Abstract
Biological weapons are considered, by the international community, as a weapon of mass destruction. When the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was negotiated during the 1960s and early 1970s, the negotiators considered unnecessary the establishment of an international organisation to supervise the implementation of the Convention’s provisions by the State parties. It is important to highlight that since the entry into force of the BWC, the international situation has significantly changed. For this reason perhaps the moment has arrived to consider again the proposal of settling down such an organisation in the framework of the strengthening the BWC.
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Notes
Biological weapons consist of biological agents and the munitions, equipment, or means employed in their delivery. (Tulliu and Schmalberger 2003).
The Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices; prohibits also the use of bacteriological methods of warfare, and commits the parties to exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the Protocol. (WMD Commission’s report 2006).
In 2009, the BWC has 163 State parties – fewer than either the NPT or the CWC. Thirteen States have signed but not ratified the Convention, while 19 States have neither signed nor ratified it.
The BWC entered into force on 26 March 1975. During World War I an attempt was made by German forces to use pathogens for the purpose of sabotage. During World War II, biological weapons were used by the Japanese military forces in attacks and in experiments conducted against wartime opponents. During the war, other States also conducted biological warfare research.
See the BWC’s text for additional information.
Other States considered that the OPCW should be the international organisation designated to supervise the implementation of the BWC’s provisions by the State parties.
Perhaps when all chemical weapons and chemical weapon production facilities are already destroyed, this proposal could have more chance to be accepted by the OPCW’s Member States.
A SIU has been created within the United Nations’ Secretariat with the purpose to deal with some of the activities mentioned in point 3.
The Scientific Advisory Board should be established even in the case that no agreement could be reached regarding the establishment of a new international organisation to supervise the implementation of the Convention’s provisions in the coming years.
The final VEREX’s report containing a set of recommendations was presented to a Special Conference of States Parties in 1994. The Conference agreed to develop a legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness of the BWC in the field of disarmament.
Negotiations on a verification protocol began in 1995 and continued through 2001, when they were brought to a sudden halt by the withdrawal of the USA’s support. For additional information see the VEREX’s report.
The OPBW can assume this responsibility in the most effective manner, once established.
The experience in the work of UNSCOM and UNMOVIC could be also very useful in this regards.
The universality of the BWC should go hand by hand with the universality of the CWC, in order to ensure that no chemical and biological weapons are in the military arsenals of any State under any circumstance.
In the absence of the OPBW, Annual Meetings of State Parties of the BWC should be supported. The main purpose of these meetings is to review the implementation of the BWC’s provisions by all State parties.
References
Ad hoc group of governmental experts to identify and examine potential verification measures from a scientific and technical standpoint; VEREX’s report, UBWC/CONF.III/VEREX/8; United Nations; 24 September 1993.
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Text of the Biological Weapon Convention of 1972; p. 1–5.
Tulliu, S., & Schmalberger, T. (2003). Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arm Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building. UNIDIR /2003/22, 2003, pp. 1–240.
Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Arms, Weapon of Mass Destruction Commission, final report, Stockholm, Sweden, 1 June 2006; pp. 1–227.
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Morales Pedraza, J. The Need to Establish the Organisation for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons: A Proposal for the Future. Public Organiz Rev 12, 57–70 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-011-0156-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11115-011-0156-5