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Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all

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Abstract

A review of the theory and evidence on corporate governance indicates several related themes. First, corporate governance is multidimensional. Second, corporate governance is an endogenous response to a firm’s economic environment. Third, the role of different governance mechanisms varies across industries. New analysis of a sample of 1235 US corporations from 40 different industries in the year 2000 confirms the empirical regularities reported in prior research. The central policy implication of the prior research and new supporting evidence is that one size does not fit all in corporate governance.

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  1. Department of Economics, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont, CA, 91711, USA

    J. Harold Mulherin

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Mulherin, J.H. Corporations, collective action and corporate governance: One size does not fit all. Public Choice 124, 179–204 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-4761-0

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