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A race to liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among OECD-economies

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Abstract

Most OECD economies witnessed a liberalization of economic policies over the past thirty years. The present paper examines to what extent this development is caused by domestic political and economic factors on the one hand, and international policy diffusion via competitive interaction of governments on the other. Employing a comprehensive index of economic reform it can be shown that policy diffusion is a driving factor for economic liberalization. Especially in the fields of regulatory, monetary and trade policies we find significant interdependence of policy choices, as suggested by theories of policy diffusion.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO), P.O. Box 91, A-1103, Vienna, Austria

    Hans Pitlik

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  1. Hans Pitlik
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Correspondence to Hans Pitlik.

Additional information

JEL D78, P11, P21

The author is indebted to Ralf Dewenter, Gerhard Wagenhals and two anonymous referees for very helpful comments on a previous version.

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Pitlik, H. A race to liberalization? Diffusion of economic policy reform among OECD-economies. Public Choice 132, 159–178 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-9140-y

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