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Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects

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Abstract

Legislative agendas depend on parliamentary procedure, of which there are two main versions and a noteworthy variant: Anglo-American, Euro-Latin, and Mex-Italian. Theorems proved here identify the output of each procedure under strategic and sincere voting. Surprises abound: Strategic voting makes Anglo-American procedure more restrictive than Euro-Latin, and either sort of voting makes Anglo-American procedure more conservative, or stabilizing. Although sincere voting makes Mex-Italian procedure equivalent to the similar-looking Euro-Latin, strategic voting makes it equivalent rather to Anglo-American. Also strategic voting reduces the effects of agenda manipulation only under Mex-Italian procedure. These findings raise new research questions.

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  1. Department of Political Science, UCLA, 4289 Bunche Hall, Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA, 90095-1472, USA

    Thomas Schwartz

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  1. Thomas Schwartz
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Correspondence to Thomas Schwartz.

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Schwartz, T. Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects. Public Choice 136, 353–377 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9300-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-008-9300-3

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