions. In addition, some foreign interference took place in three to four cases when it is unclear that the intervention was crucial. Finally, foreign mercenaries were involved in another three to four cases. The mercenaries may have worked for or with a state agency in their country of origin (see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Denard).
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Acknowledgements
This paper is a part of a project, notably Paldam and Gundlach (2018), but I have made it independently readable. I want to thank Erich Gundlach for many fruitful discussions and useful comments to the paper. I also want to thank the referees for their constructive comments. The paper was presented at the Political Economy of Democracy and Dictatorship 2018 Conference in Münster (Germany), and at the Meeting of the European Public Choice Society 2018 in Rome. I am grateful to the discussants. Tobias Moser has been a fine research assistant.
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Appendix: Is the sample of larger regime changes a good sample?
Appendix: Is the sample of larger regime changes a good sample?
The sample of major regime changes includes all differences over the threshold of three points (i.e., for 4 or more points) in the Polity index from 1960 to 2015, as explained. The threshold is chosen according to the model in Fig. 3. Within those frames, the sample is transparent and complete.
Other political regime indices exist. Some are binary, but others are based on scales allowing a selection of the larger changes. The alternative indices yield alternative data samples. Most large changes surely would be included in all samples, but some Polity jumps would have been excluded, and other extra jumps would have been identified. As long as those differences are random relative to Table 6, they would not have influenced the results.
One alternative index is the Freedom House’s FH index. To see if the sample is robust, I have repeated the exercise with the FH index. It starts in 1972 and has two parts: Political Rights and Civil Liberties; I use the average of the two. Both parts use an integer scale from 7 for the least democratic to 1 for the most democratic countries. Thus, the scale is falling when democracy increases. The FH index does not include the categories of anarchy and foreign intervention. The FH index was started for a period that overlapped 2 years, but then the overlap changed until it became a calendar year and, in the process, 1 year was lost. That change is very visible when the larger events are matched, but it is easy to control for. As general characterization, the FH Index has more small events and more sequences than Polity does. The closest matching to a Polity change of four points is a FH change of 1½ point.
The two indices are matched for 169 countries from 1973 to 2015. For 127 countries, both indices point to the same large events. In the data for the last 42 countries, some differences are evident. Polity typically has larger changes, i.e., more changes pass the threshold. An example is the events in Myanmar since 2014, which Polity counts as a large move towards democracy (+ 11 points), while Freedom House only reports a small adjustment (− ½). There is about 20 such cases. The difference in the sizes of the changes are especially large since 2010 and explaining why the FH index shows falling democracy since 2010, while the P-index reveals no such decline. By my assessment, the FH index misses about 20% of the larger changes, while Polity misses only 3% of them. A few countries are treated quite differently, notably Bangladesh, Cambodia, Congo Ki, Guyana, Haiti and Pakistan. It is clear that such measurement contains error. It appears that the missing cases are distributed randomly across Table 6.
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Paldam, M. A study of triggering events: When do political regimes change?. Public Choice 182, 181–199 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00678-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00678-4