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Impact of BB84 QKD transmitter’s parameter mismatch on secure key generation rate

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Abstract

In principle, BB84 protocol supports secure quantum communication by assuming transmitter and receiver devices to be ideal. However, practically it is very challenging to build an ideal single photon source and detector. These imperfections in practical devices (i.e., wavelength mismatch, full width at half maximum pulse width mismatch and different arrival times of photon) lead to side-channel attacks. In this work, we have analyzed the wavelength mismatch and pulse width mismatch issues associated with four laser-diode based practical BB84 transmitter. An asymptotically achievable rate for extraction of secure key (also known as key generation rate) is estimated from side-channel leakage calculation between transmitter (Alice) and adversary (Eve).

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Data availibility

The data shown in Fig. 3 are measured in our laboratory and hence, reported first time in IEEE ANTS 2022 conference paper, and now, we are submitting same data in this special issue of Photonic Network Communications journal. In Fig. 8, we have taken one of the laser beam power characteristics from Fig. 3 and make \(+1nm\) shift in the same cure to show worst case calculation. The data shown in Fig. 4 are extracted from work [10] with the help of webplotdigitizer [15].

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Correspondence to Pragya Kushwaha.

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This paper is the extended version of the work presented in IEEE International conference on Advanced Networks and Telecommunications Systems (ANTS) 2022 [1].

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Kushwaha, P., Jain, A., Varma, P. et al. Impact of BB84 QKD transmitter’s parameter mismatch on secure key generation rate. Photon Netw Commun (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11107-023-01010-3

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