Advertisement

Public Choice

, Volume 158, Issue 3–4, pp 513–523 | Cite as

A Danish killer amendment—when judicial review was banned from the 1849 Constitution

  • Mogens N. Pedersen
Article
  • 169 Downloads

Abstract

In real political life “killer amendments” are very rare. William H. Riker was the first political scientist to draw systematic attention to this special “heresthetic” phenomenon, but he was himself only able to identify a handful of successful “killer amendments”. Subsequent systematic empirical research has brought a few more to attention. In this article what may be the first successful example from outside the US context is described. It took place, when the Danish Constituent Assembly in 1849 discussed, if a proper judicial review procedure should be institutionalized in the Danish Constitution. The motion was defeated by means of what looks like a nicely orchestrated “killer amendment”.

Keywords

Killer amendment Heresthetics Danish Constituent Assembly 1848–49 Judicial review 

References

  1. Bagge, P. (1947–49). Review in Historisk Tidsskrift, Vol. 11, række 2. Google Scholar
  2. Barfod, P. F. (1849). In Den grundlovgivende Rigsforsamlings Historie, Copenhagen: Eget Forlag. Google Scholar
  3. Beretning om Forhandlingerne paa Rigsdagen (1848–49). 2 bind. Copenhagen: Bianco Luno. Google Scholar
  4. Christensen J. P. (1990). In Forfatningsretten og det levende liv. Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag. Google Scholar
  5. Christensen, J. P. (2003). Domstolene—den tredje statsmagt. Aarhus: Magtudredningen. Google Scholar
  6. Christensen, J. P. (2011). Højesteret og statsmagten. In P. Magid et al. (Eds.), Højesteret—350 år (pp. 211–309). Copenhagen: Gyldendal. Google Scholar
  7. Elster, J. (1995). Strategic uses of argument. In K. Arrow et al. (Eds.), Barriers to conflict resolution (pp. 236–257). New York: Norton. Google Scholar
  8. Elster, J. (1998). Deliberation and constitution making. In J. Elster (Ed.), Deliberative democracy (pp. 97–122). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Finocchiaro, C. J., & Jenkins, J. A. (2008). In search of killer amendments in the modern U.S. House. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 33, 263–294. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Gilmour, J. B. (2001). The Powell amendment voting cycle: an obituary. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 26, 249–262. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Green, D. P., & Shapiro, I. (1994). Pathologies of rational choice theory. New Haven: Yale University Press. Google Scholar
  12. Jenkins, J. A., & Munger, M. C. (2003). Investigating the incidence of killer amendments in congress. The Journal of Politics, 65, 498–517. Google Scholar
  13. Mackie, G. (2003). Democracy defended. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Matthews, D. R., & Stimson, J. A. (1975). Yeas and nays: normal decision-making in the U.S. House of Representatives. New York: Wiley-Interscience. Google Scholar
  15. Matthews, D. R., & Stimson, J. A. (1977). Cue-taking by congressmen: a model and a computer simulation. In W. O. Aydelotte (Ed.), The history of parliamentary behavior (pp. 247–273). Princeton: Princeton University Press. Google Scholar
  16. Møller, P. (1943–1948). Baron C. Zeuthens Dagbog fra den grundlovgivende Rigsforsamlings Tid. Danske Magazin, 7(IV), 130–228. Google Scholar
  17. Nannestad Olsen, P. (1972). At the cradle of a party system: voting patterns and voting groups in the Danish Constitutional Convention 1848–1849. Scandinavian Political Studies, 7, 119–135. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. Neergaard, N. (1892). Under Junigrundloven (Vol. 1). Copenhagen. Google Scholar
  19. Ørsted, A. S. (1849). Prøvelse af de Rigsforsamlingen forelagte Udkast til en Grundlov og en Valglov. Copenhagen: Deichmanns Forlag. Google Scholar
  20. Rasch, B. E. (1987). Manipulation and strategic voting in the Norwegian parliament. Public Choice, 52, 57–73. CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. Rasch, B. E. (2002). Parliamentary floor voting procedures and agenda setting in Europe. In G. Loewenberg et al. (Eds.), Legislatures—comparative perspectives on representative assemblies (pp. 269–287). Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Google Scholar
  22. Riker, W. H. (1965). Arrow’s theorem and some examples of the paradox of voting. In J. M. Claunch (Ed.), Mathematical applications in political science (pp. 41–60). Dallas: Arnold Foundation. Google Scholar
  23. Riker, W. H. (1986). The art of political manipulation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Google Scholar
  24. Sartori, G. (1987). The theory of democracy revisited. Chatham: Chatham House Publishers. Google Scholar
  25. Shepsle, K. A., & Bonchek, M. S. (1997). Analyzing politics—rationality behavior, and institutions. New York: Norton. Google Scholar
  26. Tscherning, A. F. (1878). Af Anthon Frederik Tschernings efterladte Papirer. Udgivet af hans efterlevende Familie. Copenhagen: P. G. Philipsens Forlag. Google Scholar
  27. Wilkerson, J. D. (1999). Killer amendments in Congress. American Political Science Review, 93, 535–552. CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Southern DenmarkOdenseDenmark

Personalised recommendations