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Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities

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Abstract

Conventional wisdom has it that the absolute (purely negative) veto is ineffective when overridable by a simple majority. That is flatly false. The examples that prove this surprising fact are themselves surprisingly ordinary yet oddly resistant to direct observation. They reveal virtues of a neglected institutional design.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, UCLA, 4289 Bunche Hall, Box 951472, 90095-1472, Los Angeles, CA, USA

    Thomas Schwartz

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  1. Thomas Schwartz
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Correspondence to Thomas Schwartz.

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JEL classification: D71, D72

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Schwartz, T. Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities. Constit Polit Econ 15, 383–389 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-004-7770-y

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-004-7770-y

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