Abstract
This paper uses a simultaneous equations model to analyze increases in intergovernmental fiscal transfers and associated vote changes in Portuguese legislative elections. The results suggest that election year increases in transfers by the central government to municipalities secure added votes, and that these transfers are targeted at jurisdictions where the government faces the risk of losing support.
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Veiga, L.G., Veiga, F.J. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers as pork barrel. Public Choice 155, 335–353 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9863-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9863-2