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The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

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Abstract

This study identifies the optimal collective decision rule in a dichotomous symmetric setting, allowing for probabilities distortion as originally assumed by Tversky and Kahneman (Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4):297–323, 1992). We show that previous results that identified the weighted majority rule as the optimal one, and did not consider subjective probabilities, are robust to such distortion in the sense that neither the rule nor the weights are changed.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, The University of Haifa, Haifa, 31905, Israel

    Eyal Baharad

  2. Department of Economics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel

    Ruth Ben-Yashar

Authors
  1. Eyal Baharad
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  2. Ruth Ben-Yashar
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ruth Ben-Yashar.

Additional information

We thank Doron Kliger, Shmuel Nitzan, Jacob Paroush, the editor, and two anonymous referees for their useful comments and discussions. The second author acknowledges the support of the Schnitzer Foundation for Research on the Israeli Economy and Society.

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Baharad, E., Ben-Yashar, R. The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion. Public Choice 139, 53–59 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9378-7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9378-7

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