Abstract
In this paper we analyze the optimal mix between appropriative and defensive activities for goods (goods contest) and appropriative and defensive activities for resources (resource contest). We show that goods contests are qualitatively different from resource contests. It turns out that for plausible cases the resource contest is dominated by the goods contest in the sense that investments are only positive in the latter.
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JEL Classification: D74