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Performance of Water Utilities Evaluated from Different Stakeholders Perspectives: An Application to the Ivorian Sector

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Abstract

In this paper, we model a performance measure of water utilities, considering an undesirable output: the amount of water lost within the network during distribution. We improve three methodological approaches in traditional production technology modeling with an undesirable output. We first adapt the model to the specificities of water production and distribution network. We then extend the analysis to include the economic objectives of three different stakeholders - a regulator that seeks to preserve this natural resource, the operator who wants to maximize his profit, and the consumer who seeks maximum consumption - in the context of a developing country with unfulfilled water demand. Finally, using our model, we estimate the economic value of lost water by its shadow marginal cost, which enables us to evaluate the cost of loss on the water grid in each of the scenarios. We then propose an empirical application for water production in Côte d’Ivoire.

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Notes

  1. In collaboration with “Fondation France Libertés”.

  2. As mentioned by Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008), the main reason for this is that water utilities are supposed to meet a given demand, so the main decision variables to attain efficiency are the level of use of production factors.

  3. In particular those related to repair task (labor and material) as indicated in the introduction.

  4. As mentioned by Kuosmanen, this formulation is nonlinear but its linearization is provided (see Kuosmanen 2005).

  5. Färe and Grosskopf (2010) introduces a slacks-based measure of efficiency based on a directional distance function. They show the correspondence of their slacks-based measure to that obtained by an optimization program incorporating a directional vector whose components are equal to unity or zero depending on the direction of projection on the frontier.

  6. Such problems may manifest in stochastic frontier analysis, relying on Cobb-Douglas or translog production functions.

  7. An armed rebellion broke out in 2002, dividing the country into two parts until 2011. As a result, data was available only on the party under government control. This situation resulted in a deterioration of the DWS infrastructure; thus, the pre-rebellion timeframe better reflected the actual state of DWS in Côte d’Ivoire.

  8. 1 Euro = 656 FCFA.

  9. This is the theoretical maximum capacity.

  10. Extra VC* (€) = difference between the compared models’ optimal variable costs.

  11. One can express it differently by saying: “By rationalizing its production costs, the operator gains 8.02 million euros by losing 18,3 million m3 of billed water”.

  12. Given the scale of the problem, the supervisory ministry created in 2021 an investigation brigade called “Eaux Non Facturées”. Composed of 180 specially trained investigators, the brigade has been operational since March 26, 2021 in Abidjan.

  13. With a view to achieving Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 6, the program “Water for All”, which aims to achieve 100% access to drinking water nationwide by 2030, has been launched.

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Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to Hervé Leleu for helpful methodological comments and estimation expertise on previous version of this paper.

Author contributions

All authors contributed to the study conception and design. Material preparation, data collection and analysis were performed by J-PB, DD and RP. The first draft of the manuscript was written by DD and all authors commented on previous versions of the manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Correspondence to Daouda Diakité.

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Appendix

Appendix

A.1. Dealing with abatement factors in our specific frame.

In the Färe and Grosskopf (2003) we show below the abatement factor θ is equal to the unit.

We have:

$$\begin{array}{l}\left. {\begin{array}{*{20}{c}} {\theta V_{bill}^ \ast = V_{bill} + \delta \Leftrightarrow \theta V_{bill}^ \ast - V_{bill} = \delta } \\ {\theta V_{loss}^ \ast = V_{loss} - \delta \Leftrightarrow \theta V_{loss}^ \ast - V_{loss} = - \delta } \end{array}} \right\}\\ \Leftrightarrow \theta V_{bill}^ \ast - V_{bill} = V_{loss} - \theta V_{loss}^ \ast \\ \Leftrightarrow \theta \left( {V_{bill}^ \ast + V_{loss}^ \ast } \right) = V_{bill} + V_{loss}\end{array}$$

Given \(V_{bill} + V_{loss} = V_{prod} = V_{bill}^ \ast + V_{loss}^ \ast\), hence θ = 1.

In the modified Kuosmanen (2005) and Kuosmanen and Podinovski (2009) model, we can show, equivalently, that DMU-specific abatement factors are also equal to the unit \(\theta _i = 1,\,\forall i \in I,\). In NLP1 we can re-write the first constraint at the optimum as:

$$\mathop {\sum }\limits_{i = 1}^I \theta _i\lambda _iV_{bill_i} + \mathop {\sum }\limits_{i = 1}^I \theta _i\lambda _iV_{loss_i} = V_{bill_o} + \delta + V_{loss_o} - \delta = V_{prod_o}$$
$$\Leftrightarrow \mathop {\sum }\limits_{i = 1}^I \theta _i\lambda _i\left( {V_{bill_i} + V_{loss_i}} \right) = V_{prod_o}$$
$$\Leftrightarrow \mathop {\sum }\limits_{i = 1}^I \theta _i\lambda _iV_{prod_i} = V_{prod_o}$$

At the same time we also have that: \(\mathop {\sum}\nolimits_{i = 1}^I {\lambda _iV_{prod_i}} = V_{prod_o} \Rightarrow \,\theta _i = 1,\,\forall i \in I.\)

A.2. Equivalence between programs LP2 and LP3.

From LP2:

$$\begin{array}{l}\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\mathop {{\max }}\limits_{\lambda ,\delta } \,\delta \\ s.t.\quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jV_{bill_j} = V_{bill_o} + \delta } \\ \quad \quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jV_{loss_j} = V_{loss_o} - \delta } \\ \quad \quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jVC_j \le VC_o} \\ \quad \quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _j = 1} \\ \quad \quad \lambda _j \ge 0\quad \forall j = 1,\,...,\,J\end{array}$$

From the second constraint of LP2, we have:

$$\delta = - \left( {\mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^j {\lambda _jV_{loss_j}} - V_{loss_o}} \right)$$

By reporting the result in the first constraint, we get:

$$\mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jV_{bill_j}} - V_{bill_o} = - \left( {\mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jV_{loss_j}} - V_{loss_o}} \right)$$
$$\mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _j\left( {V_{bill_j} + V_{loss_j}} \right) = V_{bill_o} + V_{loss_o}}$$

Given: \(V_{bill_j} + V_{loss_j} = V_{{\it{Pr}}o{\it{d}}_j},\,\forall \,j = 1, \ldots ,J\)

Hence LP3:

$$\begin{array}{l}\,\,\,\,\,\,\,\mathop {{\max }}\limits_{\lambda ,\delta _1} \,\delta _1\\ s.t.\quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jV_{loss_j} = V_{loss_o} - \delta _1} \\ \quad \quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jV_{prod_j} = V_{prod_o}} \\ \quad \quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _jVC_j \le VC_o} \\ \quad \quad \mathop {\sum}\limits_{j = 1}^J {\lambda _j = 1} \\ \quad \quad \lambda _j \ge 0\quad \forall j = 1,\,...,\,J\end{array}$$

A.3. Descriptive statistics for DRs

Table 10b–k

Table 10 b: DR2 descriptive statistics. c: DR3 descriptive statistics. d: DR4 descriptive statistics. e: DR5 descriptive statistics. f: DR6 descriptive statistics. g: DR7 descriptive statistics. h: DR8 descriptive statistics. i: DR9 descriptive statistics. j: DR10 descriptive statistics. k: DR11 descriptive statistics

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Boussemart, JP., Diakité, D. & Parvulescu, R. Performance of Water Utilities Evaluated from Different Stakeholders Perspectives: An Application to the Ivorian Sector. J Prod Anal 60, 87–105 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-023-00676-1

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