Abstract
The traditional approach to election design focuses solely on the best method to aggregate the preferences of the voters. But elections are run by institutions, and the interests of the institution may not be reflected in the preferences of the voter. In this comment I discuss how institutional considerations come into play in election design in three areas: political representation, corporate voting, and judging in competitions. As an illustration of this institutional approach I appraise the method by which the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences selects the nominees and winners of the Oscars.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Academy (2011). The history of the Academy. http://www.oscars.org/academy/history-organization/history.html. Accessed 28 March 2011.
Arrow, K. (1963). Social choice and individual values (2nd ed.). New York: Wiley.
Bainbridge, S. (2006). The case for limited shareholder voting rights. UCLA Law Review, 53(3), 601–636.
Balinski, M., & Laraki, R. (2007). A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104(21), 8720–8725.
Balinski, M., & Laraki, R. (2011). Majority judgment: measuring, ranking and electing. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bebchuk, L. (2005). The case for increasing shareholder power. Harvard Law Review, 118(3), 833–914.
Bialik, C. (2009). And the Oscar goes to … Not its voting system. Wall Street Journal. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123388752673155403.html. Accessed 28 March 2011.
Cox, G. (1997). Making votes count-strategic coordination in the world’s electoral systems. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties. New York: Wiley.
Easterbrook, F., & Fischel, D. (1991). The economic structure of corporate law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Hasen, R. (1997). Entrenching the duopoly: why the Supreme Court should not allow the states to protect the Democrats and Republicans from political competition. Supreme Court Review, 1997, 331–372.
Hayden, G., & Bodie, M. (2009). Arrow’s theorem and the exclusive shareholder franchise. Vanderbilt Law Review, 62(4), 1215–1243.
Hochschild, J. (2005). APSA presidents reflect on political science: who knows what, when and how? Perspectives on Politics, 3(2), 309–334.
Issacharoff, S. (2007). Fragile democracies. Harvard Law Review, 120(6), 1405–1467.
Lowell, L. (1897). Governments and parties in continental Europe. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Mulherin, J. H. (2005). Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: one size does not fit all. Public Choice, 124(1–2), 179–204.
Pelizzo, R., & Cooper, J. (2002). Stability in parliamentary regimes: the Italian case. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 27(2), 163–190.
SEC (2010). Facilitating shareholder director nominations. Securities and exchange commission release no. 33-9136. http://sec.gov/rules/final/2010/33-9316.pdf. Accessed 28 March 2011.
Smith, W. (2004). Range voting. http://math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/rangevote.pdf. Accessed 28 March 2011.
Taagepera, R., & Shugart, M. (1989). Seats and votes: the effects and determinants of electoral systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Thompson, R., & Edelman, P. (2009). Corporate voting. Vanderbilt Law Review, 62(1), 129–175.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Edelman, P.H. The institutional dimension of election design. Public Choice 153, 287–293 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9794-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9794-y