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Federalism and the shadow economy

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the relationships between federalism and the shadow economy. The theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that the shadow economy is smaller in federal countries than in unitary states. The mobility of individuals among competing jurisdictions leads policy makers to adopt policies that are more efficient in terms of taxation and public good provision. This increases the return for activities in the formal sector relative to those in the informal one, thus reducing activity in the shadow economy. A cross-sectional empirical analysis of a sample of 73 countries confirms this theoretical prediction.

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  1. Department of Law, University of Urbino, Via Matteotti 1, 61029, Urbino, Italy

    Désirée Teobaldelli

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  1. Désirée Teobaldelli
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Teobaldelli, D. Federalism and the shadow economy. Public Choice 146, 269–289 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9590-0

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