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District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes

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A COMMENTARY TO to this article was published on 27 November 2012

Abstract

Representatives have more effective incentives to cater to the preferences of the majority of citizens when they are elected in districts with few rather than many seats. We investigate this hypothesis empirically by matching Swiss members of parliament’s voting behavior on legislative proposals with real referendum outcomes on the same issues for the years 1996 to 2008. We thus identify the impact of district magnitude on representatives’ incentives to adhere to citizens’ revealed preferences. We find systematic, statistically significant and economically relevant evidence that individual representatives from districts with few seats vote more often in line with majority preferences.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland

    Marco Portmann, David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger

  2. CREMA—Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts, 4052, Basel, Switzerland

    David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger

Authors
  1. Marco Portmann
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  2. David Stadelmann
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  3. Reiner Eichenberger
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Correspondence to David Stadelmann.

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Portmann, M., Stadelmann, D. & Eichenberger, R. District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes. Public Choice 151, 585–610 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9760-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-010-9760-0

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