Abstract
The programme for international student assessment (PISA) 2006 Report (OECD, PISA 2006: science competencies for tomorrow’s world, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris in 2007) showed significant differences among Spanish students attending publicly financed schools. Publicly financed schools include entirely public schools and schools that are privately managed but publicly funded. Families with a lower socioeconomic status may self-select into public schools, so a direct efficiency comparison between the two school types could lead to flawed conclusions because of the possible school selection bias. In this paper, we suggest using a propensity score matching approach in order to correctly analyze the impact of school ownership on student performance. After tackling the self-selection problem, we use a stochastic parametric distance function framework to compare student efficiency and productivity in both school types across ten Spanish regions using PISA 2006 data. Furthermore, we propose two original measures to analyze the impact of school ownership on academic performance across regions: the average treatment effect on the treated on the production frontier and the average treatment effect on the treated assuming school inefficiency. We find that, on average, private government-dependent schools are more productive than public schools, although efficiency results across regions are highly divergent.
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Notes
The organizations are mostly Catholic schools, teachers’ cooperatives, non-for-profit organizations or simply private enterprises.
There are also private government-independent schools, controlled by non-government organizations, which receive most of their core funding from student fees. In this paper, we focus only on the publicly financed schools.
An article from EL MUNDO reports that PGDS are on average 69 % more expensive than the public schools. In 87 % of PGDS, it is compulsory for students to wear school uniforms, and services, such as school bus and lunch, are 30 % more expensive than in PS. Moreover, 91 % of PGDS ask for a fee to parents to improve school facilities or to offer some extra-curricular activities while this fee does not exist in PS. http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2012/09/12/espana/1347457645.html (the article is only available in Spanish).
Another possible approach would be to combine stochastic frontier analysis and switching regression (Greene 2010).
Because this analysis is performed at the student level, we refer, throughout this paper, to the efficiency scores obtained by a frontier analysis at student level as technical or educational efficiency and the mean efficiency obtained by a group of students attending the same school type as school inefficiency.
The Cobb Douglas form does not satisfy the concave imposition in the output dimension.
Distance function parameters must satisfy some restrictions like symmetry and homogeneity of degree +1 for outputs, which implies that the distance of the decision-making unit to the boundary of the production set is measured by radial expansions.
A student attending a PS is a counterfactual of a student from a PGDS if both students have similar personal and family characteristics and have a very similar a priori probability of attending PGDS.
Gertler et al. (2011, pp. 109) define the PSM method as follows: “The propensity score matching method tries to mimic the randomized assignment to treatment and comparison groups by choosing for the comparison group those units that have similar propensities to the units in the treatment group. Since propensity score matching is not a real randomized assignment method, but tries to imitate one, it belongs to the category of quasi-experimental methods”.
A relevant assumption for the PSM approach is that possible unobservable variables of students affecting both school ownership choice and results should have the same distribution for the treated and non-treated groups (Imbens 2004). We do think that this is the case for the Spanish educational context.
This method consists of an algorithm that matches the probability of each student attending a PGDS with the PS counterfactual that has the nearest probability (propensity score). There are alternative approaches to the nearest neighbor estimator for obtaining the matches, although the analysis of these alternatives is beyond the scope of this paper. For more information on this topic, see Heckman et al. (1997).
Unconfoundedness also called conditional independence assumption (CIA) implies the independence of \( Y(0),Y(1)\, \)and S conditional on Z.
For an extensive review of this issue, see Caliendo and Kopeing (2008)
We assume that technologies are different and so management drivers differ in the two school types: whereas PGDS teachers are hired and fired by school principals and are managed more flexibly, PS teachers need to pass a very hard state exam and cannot be fired. Our argument is confirmed later in Table 9 where input parameters are generally significantly different for PGDS and PS estimations.
Some divergences in the student results may also be explained by the regional context due to factors like local economic development, employment possibilities, immigrant population, rural area extensions, socioeconomic background of the population or differences among their educational policies.
Note that only school choice variables were considered for the ATT measurement, while school inputs and technology may differ between school types in the real educational production process.
To do this, we perform a radial projection of all students to the estimated production frontier (Eq. 4) assuming also that expected random noise is equal to zero.
Thus, our methodology can provide a wide range of ATTpf and ATTasi measurements according to different student typologies.
As a consequence of the use balancing and common support properties applied to ensure that only students with the same probability of attending PGDS are matched, the total sample size shrinks from 15,918 to 15,123 students.
PSM is generally calculated using Pared, Immigrant and City as control variables, with the exception of Basque Country and Castile-Leon where the balancing property is tested using Hisei is used instead of Pared.
Parental education (Pared) is classified using ISCED (OECD, 2000). Parental education indexes are constructed by recoding educational qualifications into the following categories: (0) None; (1) ISCED 1 (primary education); (2) ISCED 2 (lower secondary); (3) ISCED Level 3B or 3C (vocational/pre-vocational upper secondary); (4) ISCED 3A (upper secondary) and/or ISCED 4 (non-tertiary post-secondary); (5) ISCED 5B (vocational tertiary); and (6) ISCED 5A, 6 (theoretically oriented tertiary and postgraduate).
Hisei is the highest occupational level of either parent according to the International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI). For more details, see Ganzeboom et al. (1992).
According to official Spanish educational statistics captured by MEC (2008), foreign students in non-university education have grown from a total number of 72,335 in 1998 to 695,190 in 2008.
Population size is less than 3,000 for a village, hamlet or rural area; 3,000 to about 15,000 for a small town; 15,000 to about 100,000 for a town; 100,000 to about 1,000,000 for a city and 1,000,000 or over for a large city.
A condition is that all input variables must be continuous and show significant positive correlations within each school type and across all the regions. The remaining control variables are categorical variables (dummies) or do not have a clear significant positive correlation with output (schsize) in our database.
Since the original variable has positive and negative values, we have re-scaled all the values to assure that all the input variables have positive values.
More than 40% of Spanish students had been retained at least once in 2006 (source: PISA 2006 database).
From now on and for presentation purposes we only report the mean results of analyzing the five plausible values in each discipline.
In PS from Cantabria performance is also better for reading and science, but these differences were found not to be statistically significant.
One hundred distance functions were estimated (five estimations by two school types by ten regions), although, for simplicity’s sake, these tables are not published in this paper. They are all available upon request from the authors.
Notice that the sign of the first-order input parameters may be changed in order to provide a straightforward analysis of output-input elasticities.
This produces three predicted values (mathematics, reading and science), one for each distance function estimation.
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Acknowledgments
This paper owes a debt to Joaquín Artés and Sergio Perelman for their valuable comments and encouragement. We also thank Boris Bravo-Ureta, Astrid Cullmann, Antonio Estache and two anonymous referees for helpful discussions and suggestions. The authors received financial support from the Spanish Government, Ministry of Science and Innovation, Projects ECO-2009-13864-C03-01 and ECO-2009-13864-C03-02 and research grants from the Junta de Extremadura (research group SEJ015).
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Crespo-Cebada, E., Pedraja-Chaparro, F. & Santín, D. Does school ownership matter? An unbiased efficiency comparison for regions of Spain. J Prod Anal 41, 153–172 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-013-0338-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11123-013-0338-y