Abstract
A new way to interpret Arrow’s impossibility theorem leads to valued insights that extend beyond voting and social choice to address other mysteries ranging from the social sciences to even the “dark matter” puzzle of astronomy.
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Notes
See my referenced papers for details. Much of this article is motivated by material in my book (Saari 2018).
Hazelrigg was the first to recognize the importance of Arrow’s theorem with respect to concerns from engineering. His first paper (Hazelrigg 1996) generated a continuing discussion in this area.
Because the US house size is fixed at 435, this becomes an argument for using his method.
That is, a state does not lose a seat with an increase in house size.
Recall, the Borda Count tallies a N-candidate ballot by assigning a top ranked candidate \((N-1)\) points, a second ranked candidate \((N-2)\), points, …, a jth ranked candidate \((N-j)\) points, ….
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Acknowledgements
My thanks to Santiago Guisasola, Dan Jessie, Ryan Kendall, Norm Schofield, Katri Sieberg, and June Zhao for their comments.
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Saari, D.G. Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem. Public Choice 179, 133–144 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0531-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-018-0531-7